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CONTENTS

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New Pages of Leniniana	1
Nature of the New 5-Year Plan; Thoughts on a Topical Problem [L. Abalkin; pp 10-19]	6
Once Again About Food Imports [D. Bulatov; pp 20-21]	12
Are Balances Real? [A. Volkov, A. Samokhvalov; pp 22-23]	13
'...For Advice and Resolution of Important Matters' [O. Kuprin; pp 24-33]	15
'Ready to Sacrifice Everything for the Sake of Truth' [R. Rolland; pp 34-37]	22
Rule of Law: From Idea to Practice [M. Baglay; pp 38-47]	24
Paradoxes or New Trends? Unity and Pluralism of Industrial Forms [Yu. Olsevich; pp 48-57]	30
Greater Innovation and Daring [A. Ivanov, N. Kirabayev, et al.; pp 58-61]	37
Listening To One Another. KOMMUNIST, KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII, KOMMUNIST ESTONII, and KOMMUNIST (Lithuania) Roundtable [pp 62-80]	40
Letters to the Editors [pp 81-91]	59
There Is an Opinion [A. Vasilyev; pp 92-96]	68
Climate and Economic Management Priorities [G. Golitsyn; pp 97-105]	72
China's Economic Reform [pp 106-113]	77
Seven Days in Tehran [M. Stepanyants; pp 114-123]	84
Based on the Vienna Mandate [V. Drobkov; pp 124-125]	91
Short Book Reviews [pp 126-127]	92
After Publication in KOMMUNIST [pp 127-128]	94
Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors [pp 128]	94
Publication Data	95

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New Pages of Leniniana

18020012a Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6,
Apr 89 (signed to press 4 Apr 89) pp 3-9

[Text] The following documents pertain to one of the most important events in the history of the party and in V.I. Lenin's activities—the January 1910 RSDWP Central Committee Plenum.

The defeat of the First Russian Revolution led to a decline in the struggle waged by the working class, to a crisis and even to a partial breakdown of the social democratic movement. Different assessments of the situation were voiced within the party, and it was on such grounds that the factional struggle intensified. Within the ideological and political trends which existed at that time in the RSDWP—bolsheviks, otzovists, ultimatists, menshevik-liquidationists and menshevik-party supporters, and conciliationists—the liquidationists represented the extreme right. They demanded that all clandestine party organizations be disbanded, that the forces be maximally concentrated on legal work and that the RSDWP Central Committee be turned into an information center. The position of the otzovists and ultimatists, who left the bolshevik faction and which set up their own independent VPERED group was, as described by V.I. Lenin, "liquidationism from the left," and "upside-down menshevism." They called for the withdrawal of the social democratic faction from the 3rd State Duma and deemed the use of any kind of legal forms of RSDWP activities impossible; this was bound to weaken their ties with the masses.

The factional struggle put the RSDWP on the brink of division. The labor movement, however, needed a strong, a united party. The task of rallying all party forces on a revolutionary basis remained primary. The ways and means of solving the problem were discussed at the 5th (all-Russian) RSDWP Conference in December 1908 and at the June 1909 Conference of the PROLETARIY expanded editorial board. The 2-23 January (15 January-5 February) 1910 "Unification" RSDWP Central Committee Plenum was an important landmark in the struggle for party unity. In assessing its role and significance to the RSDWP, V.I. Lenin wrote: "It definitively established the tactical line of the party for the period of counterrevolution; it stipulated in the development of the December 1908 resolutions that both liquidationism and otzovism were manifestations of the influence of the bourgeoisie on the proletariat. The plenum further formulated the question of the elimination of factions within our party, i.e., of the need to establish real unity

within the Worker Social Democratic Party, in connection with determining the party's ideological and political tasks for that specific historical period" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 20, p 26).

Fourteen voting members participated in the work of the plenum (bolsheviks: I.P. Goldenberg, I.F. Dubrovinskiy, G.Ye. Zinovyev and V.P. Nogin; mensheviks: B.I. Gorev, N.N. Zhordaniya, A.S. Martynov and N.V. Ramishvili; VPERED: V.L. Shantser; Polish social democrats: J. Tyshka and A. Varskiy; Latvian social democrats: M. Ozolin; The Bundt: I.L. Ayzenshtadt and F.M. Koygen); there were five participants in advisory capacity (bolsheviks: V.I. Lenin and L.B. Kamenev; mensheviks: Yu.O. Martov; VPERED: A.A. Bogdanov; Vienna PRAVDA: L.D. Trotsky).

All items on the agenda of the Central Committee meeting were subordinated to the single objective of eliminating the division within the party. The purpose was to solve this problem through organizational steps as well as the search for an ideological-political compromise. The unprecedented 3-week duration of the plenum was an indication of the complexity of the problems which were discussed and the violence of the struggle.

The plenum adopted a number of essentially important decisions. Particularly important was the resolution on "State of Affairs in the Party," which established the tactical line of the proletariat and the ideological and political tasks of the social democratic movement. The resolution proclaimed the need for the restoration of the organizational unity of the RSDWP through the "elimination of factionalism, and abolishing all more or less organized factions and converting them into trends which do not violate unity in party activities."

In order to achieve this objective, the resolution "On Factional Centers" called for closing down the publications of the bolshevik and menshevik newspapers PROLETARIY and GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA, and the disbanding of the Bolshevik Center. It was recommended that the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, which was the party's central organ, also publish articles the views of whose authors which it could share only in their general line and as a whole, while disagreeing on particulars. In order to rally all literary forces regardless of trends, the decision was made to start a nonperiodical "Discussion Collection," which could deal with the most pressing problems of party policy and tactics. The editors of the collection would consist of one representative of each trend and of national social democratic organizations.

Although we have the full text of the plenum's resolution, unfortunately we do not have its minutes. This has made it necessary to collect and reconstruct data on the plenum on a peace-meal basis, through second-hand documents and testimony.

It is precisely such sources that include the note drafted by V.I. Lenin and G.Ye. Zinovyev, entitled "Plenary Meeting of the Party's Central Committee," the correspondence among G.Ye. Zinovyev, Yu.O. Martov and A. Varskiy, members of the editorial board, on the subject of the publication of this note, and the report by the special assignments official of the minister of internal affairs to the director of the police department on the RSDWP Central Committee Plenum, which was held in Paris, and on its resolutions.

The value of this selection is, above all, that the letter which Zinovyev sent to Varskiy enables us to determine the authorship of the information note on the plenum, which was published in the central organ, and which was traditionally considered an editorial article. It was drafted by Lenin and Zinovyev, who were closely cooperating at that time as members of the SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT editorial board. By interpreting this note as an authored document, we can determine the items in the plenum on which Lenin focused his attention and the ones he considered the most important.

The documents enrich our concepts on the course of the January Plenum and the subsequent events, and provide essential information on the consideration of the plenum on the problems on which no resolution was passed and on which, consequently, we have no accurate data. It is a question, above all, of the activities of the social democratic faction in the Duma and its views in the discussion on the persecution of trade unions, which took place at the session of the 3rd State Duma.

The essence of the matter is the following: in April 1908 the social democratic faction raised the question of the gross violations by the tsarist government of the 4 March 1906 law which allowed trade union activities in Russia. For about a year the question was not released by the Duma Commission and it was only in November 1909 that the debate on this topic began. In their speeches, the members of the government denied the accuracy of the facts presented by the social democratic deputies on the persecution of trade unions, and misrepresented the resolution of the 5th (London) RSDWP Congress and the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International. However, the obvious misrepresentation of party and international social democratic documents was not properly refuted by N.S. Chkheidze, I.P. Pokrovskiy and G.S. Kuznetsov, who represented the social democratic faction.

The error of the social democrats at the Duma was acknowledged almost unanimously by the participants in the January Plenum. They expressed their agreement with the viewpoint of the bolsheviks, which was to use the trade unions for political work among the masses. Unwilling to acknowledge the error of the mensheviks, and supported by F.I. Dan, Yu.O. Martov spoke out against including information on this matter in the

information note on the plenum. Although with reservations, his motion was seconded by A. Varskiy. The information noted drafted by Lenin and Zinovyev is now published in its entirety.

The documents make it possible to refine the deployment of forces among the editors of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. By decision of the January Plenum, the central organ included Lenin and Zinovyev for the bolsheviks, Dan and Martov, from the mensheviks, and Varskiy from the SDKPiL. Despite the agreement reached by the factions to work jointly, during the first sessions the atmosphere among the editors was quite tense. The nature of the decisions which were made frequently depended on Varskiy's views. As a rule, he shared the viewpoint of the bolsheviks and tried to act strictly in accordance with the resolutions of the plenum. The following letters help to look at the events of that time through the eyes of the direct participants, to sense their moods and the emotional background of internal party relations.

These documents are filed in the Central Party Archive of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism the archives of the editorial board of the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, and at the Central State Archives of the October Revolution of the USSR, in the police department file.

The publication of these materials was prepared by L. Kosheleva, L. Rogova and N. Tarasova, associates at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

Note by V.I. Lenin and G.Ye. Zinovyev on the January 1910 RSDWP Central Committee Plenum (Previously Unpublished Passages Set in Italics)¹

Plenary Meeting of the Party's Central Committee

The plenary meeting of our party's Central Committee was concluded recently, after a considerable interruption. It was attended by 14 comrades with voting rights. The entire editorial board of the central organ and one of the Central Committee candidates,² elected at the London Congress, were present in a nonvoting advisory capacity. Furthermore, a representative of the newspaper PRAVDA was allowed to attend in an advisory capacity. Comrade Plekhanov, who had been invited to attend in an advisory capacity was unable to come for reasons of poor health.

Following are the plenum's resolutions subject to publication. They will give the readers an idea on the work of the plenum. The Central Committee paid a great deal of attention to the work of the Duma. It was made clear that the local party organizations and party publications are still doing extremely little to promote this important area of work to a suitable level. The materials reaching the Duma faction remain very few. So far the use of the speeches made by the social democratic deputies has not

been organized on a somewhat systematic basis. *The plenum unanimously noted a significant improvement in the basic line of the Duma faction in the past year. Among the latest speeches at the Duma faction, the recent speech on the persecution of trade unions was singled out for particularly detailed discussion. The virtually entire Central Committee (all bolshevik comrades, all "national" social democrats,³ and some of the menshevik comrades) acknowledged that in this case the faction made a major error: it did not speak out quite clearly against the "neutralism" and in defense of the party position as defined by the Stuttgart and London resolutions. Wishes were expressed for this error to be corrected in the next addresses.*

All comrades acknowledged the need for drafting a number of bills on the labor problem.

Because of the partial loss of workers elected to the central institution at the London Congress, the Central Committee unanimously acknowledged the need to co-opt people so that those co-opted may be ratified at the following party-wide conference.

It was resolved to make all the necessary efforts to organize the publication of LETUCHIY LISTOK TsK RSDRP⁴ in Russia and to increase, in general, party agitation-propaganda literary publications.

Unanimous approval was given of a number of steps aimed at restoring the true unity of the party organization in Russia and abroad and the elimination of factional exclusivity and factional struggle. Holding a Russian-wide conference was considered the main forthcoming practical task and it was decided that work on convening it be started **immediately**.

Several reports from the local areas were heard. We shall try to publish the parts of such reports which can be published in the central organ.⁵

The Central Committee, together with the editors of the central organ, sent greetings to A. Bebel on the occasion of his birthday.⁶

Such were the most important resolutions adopted by the Central Committee.⁷

TsPA IML, f. 28, op. 1, d. 117

Handwritten by Z.I. Lilina⁸, proofed by G.Ye. Zinovyev.

G.Ye. Zinovyev's Letter to A. Varskiy

(21 (8) February 1910, Paris)⁹

Dear Comrade:

Following is the text of the actual note on the Central Committee, submitted by me and Comrade Lenin (to be included before the resolution of the Central Committee). I submitted the text to Comrade Martov more than a week ago but he sent it back, together with a letter, which I received only this morning. Also attached is Comrade Martov's letter so that you will see what precisely he suggests to be deleted. Considering your absence, we shall have to take a poll.¹⁰ Lenin and I absolutely insist that this passage be retained.... (I was unable to ask Dan but probably Comrade Martov is speaking on his behalf as well). We would like to have your opinion, above all **immediately**, in order not to delay the publication. Therefore, the moment you receive this express letter **able immediately** a single word, "yes" or "no."

We expect an immediate cable.

With comradely greetings, Grigoriy, editorial secretary, Monday.

Following is a copy of Comrade Martov's letter:

20 February

U.T.! I firmly disagree with including in the actual notes on the plenum one-sided interpretations of reports on events about which the plenum has not passed resolution on their publication. By this I mean debates on the trade unions and the faction. Leaving aside the nature of the presentation of particulars, let me point out that the question was raised more broadly at the plenum: the discussion was not only about the speeches of the faction but also the attacks which the central organ launched against it on this subject. These attacks were evaluated in the speeches as clearly as the address itself. We have no reason whatsoever to single out among all the debates at the plenum precisely those dealing with the faction, while nothing is being reported on the discussions concerning the management of the central organ, the activities of the ZBTsK,¹¹ the activities of the bolshevik center, etc. Singling out and publishing precisely the debates which criticize the activities of the Duma, while keeping silent about the rest, is of a clearly factional nature and could be used as proof that the central organ is pursuing that same line which was condemned by everyone (other than the editors) at the plenum, much more unanimously than the line followed by the Duma faction.

I therefore suggest to delete from your notes the entire section beginning with "it was unanimously noted" to "on the workers problem." If you disagree with my view we must call a general editorial meeting. This is a very important problem: if the central organ would published debates which were not concluded with the adoption of a resolution, nothing would prevent anyone from publishing debates on which a resolution was passed, although not intended for publication.

I have no remarks whatsoever to make concerning the text of the letter (about the conference).¹²

With comradely greetings, L. Martov.

Dear Comrade Adolf!¹³ Two words: unofficially from me and from Lenin.

Martov accurately notes that the incident is important: essentially, his letter may be reduced to the following: if you mention our errors on the matter of the trade unions we will delete the exes.¹⁴ To put it mildly, this is political extortion. Please note that on the matter of the trade unions the Bundt, Kostrov,¹⁵ and, to a certain extent, Petr¹⁶ were with us. If now Martov would organize a "benefit" on this matter, that is perfect. What is "factional" in the words which he suggests to be deleted? Nothing. No concession must be made here. If an actual note is being drafted, add it to the resolution, and we should write accurately about everything important, about which no resolutions were passed. The need for such notes was acknowledged by Martov himself. The question of the trade unions was singled out at the plenum itself. There were special debates and now they are being kept quiet to suit Dan (as in the text)..., whereas one-half of the mensheviks were with us. Furthermore, the note itself mentions this in a most calm and impartial tone.

We expect of you unconditionally a cable "for." Do not delay your answer: we are holding the publication.

What pain and what delay accompany each word (as in the original)...

I shake your hand, Grigoriy

TsPA IML, f. 28, op. 1, d. 111

Written by G.Ye. Zinovyev

A. Varskiy's Letter to the Editors of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT

Zurich, 24 February 1910

To the editors of the central organ.

Dear Comrades:

It was only last night that I received the express letter sent by the editorial secretary, i.e., a copy of Comrade Martov's letter on the subject of the note concerning the plenum, the note itself and a letter asking of me to say something for or against Comrade Martov's motion. I cabled this morning the following: "Against the text concerning the parliamentary group" (contre texte concernant groupe parlementaire) (the text in the cable was in French), i.e., **I voted for Comrade Martov's motion.** Here is why: debates on the social democratic faction in the State Duma were not entered in a separate resolution

in the plenum and this fact alone gives every member of the central organ the unquestionable official right to demand that the respective part of the note be deleted or else to say that the debates, in his view, were not all that important as described in the note, for these debates were not included in the minutes.

In essence, however, the author of the note has unquestionably accurately assessed these debates as an expression of the views of a very impressive majority of the Central Committee on the question of the attitude of the party toward the trade unions. This fact morally obligates the editors of the central organ to bear in mind that the party shares entirely the viewpoint expressed at the London Congress and that whenever this question faces the editors, whether on the subject of the speeches of the social democratic faction at the State Duma or on any other subject, taking into consideration the views of the Central Committee Plenum, the editors must and are morally obligated, more than ever before, to support the viewpoint of the London Congress.

For that reason **I firmly object to the threat to which Comrade Martov is resorting by demanding the deletion of the corresponding excerpt.** I do not wish to qualify this inadmissible method which means that if the central organ deems it necessary to emphasize or even to mention that the party supports the viewpoint of the London Congress on the question of the trade unions, at any time Comrade Martov will give himself the right to expose one or another circumstance from the life of the party or of a certain segment of the party, which has nothing in common with the party's tasks and has already been decided once and for all by the plenum, as something in the past and publicly presented in the resolution. Party policy is one thing and events from the past not pertaining to the current party tasks, something entirely different. Comrade Martov's threats are nothing other than a **manifestation of extreme factionalism, seeking inadmissible reasons for acting against party unity.**

With comradely greetings, Varskiy.

TsPA IML, f. 28, op. 1, d. 114

Handwritten by A. Varskiy

From the Report by the Special Assignments Official of the Minister of Internal Affairs to the Director of the Police Department

Top secret.

On the basis of the instructions dated 28 and 29 January, Nos 104886 and 105202, I beg to submit to Your Excellency the following information on the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which was held in Paris between 15 January and 5 February, new style.

As to the Duma faction, no special resolutions were passed and the Central Committee Plenum did not deal with it especially. In the course of the debates on the resolution concerning the "situation within the party," the mensheviks, represented by Martov and Martynov accused the bolsheviks of undermining the confidence in the social democratic faction in the Duma through their articles in PROLETARIY and the central organ, on the subject of the clashes which occurred in the State Duma between members of the government and the social democratic faction—the deputy Chkheidze. After that, all participants in the plenum expressed views which firmly justified the position held by PROLETARIY and the central organ, reprimanding deputy Chkheidze and the entire Duma faction for their error in choosing the view they held against the representative of the government, the more so since the resolutions at the Stuttgart International Congress and, particularly, the resolution at the Stockholm Unification Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, clearly favored the revolutionizing of the trade unions. Therefore, although no vote was taken on this problem, only two people spoke in favor of Chkheidze: "Martov" and "Martynov."

Chkheidze did not participate in the meetings of the plenum, for he was not in Paris.

Krasilnikov, special assignments official.

No 282, Paris, 6/19 February 1910

TsGAOR SSSR, f. 102, (Dp) OO, 1910, d. 5, l. 240-241

Footnotes

1. With the exception of the text set in italics, published in the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, No 11, 13 (26) February 1910.

2. Reference to A.A. Bogdanov.

3. Reference to the representatives of the SDKPiL (Ya. Tyshka and A. Varskiy), SDLK (M. Ozolin) and the Bundt (F.M. Koygen and I.L. Ayzenshtadt) who attended the plenum, and who were members of the RSDWP as territorial organizations by decision of the 4th (Unification) RSDWP Congress.

4. Probably referring to resuming the publication of LETUCHIYE LISTKI TsK RSDRP, which came out irregularly between June and September 1905, with a view to explaining current tactical and organizational problems of party activities in accordance with the resolutions of the 3rd RSDWP Congress.

5. Judging by the plenum's agenda, reports were heard at the meetings submitted by the central committees of the national organizations. However, the central organ published only the report by the representative of the SDLK "The Situation With Party Work in the Latvian Area" (SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, No 12, 23 March (5 April) 1910).

6. A. Bebel (1840-1913) was one of the founders and leaders of the German Social Democrats and the Second International. Bebel's 70th birthday was extensively noted by the International Social Democratic Movement in 1910.

7. Subsequently SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT published the plenum's resolutions.

8. Z.I. Lilina (1882-1929), RSDWP member since 1902, G.Ye. Zinovyev's wife.

9. The date of the letter established by the authors of the publication.

10. On 20 February 1910 A. Varskiy left Paris for Zurich for a few days.

11. The foreign bureau of the RSDWP Central Committee (ZBTsK) was established by the RSDWP Central Committee Plenum in August 1908 as a general party mission abroad. It consisted of three people. Its obligations were to maintain constant contacts with the Russian bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Committee members working abroad, and monitor the activities of groups abroad which were working together with the RSDWP and to organize the collection of funds abroad in support of the RSDWP Central Committee.

12. The "Letter to the Party Organizations," signed by the RSDWP Central Committee was published in issue No 11 of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT.

13. Adolf Varskiy.

14. The word exes indicated expropriations, which were conducted to supply funds for the party. Essentially, these were armed robberies of banks, mail carriages, and steamships. The armed robbery of the Tiflis Treasury became particularly notorious. It contributed to the party cash more than 300,000 rubles. This "ex" was carried out by a revolutionary fighting group which included Kamo (S.A. Ter-Petrosyan), J.V. Stalin and L.B. Krasin, head of the "combat technical group of the Central Committee," participated in planning the coup. The expropriation of funds was prohibited by the 4th RSDWP Congress (1906) and the RSDWP Central Committee plenums (August and December 1908).

15. N.N. Zhordaniya.

16. N.V. Ramishvili.

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Nature of the New 5-Year Plan; Thoughts on a Topical Problem

18020012b Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 6, Apr 89 (signed to press 4 Apr 89) pp 10-19

[Article by Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, academician, USSR Academy of Sciences, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics]

[Text] The fate of perestroika greatly depends on the nature of the 13th 5-Year Plan. We are not referring to the figures but to the type, the model of the 5-year plan and its consistency with the nature and depth of changes occurring in society.

A Time for Thought and Action

The time which has been allocated for drafting the new 5-year plan is shrinking with every passing month like a piece of shagreen leather. We must think and act energetically, for otherwise the forces of inertia will prevail.

The task is complicated by the need to formulate alternate choices (concepts) which will define the basic trends of economic and social development in the first half of the 1990s. The point is not only that the existence of alternate options is a real base for a democratic plan formulation procedure. The main thing is that social development is multivariant. Society always has a certain freedom of choice, taking into consideration the entire variety of social, national, and economic interests and domestic and international factors. A comparison among them, and "weighing" them on the scale of public opinion open the way to optimal decisions. All of this reduces even further the remaining time for work on the 5-year plan. If we waste it, the purely mechanical process of its drafting and adoption will become inevitable and the question of alternate options will vanish by itself.

In the time left before the 5-year period begins we must prepare a reliable starting ground for it. A loose and brittle ground makes a start difficult. Steady efforts are needed to improve the economy and to reduce (unless we can totally eliminate) disproportions, and to streamline monetary circulation.

Obviously, the forthcoming congress of people's deputies will have to discuss and adopt a program of emergency steps to improve the country's national economy and to amend this year's plan and budget. This can be accomplished in the course of the debates on the program of activities of the new government. Armed with the congress' vote of confidence, it would be able to act confidently and energetically.

A realistic assessment of the situation makes it clear that not all the accumulated problems which can be resolved in the next 2 years. Therefore, some of them will have to be included in the new 5-year period, and this will predetermine its features and content. Nonetheless, we must clearly realize that the success of the 13th 5-Year

Plan will depend on the extent to which we have been able to improve the economy. If we waste this time, the forthcoming 5 years as well will not yield the expected results.

The 13th 5-Year Plan must not only solve "its own" problems but also lay the foundations for the implementation of long-term large-scale socioeconomic, scientific and technical, and ecological programs. We cannot ignore present concerns, that which is dictated by current events. However, nor should we forget the future, for most of today's economic difficulties, from food supplies, housing and services to the state of education, medicine and the ecology, are the result of the fact that in the past current interests had prevailed over long-term ones, and that the future was sacrificed for the sake of instant advantages. Social shortsightedness is incompatible with a planned strategy for the revolutionary renovation of society.

Clearing the starting grounds has yet another aspect. In shaping the concept and the main outlines of the new 5-year plan we must get rid of anything which hinders the making of the most progressive and efficient decisions. Today such limiting factors are the numerous resolutions, which stipulate in advance assignments and volumes of capital investments for the forthcoming 5 years and, in frequent cases, for longer periods of time. If we accept them as inviolable, there is virtually no opportunity to maneuver.

The question of how and why such resolutions are being passed and the extent to which they are basically admissible prior to the adoption of a general concept or, perhaps, even an outline of the next 5-year plan has a significance all its own. Today we must clearly realize that without blocking the effects of all already adopted resolutions, (however prestigious the authorities which backed them may have been) it is simply impossible to formulate a considered, realistic, and efficient plan. We must choose: either move along by inertia or else take radical steps to restructure the economy and define our priorities.

The next 5-year plan will be drafted and implemented under conditions influenced by profound socioeconomic changes. Ownership relations are becoming more varied; concerns, cooperative forms, leasing relations, regional cost accounting, and many others are making their appearance. Some of these changes have already become reality while other will take place in the immediate future. Such changes will keep taking place throughout the entire 13th 5-year period on an even greater scale and in forms difficult to anticipate. The interpretation of such changes, added to the uncertainty factor will become necessary prerequisites in converting to a qualitatively new model of the 5-year plan.

The question of coordinating, of synchronizing the structure and content of the plan with the other elements of the economic mechanism needs a weighed solution. The experience of recent years has indicated how detrimental to the economy could be the lack of coordination among them. From its very first steps, the restructuring of the management system had to face the pre-reform structure of the 12th 5-year period, which was one of the main reasons for the fact that the economic reform got stuck. This must become a lesson to us.

The difficulty of such coordination is worsened by the fact that, in all likelihood, substantial economic differences will separate the actual economic conditions which will prevail at the beginning and the end of the 13th 5-year period. Therefore, the instruments of the economic mechanism as well cannot remain fixed. It is clear, for example, that at the beginning of the 1990s stabilizing the situation on the consumer market will be unlikely. In wholesale trade as well we should be able to take no more than the very first steps (with quite energetic efforts at that). Toward the end of the 5-year plan it will be necessary to complete, in its essential features, the shaping of a socialist market in means of production and consumer goods.

What should we proceed from in formulating the economic mechanism of the 5-year plan? If we absolutize the starting base, in the course of time its instruments will become a restraint and a hindrance. Nor can we adopt as a base the probable resulting situation. This involves a real contradiction which must be realized and taken soberly into consideration in decision making. The problem can be largely solved by adopting a different model for the 5-year plan itself, eliminating rigidity and one-sidedness and contemplating the rejection of the customary stipulation of assignments and directives.

What Do the New Approaches Dictate?

The need for a conversion to a new model of the 5-year plan is determined by the radical changes in the structure of reproduction and sources of economic growth and the updating of the entire system of socialist production relations. At the present time the very essence of the sources of economic growth is changing; qualitatively new technologies and means of creation of labor objects are appearing; information is becoming a most important resource and radical changes are taking place in the conditions governing the interaction between man and his habitat. The many faults which existed in the past approaches to economic growth have been revealed. This applies, above all, to the deficit type of economic growth which prevailed throughout the virtually entire history of our planning. There is no longer any doubt that the chronic economic shortages (which can be traced to the familiar concept that in our country, allegedly, unlike capitalism, demand should outstrip supply) are one of the most profound deformations of socialism.

An economy based on shortages cannot be efficient. This is not an axiom but a social theorem proven through historical experience. However, it is not a question exclusively of purely economic consequences. Shortages and the related distribution system violate social justice, lead to the omnipotence of the administrative apparatus and undermine the foundations of individual freedoms. Without converting to a balanced economic growth the new quality of the economy cannot be secured. Today the requirement of full and efficient balancing of the plan, including the creation of the necessary reserves, becomes a categorical imperative of perestroika. In this case there must be no compromise or concessions to departmental or parochial pressure. Only under such circumstances could the establishment of a socialist market and the use of its instruments become possible in upgrading production efficiency. Naturally, given the existence of a market, the nature of the plan as well should be different.

A conversion to balanced growth and elimination of scarcity would enable us to include in the economic mechanism and provide a real economic content to commodity-monetary relations and thus eliminate their formal aspect, which is used merely for accountability purposes. Actually, as a universal equivalent, money must have the ability freely to be exchanged for any variety of consumer value. Unless this exists and unless exchange is taking place indirectly through a variety of regulatory instruments (stocks, ceilings, etc.), neither money nor the categories related to it can perform their functions.

The establishment of full cost accounting and self-financing and the development of leasing relations and new forms of cooperation, and broadening the autonomy of republics and local soviets radically changed the socioeconomic prerequisites for planning. The regulation concerning the enterprise as the basic unit in the national economy and the socialist commodity producer, included in the Law on the State Enterprise, must be fully implemented in the forthcoming 13th 5-year period. Consequently, the methods for issuing planned assignments to enterprises must become essentially different. For example, if the volume of output and profits and the growth of labor productivity are given merely as recommendations to the enterprises and as control figures, the need for their ratification on all other levels is eliminated. At that point we can no longer mandatorily define the volumes of capital investments for the national economy or for individual sectors and republics. So far, however, this has been the main content and bearing structure of the plan.

Adding to these changes which are occurring in the national economic sector the growing variety of types and models of ownership and economic management methods, including nongovernmental ones, the need for a new type of plan becomes even clearer. The conversion of the economies of Union republics to the principles of self-financing and self-management follows the same way.

However, it is not a question merely of the variety of existing economic forms but also of the substantially undefined nature of the development of organizational economic structures. A process of developing socialist concerns has been initiated, as intersectorial state associations without any direct sectorial affiliation. For the time being, three such concerns have been created. How many of them will there be at the beginning and the end of the 5-year period? Will sectorial ministries be retained or will structures such as voluntary associations develop? If today we find it impossible to provide an answer to such questions, it becomes even less admissible to draft a 5-year plan on the level of the existing ministries.

On Unity Between Words and Actions

The basic approaches to the new plan model took shape as part of the theoretical concept of the radical reform in the management system and methods. Therefore, at this point we must not begin from scratch. Naturally, life makes its corrections to the initial concept and reveals the difficulties of the transition even more sharply. What matters, however, is that the basic line has been defined.

The series of basic assumptions and political concepts drafted by the party over the past 3 years are of particular significance. This applies, above all, to the concept of the new quality of growth, which was formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress. Its core was to shift the center of attention from quantitative indicators to quality and efficiency, and from intermediary to end results, from expanding production assets to their updating, and from increasing fuel and raw material resources to improving their use and accelerating the development of science-intensive sectors and of the production and social infrastructures.

The materials of the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum contained an essential assessment of the administrative-command management system. This assessment proved its unsubstantiated and unpromising nature and indicated the need to eliminate and replace it with a qualitatively new management system systematically based on the Leninist principles of socialist economic management. This was the base of the main outlines of the new model of economic mechanism. We can daringly claim that never before, in undertaking economic reforms, have we had the type of theoretical foundation we have now.

In this case the new concept of centralism, according to which the efforts of the center are concentrated on the basic problems of development of the national economy as a whole and are implemented with the help of economic methods is of fundamental significance. The essence of these methods is management by and through interests. It is precisely in this aspect that centralism becomes an organic part of the process of democratization of Soviet society and its economic system.

Also essentially important is the choice of the starting point of the reform. This pertains to converting production enterprises to total cost accounting and self-financing and to self-management of labor collectives. Only thus can we eliminate the foundations of the administrative-command system (all previous efforts to redo it "from above" proved inefficient), and to involve the millions of working people in the process of renovation of the economic mechanism. Although the situation may be changing slowly, reality indicates that we made the right choice. With the introduction of full cost accounting and self-management the labor collective converts from an object into a subject of management. It becomes the true master of the production process. This indicates a real and not ostensible democratization of social life.

The concept of the starting point is not simply an artistic image but a base in solving the entire array of economic problems. Based on the new understanding of the role and functions of the main unit, which is the socialist commodity producer, we must restructure the forms and methods of planning and organizing the turnover of material resources and the financial and banking institutions. Even in such a complex and delicate problem as converting the republics to cost accounting, the acknowledgment of the cost accounting rights and autonomy of labor collectives enables us properly to formulate and solve arising problems.

Let us include in the starting stipulations which determine the model and content of the forthcoming 5-year period the conclusion of the 19th All-Union Party Conference on the need for a steady social reorientation of the Soviet economy. The conference stipulated that the social reorientation of economic development and the increased share of consumption in the national income have become the pivot of the entire structural and investment policy and the cornerstone in shaping economic rates and proportions.

Therefore, the statement has been made and the program has been defined. Now we must ensure the practical and systematic restructuring of the economic mechanism and formulate the 13th 5-Year Plan on a qualitatively new basis.

Balancing, Growth Rates, Priorities

The conversion to a balanced growth would break the vicious circle which links the volume of output to growth rates and disproportions. An orientation toward a high pace inevitably leads to economic discoordination and triggers shortages. The aspiration to reach a high pace leads to the involvement of additional resources in the production process. However, this requires additional capacities and additional manpower. They become included in the plan, which worsens disproportions even further. In order to prevent this, additional pressure on the volumes and the pace must be applied. The completes the circle.

It has been scientifically established today that the adoption of volume indicators as a target function of the plan inevitably leads to increased disproportions and puts a heavier burden on the economy. The reorganization of the economic structure, technical progress, and quality assume second priority. This situation can be changed only by abandoning the volume concept in economic growth.

The question of the quantitative orientation of growth has long been under discussion in the press. A number of theoretical arguments have been brought forth. Let us add to them a few practical considerations.

The planning practice which was developed over several decades called for fulfilling certain quantitative assignments by a given clearly set date. This became the basis of planning, something unquestionable. However, the setting of such targets (on which the entire system for planning volumes and rates was based) is the least reliable management method. As early as the 1920s this was proved in the works of N.D. Kondratyev. Almost never, in the entire 60-year old history of 5-year plans, have "planned and factual implementation" been consistently attained by the predetermined date. The question is the following: What is the value of such planning?

Furthermore, any formulation of assignments in terms of volumes and growth rates has a built-in incurable vice: planning "from the basis," from the already reached level. The lower the basis the better the plan looks and so does its implementation. For example, if the work was not done in the first quarter of 1987, the achievement of the first quarter of 1988 appears impressively good. The great variety of clever devices of adapting the "plan to the plan" and not to the fact only confused the situation further.

Today one of the major structural reserves is the conversion which enables us to shift the capacities of defense industry plants to the production of civilian goods. The importance of this is self-evident. However, such a conversion will inevitably slow down the growth rates of industrial output and, in some cases, will result in an absolute reduction (regardless of the method of accounting used, whether on the basis of commodity, net output or other). If we are guided by the growth rates and rate successes on its basis, a most severe blow will be inflicted at the conversion and opposition to it will begin to mount on all levels.

Priority in the planned ratios and target stipulations should be assigned to the solution of social problems and to resource conservation. Generally speaking, there cannot be too many priorities, for otherwise they would lose their organizing and guiding role.

Resource conservation is a key problem in the conversion to the new quality of economic growth. In the next 5-year period (and, possibly, in the several years subsequent years) we must cover the distance which the

developed Western countries covered in the 1970s. Our technical decisions and the search for efficient forms of organization of production and economic relations and price and financial-credit instruments must be directed toward this target.

The question of the priority of social targets is, in principle, quite clear. They are a manifestation of the humanistic nature of the economic socialist system, surmounting deformations caused by the prevalence of the concept of "production for the sake of production." At this point we can point out only two essential aspects.

First, the social targets and programs must be aimed not only at solving the problems inherited from the past: If food is in short supply, we must increase its production; if housing is insufficient, we must build more. The main thing here should be an orientation toward the future, toward the objectively developing laws which shape the requirements and prerequisites for the comprehensive development of the individual. It is only with this type of approach to priorities that the target function of socialist production can be achieved.

Programs related to investments in the so-called human factor become particularly significant. These are the most efficient priority investments which, in principle, cannot be assessed in terms of current economic results. The creation of labor conditions worthy of the citizen of a socialist state and opportunities for physical and intellectual development means investing in the future of society and in increasing the social genetic stock of the nation.

Despite the gravity of the problems we have inherited from the past and despite the scarcity of resources, it is inadmissible to postpone the solution of such problems indefinitely, and to sacrifice strategy for the sake of tactics. It is precisely through the priorities of contemporary objectives that economic and scientific and technical progress acquires its true meaning and it is precisely thus that the humanism of the social system is revealed. The more we apply this approach, the more socialism we acquire.

The second and even more important component of social progress is that of setting ecological priorities. They assume the nature of absolute values. This means that any economic decision which could violate scientific, medical, and other requirements relative to environmental protection is unacceptable in principle. To retreat from this principle means to sacrifice the fate of society and the life of our children to the self-seeking and egotistical interests of the present generation.

Observing such strict requirements may require abandoning many planned projects, closing down operating production facilities, and reducing growth rates and, perhaps, even production volumes. This will be the price

of social progress. It is thus that we can convert from the arithmetic of growth rates to the higher algebra of socially oriented development.

What Should Be the Content of the Plan?

As we frequently say, the target-setting part must become the most important feature of the state plan for the country's economic and social development. It is precisely this that defines the main objectives of the planned period and sets target setting as the most important function of planned management. It is a question not of issuing specific figures and assignments to be met by a certain date, for this is the most primitive and, as we said, the most unreliable method for the management of socioeconomic processes.

We must define the priority tasks of the forthcoming period, which would reflect the primary interests of society as a whole and of individual social groups, the interests of which must be considered primary. The choice of priorities is one of the most complex problems solved on the basis of social compromise. The choice is difficult. However, its only alternative could be the equalizing approach based on the "something for everyone" principle. This can only codify the existing proportions and structures but would be unable to solve anything essential.

The selection of targets and definition of priorities is not a strictly professional but a sociopolitical task. This is one of the essential differences between the suggested and the existing plan models. If the volume and growth rates are used as guidelines, the formulation of the plan is reduced to purely professional computations of the volumes and structures of capital investments, the resources invested in the production process and return on investments, the rationalization of economic flows, etc. This becomes the inviolable field the activities of professional planning workers and, by giving advice the public could only hinder the work and distract the "serious people" from their activities.

The situation is different when planning is focused on target setting (no longer identified with growth rates) and the formulation of priorities. It is a matter not only of the fact that it is precisely this approach that is consistent with the task of democratizing the process of drafting the plan. Giving a socioeconomic purpose to planning and abandoning its administrative model are the main features.

The most important national social, economic, and scientific and technical programs, financed out of the state budget, must become the other key link of the 5-year plan. Their structure and number should also be limited and stem from the priority trends in the development of the national economy, although in this case their full coincidence is not mandatory.

The implementation of such programs is the function of the center and their selection and structure determine its influence on the most important structure-forming proportions in the national economy. The narrower the range of problems which must be solved by the center, the stronger becomes its influence on the development of the national economy as a single entity, naturally assuming that we do not absolutize this form but choose the problems, the solution of which is of truly key significance.

What about the rest? A great deal (production of consumer goods, development of the APK, trade and public catering, etc.) should be transferred to the local areas, to the republics, krais, and oblasts, where they must be solved within the framework of regional relations.

The development of the existing sectors (unlike the essentially new sectors developed in accordance with governmental programs) must be regulated by a system of horizontal rather than vertical relations. Economic contracts and the various types of cooperation agreements become the starting point in planning. Naturally, this is possible only in a balanced economy. If no such economy exists, a return to the administrative system, with all deriving consequences, becomes inevitable. At this point it is a question of what type of plan will be used by the new system?

Naturally, one could gather the plans adopted and approved by the enterprises, add them up, and include them in the general state plan. But why do so? The plan is not a recording instrument for developing trends but an active instrument for regulating the economy. This can be achieved through the use of economic methods for influencing economic processes and on the basis of the interests of the subjects of production relations. Determining the array of such means and instruments includes yet another perhaps most important and active part of the 5-year plan. At the same time, it is also an entirely new unit, the appearance of which is based on the contemporary concept of centralized management, formulated in the course of the radical reform.

This is the sum of what constitutes the content of the plan and its completed form, which will become state law. Forecast evaluations, scientific substantiations, computations and balance correlations, which precede the adoption of the plan, are something like intermediary products while working on the plan. They are important and necessary and their quality decisively determines the scientific substantiation of the plan itself. Nonetheless, by virtue of their very nature they are semifinished products the development of which stop at the pre-planning stage. The plan itself, as the guiding instrument in regulating economic and social processes, becomes the end product.

Plan and Economic Mechanism

The contemporary concept of economic management, consistent with the spirit and nature of perestroika, was formulated in the Fundamental Concepts of the Radical

Restructuring of Economic Management which were approved at the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. This concept was reflected in the Law on the Enterprise and in the other recently passed laws. An implementation of this plan is possible only with a conversion to a new model of the 5-year plan and its structure.

In the old model, which was used from the first to the 12th 5-Year Plan, volume assignments were mandatory (based on directives) and were issued from higher-up down, to their sectorial and territorial levels. This procedure must become part of the past. It must be replaced by control figures which are not mandatory and are not used in assessing the results of economic activities.

The purpose of the control figures is qualitatively different: They must perform an information-orientational function. They are a manifestation of the social assessment of the dimension of anticipated needs and the resources which are necessary to satisfy them. What matters here is not specific volumes, computed in detail, but substantiation and realism. Hence the need for a different approach to the development of control figures and the extensive use of expert evaluations and the study of the condition of market circumstances and changing trends.

In the past we were unable to meet the objectives of the state orders. The temporary regulation on state orders, which was scheduled to last 2 years, was an effort to adapt the new element of the economic mechanism to the existing model of the plan. The possibility of utilizing the advantages of this progressive form become apparent in connection with the conversion to the new model of the 5-year plan itself, in which the state order is a structural unit in reorienting the production process toward the consumer, while the state becomes the priority customer for the most important social strategic and social requirements. The state order provides a guaranteed market. It is placed, as a rule, on a competitive basis, and stipulates the reciprocal obligations of the two sides. Correspondingly, it is not issued as a mandatory assignment by the superior authorities (such authorities may not even exist!), but is formulated by the consumer who has the right to place an order in the name of the state. The consumer, who has issued the state order also assumes corresponding obligations. Naturally, all of this is possible under the conditions of the successful implementation of the program for improving the economy and formulating a truly balanced plan. This is extremely difficult but necessary, for without it no progress is possible. In this case the alternative would be that the economy would find itself in a new pre-crisis situation, the solution of which will become even more difficult.

The conversion to the new 5-year plan model opens the way to the utilization of the tremendous potential of long-term economic standards. Their purpose is to

ensure the stable financial base for the implementation of national programs and to provide conditions for true cost accounting and self-financing in the basic national economic units.

Theoretically, the concept of standards takes us to the Leninist idea of the tax in kind as the opposite of administrative confiscation. Under contemporary conditions, such standards are converted into a system of payments for resources, on the one hand, and taxes on profit (income) on the other. The conversion to taxing the general income of the enterprises and income from salaries is the most promising method for economic control. It totally excludes the individualized nature of payments (and the related inevitable subjectivism), as well as any forms of administrative interference in enterprise economic life.

All the elements of the economic mechanism are interrelated and cannot be applied independently and on a scattered basis. Incidentally, the very aspect of the "mechanism" as a complex system of closely interrelated elements is not accidental. This could be proved with the example of the new principles of price setting, the extensive use of contractual prices in particular.

Contractual prices are a structural component of the market mechanism. They can be applied only where there is a real market, which includes wholesale trade in means of production. It is clear that preserving the monopoly status of producers and lack of competitiveness exclude the use of contractual prices. Under such circumstances they will be rising without any relation to the quality and efficiency of output.

The conversion to the widespread application of contractual prices, consequently, should be combined with the shaping of the market, eliminating monopoly structures and achieving a balanced plan. Therefore, the new model of the plan will include the creation of said prerequisites and will be implemented strictly with their help.

This array of planned steps opens the way to true full cost accounting of enterprises and associations. In addition to purely economic results, this conversion would improve the social situation and allow workers and labor collectives to become the true owners of the production process. It is precisely full cost accounting that is the universal and inherent form of dynamics and implementation of the principle of social ownership in socialism.

So far there is no full cost accounting (nor could there be any!) in even a single enterprise. Essentially, the percentage of enterprises in different sectors allegedly applying the principles of full cost accounting is fiction. In the same way that a part cannot be more developed than the whole, cost accounting cannot be more advanced than the entire system of production relations. It would be premature to speak of full cost accounting before the

conversion to the new type of plan has been accomplished, wholesale trade has been introduced as the basic channel for commodity exchanges, and the banking system and the price-setting mechanism have been restructured.

Furthermore, the concept itself of full cost accounting and its essential features must be enriched and developed in accordance with occurring processes. This applies above all to leasing relations, not as directly used in agriculture, but in the various models used in the governmental (national) economic sector.

We believe that pitting leasing against cost accounting is theoretically unsupported. Naturally, the word "cost accounting" has already become hackneyed and carries the burden of former concepts, whereas the word "leasing" is fresh and unhackneyed. It implies real hope of renovation of obsolete forms and a major increase in the rights of the labor collective.

In reality, however, leasing at state enterprises is the name given to nothing but a more developed model of cost accounting, coming closer to its ideal, i.e., to its theoretical concept. Obviously, the elements of leasing should be considered a feature of any true full cost accounting and be included in it. It is a question above all of contractual relations between enterprises and superior authorities (or authorities which place state orders); unregulated distribution and utilization of profits (income), controlled through taxation; stable relations with the state (the budget) and so on.

The next few years, like the next 5-year plan as a whole, will be a period of intensive development of new forms and organizational structures and nontraditional economic control methods. Their prediction is impossible, and their regulation inadmissible. Hence one of the primary requirements concerning the economic mechanism in the 13th 5-year period is to create conditions for testing the viability and efficiency of the newly arising developments.

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Once Again About Food Imports

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[Article by D. Bulatov, economist]

[Text] Of late a great deal has been written about inefficient equipment imports, imported equipment left unprotected in the open, and defective electronic equipment. Against this background our purchases of agricultural goods appear well-organized and entirely justified. No one needs convincing that we are short of food. Nonetheless, even a most superficial study of our agricultural imports raises serious questions to which it is very difficult to obtain intelligible answers. Such answers

are particularly necessary today. A realistic and scientifically substantiated agrarian policy, consistent with the interests of the people, was formulated at the recent CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Compared with it, the foreign trade aspect of the problem appears simply anachronistic.

Not everyone knows that the USSR became a steady net importer of grain only starting with 1972. Until then grain imports were compensated by grain exports (with the exception of the 1964-1966 period, when 6-7 million tons of wheat per year were purchased while exports of feed grain were kept up). Since then the volume of purchases began to increase rapidly. In the 1980s, having become the biggest grain importer in the world, our country has been importing more than 30 million tons of grain annually. It is logical to assume that if we are forced to spend huge sums for such purposes, (the cost of annual agricultural imports is between \$15 and 16 billion), the most efficient use of such imports would be thoroughly secured. Is this the case?

Let us begin with the fact that in most industrially developed countries mixed fodder contains substantial amounts of high-protein supplements, soybean products in particular. This saves on feed grain and reduces its purchases.

In our country the unbalanced rations in animal husbandry, which lead to large-scale feed overexpenditures, are the talk of the town. Between 1971 and 1984 fodder expenditures increased by 30 percent per kilogram of beef and 15 percent per kilogram of milk. Nonetheless, in our imports high-protein additives play an even smaller role compared to their domestic output (respectively 2 and 10 percent). The result is that we are purchasing the least effective and virtually faulty elements of the feed structure. In simple terms, we are investing billions in increasing the production of manure. What can we say, this is a valuable fertilizer but is increasing its resources through such methods worth the price?

Whereas elsewhere in the world steps are being taken to restrict and even totally to eliminate food raw material imports, in order to encourage domestic production, in our country a kind of "reverse favoritism" is taking place. Goods purchased for hard currency are reassessed on Soviet territory. Imported grain is resold by the customer organizations for approximately the same amount of monetary units but, this time, not American but Soviet. Yet, a recalculation based on the actual rate of exchange shows that purchasing a ton of grain abroad costs four times as much as the production of 1 ton of grain at home.

But is it possible that the high quality of imported grain fully compensates for outlays? Let us cite data on this account: 40 percent of the imported grain contains seeds of weeds which have no natural enemies on Soviet territory. Particularly dangerous are the various types of

ragweed, which could become widespread in the southern parts of our country. The grain is frequently contaminated with pests, including the most dangerous among them, such as the bread beetle, the granary weevil, the cucuid meal beetle, and the hooded beetle. The sad experience of the past, involving the introduction of the Colorado beetle, should serve as a reminder of the potential ecological harm which "imports" of pests could cause. Some 10 percent of the grain reaching the USSR is substandard, with increased moisture content, damaged and crushed grains, other grain and weeds mixed in, and low gluten content. There is occasional shortchanging. Every practical worker is aware of this but, apparently, the fact remains totally unnoticed by the representatives of Soviet foreign trade organizations. The grain trade agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States describe quality stipulations in most general terms only. No specific parameters are listed.

Grain exporting countries have many grain supplying companies. In an effort to break into the Soviet market, small- and medium-sized companies would settle for minimal profits and offer the USSR more advantageous deals and better quality. However, most purchases of American grain are made from only five companies: Dreyfus, Cargill, Continental Grain, Garnack, and Bunge. Close contacts with such companies exist also in making deals in other capitalist countries. Yet it is common knowledge that purchasing large grain shipments (several million tons) from a single supplier disrupts the world market and results in immediate price increases.

It is hardly necessary to prove that drafting a plan for purchases for 5 years in advance is the equivalent of planning the weather within grain production areas for the same period. Yet long-term accords on grain imports signed with leading suppliers are being regularly concluded. This largely contributes to paying higher prices. The obligations of the USSR concerning major grain purchases prevent prices from dropping below a certain level even during periods of overproduction and increased supply over demand on the world market.

Grain prices depend (sometimes substantially) also on what one may view as insignificant factors, such as the structure and representative nature of the delegation of the USSR at contract talks. As a rule, such delegations consist of "high officials." Our partners have long learned that this is an indication of the scale of our import intentions. As a result, it becomes known in advance in the world markets how much, when, and from whom will the Soviet Union be buying. The market, however, reacts sensitively even to rumors of possible contracts, with immediate price increases. Let us mention, for purposes of comparison, that many importers purchase only small quantities of grain from a large number of suppliers in different countries, making regular use to this effect of the Chicago Stock Exchange. The

average price of imported grain of the same type and quality is, in such cases, significantly lower. It is as though the commodity exchange mechanism does not exist in our case.

Our foreign trade food policy has paradoxically combined the increased strategic dependence of the country on grain (and, subsequently, meat and dairy) imports with an enviable persistence, which should be put to better use, of ensuring the cotton and rice "independence." Meanwhile, no particular success has been noted in the production of such commodities (particularly against a background of huge economic, social, and ecological costs). Between 1971-1975 and 1981-1985 the average annual rice harvest increased from 1.75 to 2.57 million tons, which was of no great importance to the grain balance, although rice consumption in the country increased somewhat. The great attention paid to rice led to the fact that it displaced wheat even in traditional wheat production areas such as Krasnodar Kray.

The aspiration to turn the Soviet Union into a "great cotton power" caused a great deal of harm. The USSR has indeed become one of the leading producers of this type of raw material in the world and is second in the volume of its exports, with the United States leading. However, as in the past, we continue to buy long-staple cotton. Furthermore, increased cotton production and exports were achieved at the expense of "harming" food crops. As a result, at the present time a clearly manifested one-crop farming has developed in the republics of Central Asia. The development of this sector was extensive, crops declined, and production increases were largely fictitious.

This distressing listing of foreign trade "accomplishments" could be continued on and on. There is hardly any need to do so, however. I believe that any soberly thinking person understands, as it were, that the entire system of planned food imports and the entire mechanism of its organization are the offspring of departmental monopoly (including foreign trade). Like any departmental offspring, it bears the ineradicable birthmark: an orientation not toward the needs of society and the people but toward satisfying the narrow group interest of accountability, increasing volumes, attractive assignments, etc. The result of departmental ambitions and contradictions, low level of competence, and support of obsolete stereotypes is the loss of foreign exchange, of which the country hardly has any surplus in these difficult times.

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Are Balances Real?

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[Article by A. Volkov, doctor of economic sciences, professor, and A. Samokhvalov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The consolidated indicators of the country's overall economic growth are the basic guidelines in planning the development of territories, sectors, and enterprises.

For decades the methods and methodology of their computation were developed by a narrow circle of specialists and the solutions they formulated are accepted today on faith, as being the only possible ones.

Of late the press has repeatedly questioned the accuracy and reliability of the published dynamics of consolidated statistical indicators and their consistency with the actual processes occurring in the economy. Answers by the State Committee for Statistics and USSR Gosplan to such statements by independent specialists were either not provided or lacked convincing counterarguments.

The urgent need for a constructive consideration of the pressing problems in the area of consolidated balance accounts is dictated by the perestroika of the centralized management, which increased the strictness of requirements on the quality of consolidated economic information. For the time being, instead of increasing the reliability of economic yardsticks with which to measure the condition and growth rates of the national economy, the state statistical authorities are simply broadening the realm of utilization of consolidated data, computed on the basis of the same old methodologies and methods, with all their shortcomings. For example, the indicator of the produced national income is now being computed not only yearly but on a quarterly and even monthly basis and not only for the country as a whole but also by republic and even oblast. As a result of such detailed computations in terms of time and territory, the old faults in computing the national income have only worsened, confusing rather than improving our concepts of changes which are occurring in individual economic areas and in the entire national economy.

Traditionally, the consolidated indicators have been used to improve on the dynamics of economic development. This is being done voluntarily, with the "best possible intentions" by those engaged in drafting such data, as well as by the people who convert their results into an intrinsic part of the resulting decisions. Not surprisingly, the fact of the invariably faster growth of the national income, compared to the pace of development of industry, construction, and agriculture, and of the latter in terms of the production of industrial commodities and food, in physical terms, which took place in the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, and which contradicted common sense, failed, as it were, to bring about any changes in the practice of the computations. This fact was "benefiting" the claimed pace. Meanwhile, changes in the economy in recent years, which inevitably should have lowered its growth, were taken immediately into consideration. It is a question of computing the pace of the physical volume of industrial output and other summing indicators which, starting with 1985, began to be computed regardless of their actual decline caused by the drop in the production of alcoholic beverages. The impropriety of such a reflection of the material turnover in the national economy is manifested particularly clearly in republics in which wine making and related

production account for a high share of their food industry output. The growth rates, computed "the new way," are directly compared to the rates of increase of public production, computed "the old way." Such methods (despite the clearly obvious inaccuracy) led to improvements in the dynamics of consolidated indicators for the 1984-1987 period. For example, in Azerbaijan, although the volume of industrial output for 1987 was, in terms of comparable prices, the same as that of 1984, according to the statistical publications its annual growth rates averaged some 5 percent. However, with an increased production of alcoholic beverages such a "refinement" of the computation method would inevitably worsen the indicators of economic growth and, clearly, would lead, once again, to the use of the old computation system.

Such circumstantial improvements have led to the fact that the system of consolidated computations has actually forfeited its role as an instrument which allows us to identify the gravest problems affecting the country's economic development. The balance method on which they are based has become a closed system of computations, the mechanism of which is tuned toward achieving a balance between the resource and outlay parts of each balance, as a self-seeking objective. The result is the illusion of well-being. One of the examples of this is the fictitious balancing of state budget revenue and expenditures, achieved through ways and means which are neither economically nor socially justified. During the recent 5-year periods these methods were used in linking the volumes of generated and used national income, in drawing up the balance of the population's monetary income and expenditures, and in formulating consolidated material balances.

The practice of consolidated computations, based on the balance system with a mandatory balancing of resources and expenditures, which makes it possible not to highlight but to conceal disproportions, did not develop all of a sudden. The first balance work done in our country in the 1920s was structured on different principles. The purpose of computing the first balance of the national economy for the 1923-1924 fiscal year was not aimed in the least at achieving such equality. The suggestions which were made already then of the need and possibility of developing a closed system of computations concerning the development of the national economy triggered sharp criticism. The specialists who drew up the balance believed that with this approach the balancing of production with consumption could be obtained by the use of "weights and computations" which would make it possible to establish a "formal balance, a statistical-computation balance" ("*Balans Narodnogo Khozyaystva Soyuza SSR 1923-1924 Goda*" [Balance of the National Economy of the USSR for 1923-1924]. Trudy TsSU, Moscow, vol XXIX, 1926). The new economic policy, which was aimed at the comprehensive use of commodity-monetary relations, objectively ascribed to work on the balance the nature of a research project. The publication of the results of the computations was accompanied by detailed information on the sources used and the

basic areas of work. The experience which was gained at that time is relevant to this day.

The purpose of the balance indicators is to provide a sober assessment of the situation which has developed in public production and to reflect the true imbalance, the elimination of which requires taking specific economic-political steps. In order to ensure their efficiency, the results of consolidated statistical computations must be consistent with actual economic processes.

To this effect, we must begin by changing the method and methodology for computing foreign trade income, budget subsidies, turnover tax, accumulations of fixed capital based on residual value, new types of labor activities (leasing, cooperative, and individual), and the practice of their inclusion in the consolidated indicators. All such components of consolidated computations today significantly distort the size of the material turnover in the country and its growth rates.

Also clearly excessive is the liking shown by the administrative authorities for consolidated computations in comparable prices, the realistic nature of which drastically drops as we prolong the period which they cover.

In planning the pace and ratios of national economic development under the conditions of a growing separation of financial and monetary resources from the dynamics of material values, we need a new approach to consolidated economic computations, which would enable us promptly and accurately to define the level of coordination between material and financial-value indicators and the extent of the gap between the two. Use exclusively of comparable prices, which do not reflect real economic relations, prevents us from linking plan balances with the normal functioning of cost accounting relations. Computations of indicators and the analysis of their reflection in actual prices is a necessary prerequisite for substantiated planning under the conditions of developed commodity-monetary relations.

Starting with the end of the 1920s, the task of developing material production assumed a central position in the activities of the administrative authorities. This target was fully consistent with the orientation of management toward the indicators of the national economic balance which, as we know, essentially reflect the material aspect of development of the national economy. Problems of the quality of growth of the economy and of balancing material with financial turnover in the country were ignored over a long period of time.

Today this can no longer be tolerated. The system of indicators of the national economic balance must be expanded with data which would cover material, labor, and financial resources as a single entity. The formulation of such data can be based on rich global experience in computing the GNP within the framework of a system of national computations. Starting with 1988, this most important consolidating indicator of economic growth

was officially introduced in domestic practices of consolidated computations. However, we are as yet to determine the place of the GNP indicator within it. We must truly link this indicator to the traditional computations of public production efficiency (capital returns, productivity, material intensiveness) and with primary accountability and planning information and its processing in accordance with a method adopted for the system of national accounts, rather than on the basis of the balance of the national economy with all of its inherent shortcomings and unsolved problems.

The restoration of the principles of a creative research-oriented approach to macroeconomic planning and analysis is the most important requirement formulated by life in processing management information. Unless this problem is solved, the formal balancing of national economic plans, which conceals deep disproportions in the economy, will remain a major obstacle on the way to the economic reform and, as in the past, tens of thousands of specialists will be engaged in making computations the results of which can only disorganize the work of sectors and enterprises.

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'...For Advice and Resolution of Important Matters'

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[Article by Oleg Vasilyevich Kuprin, KOMMUNIST deputy section editor]

[Text] Viktor Vasilyevich Novikov has been avoiding the gorkom and obkom for a number of years. Even when summoned on business, he has tried to avoid such meetings. He had no sympathy for the premises where, in a period of 13 years, on three separate occasions he had been expelled from the party, the last occasion being in 1979. It is true that he had not been expelled forever. He had spent no more than half a year without a party card. One could say that he was lucky. He had been the subject of four reprimands, three of them "strict," not all that terrible. He had twice lost his job. His plans were in disarray. There were books, dissertations... everything had to be started from scratch. In the past he had been a master of sports in Greco-Roman wrestling. He knew not only how to win but also how to lose. He did not become despondent even with crushing failures, which is a sign of true mastery in sports, and not only in sports alone.

With such a "loud" biography after those three "failures," to be elected member of the party raykom (not by the one who had expelled him, but by the other), rayon soviet deputy, and recipient of an order, and becoming a doctor of sciences, and university professor, you would agree, this is not an ordinary lot. And now, when everything seemed to be in order, once again what on earth more did he want?...

He sat down and wrote a letter to the oblast newspaper, not a letter but something like a monologue-confession. In the last paragraph he "nailed" the following question: "Will the Yaroslavl Party Gorkom listen to this monologue?"

For more than 10 years SEVERNYY RABOCHIY did not publish his article. This time it was given an almost entire column. The reaction to this letter was quick in coming. Before describing what happened, however, let us give a brief history.

Passions Having Nothing to Do With Sports

On 21 May 1988 the plenum of the Yaroslavl CPSU Obkom elected delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. One of them was F.I. Loshchenkov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Material Reserve and former first secretary of the obkom. His candidacy was listed only at the plenum and was not discussed by the party organizations. Many of them disagreed with the plenum's resolution. The "Loshchenkov topic" became the most popular in the oblast. PRAVDA published a letter by A. Malygina, the librarian of the children's library. "Too many bitter pages in the life of the Yaroslavl area are linked to the name of this person," she wrote. "Agriculture has broken down, and it is only now that social problems have actually begun to be solved." Several days after that publication, on 8 June, a meeting was held on the Volga embankment. At that meeting, both F.I. Loshchenkov and those who had elected him to attend the all-Union conference heard a great many things.

That meeting is considered the birthday of the movement for assistance to perestroika, described by its leaders as the "People's Front." This is a name which is being opposed (not without reason) by many people. However, I shall use it here because it has become firmly part of the Yaroslavl lexicon.

Yet another obkom plenum was held on 16 July to discuss "Letters and Appeals of Party Organizations and Working People in the Oblast, Addressed to the CPSU Obkom and the Mass Information Media in Connection With the Election of F.I. Loshchenkov as Delegate to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference." Another vote was taken. Another delegate was chosen to attend the conference. In short, under the pressure of public opinion, the obkom acknowledged its error.

The "People's Front" decided to continue its activities and set up its leading agency: an organizational committee of the movement for assistance to perestroika. The fact that such assistance was needed in Yaroslavl was indicated by the plenum itself which, although it had elected a suitable person to attend the conference, had had 13 obkom members casting a negative vote. The following statements were made at the meeting, which were also made public: "A deserving person was thoroughly defamed (in reference to F.I. Loshchenkov—

author). In my view, librarian Malygina, who wrote this letter to PRAVDA about Fedor Ivanovich is an enemy of perestroika." Another speaker, expressing the view of the majority of speakers, said: "I believe otherwise: Fedor Ivanovich Loshchenkov is a victim of perestroika and of the democracy we are introducing."

Incidentally, F.I. Loshchenkov was replaced in the Yaroslavl delegation to Moscow by Yu.V. Novikov, rector of the medical institute and the younger brother of V.V. Novikov who, slightly 2 months later decided to write a letter to the oblast newspaper. Before that, however, events were to take place in Yaroslavl which were to draw the attention of the most popular newspapers and journals, and Central Television. I am referring to the "People's Front" meetings at the city's Shinnik Sports Stadium.

Since the situation surrounding the meetings is well known let me merely say that it was the party gorkom that helped the "populists" (this word too has become part of the Yaroslavl vocabulary) to hold them at the stadium. The CPSU Obkom had assigned a premise for the meetings of the organizational committee at the Political Education Club and, in the winter, a hall for debates in the same premises. In short, unlike the situation elsewhere, the attitude toward the people's initiative in Yaroslavl was quite positive. At the stadium the first party gorkom secretary and other city and oblast leaders spoke repeatedly. They felt uncomfortable under a hail of questions asked by the "People's Front" on the subject of the complex problems of city life. They were also held answerable for the errors made by their predecessors. The concept of "responsibility," a rather abstract one until recently, had assumed, for the local leadership, at the meetings in the stadium, a very specific and, occasionally, quite painful aspect. To meet in public with several thousand fellow citizens who were, rightly or not, dissatisfied with one's work is not the same as to submit a report to the party-economic aktiv, for example. In this case average figures will not do and one cannot refer to a superior authority. Here in the most direct sense of the word, one must engage in political work and, again literally, with the masses.

It is naive to assume that from the very start all managers were ready for such an unusual trial. It was precisely experience in political activities that was lacking. Any error immediately triggered a stormy emotional reaction. The passions which seethed at the stadium were hardly those of sports and, in terms of intensity, exceeded those which would grab the audience at local soccer games.

It is a long known fact that it is easier to ask pointed questions than to answer them, all the more so in front of a mass audience which was on the side of the questioners and who frequently showed a bias against the respondents. Under conditions such as these, the sponsors of the meetings should show an equal capability for political activities in order not to turn a constructive debate

into a trial with plaintiffs and defendants, without an impartial judge. Once again, it would be naive to assume that the leaders of the "People's Front" had such political experience, for which reason an improper behavior, tactlessness and open insults were increasingly heard. Such meetings, which had been planned as an instrument for molding public opinion under conditions of pluralism, turned out to be not very tolerant precisely on the matter of pluralism. The sensible question arose: To what extent was the opinion of the "People's Front" that of the public? The psychological climate in the city was assuming an increasingly ugly and unstable nature.

It was at that point that Viktor Vasilyevich Novikov decided to turn to the newspaper. He was motivated to do this by his professional duty as well: he was the only doctor of psychological sciences in Yaroslavl and, furthermore, a doctor with extensive practical experience. No, in no case did the author have the intention of belittling the significance of the "People's Front." However, his letter included also the following:

"At the stadium, the noise of the public," he wrote, "was accepted and interpreted one-sidedly, as the manifestation of true public opinion: as the acceptance or rejection of the expressed views. Strictly speaking, this should not take place. To begin with, such public indicators are quite haphazard and do not reflect the sociodemographic structure of the urban population. Second, even statistically the several thousand people who were present (out of 660,000 residents of Yaroslavl) do not provide not only representative but even valid (reliable, substantial) evaluations. Third, the reactions of people who participate in such mass displays are primarily emotional rather than intellectual. Making a considered and comprehensively thought-out decision by any of the opposing parties is unlikely, given the state of euphoria and psychological intoxication with success or, conversely, a feeling of psychological suppression."

The author claimed that it was time to combine "democracy by meetings" with daily painstaking work, and called for reviving "the so-called voluntary social organizations," many of which had turned into "cozy niches for noted pensioners," had become bureaucratized and were no longer fulfilling their functions. Let us try, V.V. Novikov went on to say, to rally the efforts of the best members of all formal and informal associations within a single city public council with a view to ensuring glasnost, expertise and support of all sensible initiatives, organize the study of public opinion on a scientific basis, and expand the participation of scientists, public figures, educators and jurists in improving the economic, sociological, psychological and legal instruction of the population.... It was suggested, in order to enhance the reputation of the new organization, to include in its leadership a senior party worker on a level not below that of CPSU gorkom secretary.

Confrontation

On the day following the publication of this letter, the next meeting, the sixth consecutive one, was held at the

Shinnik Stadium. The "People's Front" challenge was answered by V.V. Volonchunas, first deputy chairman of the city executive committee, and V.V. Aristov, deputy chairman of the oblast executive committee. These leaders, as one of the speakers pointed out, behaved with dignity. Claims and critical remarks were addressed at them. The heated atmosphere of the meeting was also apparent. For example, the demand was heard of replacing the editor of the oblast newspaper. There were "expository" accusations against V.V. Novikov as well. The first came from Yaroslavl poet V.D. Ponomarenko. They were summed up, with anger and sarcasm, by Yu.B. Markovin, member of the "People's Front" Organizational Committee, who subsequently presented his views in the oblast newspaper: "Let us not replace the struggle for perestroika with the struggle against the movement for assistance to perestroika."

Meanwhile, V.V. Novikov was summoned to the CPSU Gorkom. Yes, he was told, the idea of rallying the efforts of the public organizations for efficiently dealing with urban problems was good but, for the time being, it was merely an idea. Furthermore, they went on to say, we probably have different views on the principle of the party's political leadership of public organizations. Their authority will be based not on how senior a party worker who is made a member of the board may be, but on the specific activities and the results of such an organization.

After several meetings by representatives of public organizations in the city and informal associations, the "People's Front" in particular, a constituent discussion took place. It began with a concentrated offensive mounted by the "populists" against the very idea of creating a public council. The shouts "down!" and "shame!" were heard. However, when the by now habitual polemic stir abated somewhat, a discussion in essence began. The tone was set by that same poet V.D. Ponomarenko, who said that, having soberly weighed everything, he had changed his views. One should look at what the council could contribute to the city. If slightly more than some 10 public organizations decide to join efforts, no one should have the right to prevent them from doing so. He personally was ready to participate in the work of the new association. He had also prepared a name for it, based on the initials of its official name: the Council of Public Organizations would be known as "SOBOR."

The council was established. It included a number of social organizations, informal associations and several councils of labor collectives and cooperatives. V.V. Novikov was made its chairman. However, the arguments did not stop. SEVERNYY RABOCHIY, the oblast newspaper, did not dedicate it a full column. The focal point was an article opposing the public council. Next to it was printed a letter by war and labor veterans, criticizing the "People's Front" for aspiring to the monopoly right to express the opinion of the public, as well as answers to questions which had been raised in the course of the constituent discussion. One of them was

the following: How will relations between the two organizations be developed? The explanation provided by "SOBOR" was as follows: we are hoping for cooperation. Our objectives are the same and the only difference is in the ways to achieve them.

The oblast radio organized a meeting between the representatives of the two new social groups. The oblast television presented a live roundtable between the leaders of the "People's Front" and "SOBOR." Alas, so far there has been no cooperation. Although no one seems to be disputing that they both pursue the same objectives, it turns out that the choice of means to achieve them is fraught with very grave contradictions.

At the 7 November 1988 march the "People's Front" marched separately under its own slogans, which were by no means those of a holiday, demanding the resignation of the chairman of the city soviet executive committee and the chairman of the oblast department of the children's foundation. What was "SOBOR's" attitude? At its last session it decided to hold a survey of the public organizations. The results confirmed that yes, those two managers had lost the confidence of the people of Yaroslavl although, it is true, not to the same extent.

It was at that point that, for the first time, "SOBOR" faced the problem of how to conduct its first survey? Debates were heated. Matters came to a vote. There were six votes in favor of "categorical demand....," and 19 against. Soon afterwards, A.I. Ryabkov, chairman of the city soviet executive committee, received the following letter: "Dear Aleksandr Ivanovich! The Yaroslavl Council of Public Organizations considered at its 11 November 1988 session the question of the moral and political climate in the city. With a view to improving it, the members of the council are of the following opinion: to recommend that the chairman of the city soviet, Comrade A.I. Ryabkov, voluntarily resign.... We are relying on your wisdom which would allow you to make a constructive decision in this difficult situation."

During the live television roundtable meeting, the "People's Front" leaders asked the leader of "SOBOR" directly: When will you, finally, express your attitude toward the city's mayor? Do you support our demand, yes or no? The answer was the following: It was not mandatory to demand, one could urgently advise and allow the person the possibility to make his own decision in solving a problem which, perhaps, may be the most difficult he has ever had to solve in his life.

A.I. Ryabkov resigned, the more so since his comrades in the party organization failed to elect him delegate to the city party conference; meanwhile, the public council was represented at the conference and four of the members of its leadership were elected gorkom members. The gorkom provided premises for the new social group. This was done quickly and, I would say, "with dedication." After the conference, the gorkom numbered one secretary less (this was a reduction of the party apparatus in

action). The thus released office and reception room was assigned to "SOBOR." The lobby of the Political Education House was offered for debate-holding purposes on an equal footing with the "populists." A new sector was set up in the gorkom, whose functions include work with the public organizations and informal associations. So far the sector consists of a single official: V.A. Vinichenko, a man who has practical experience in working with the soviet of people's deputies, and who has dealt seriously with problems of social psychology. Therefore, the question of the party's leadership of public organizations seemed to have been solved by itself although the actual managing work proved to be an extremely complex matter.

L.L. Karnakov, the first secretary of the Yaroslavl's party gorkom, told me that the fact that two authoritative informal organizations had appeared in the city made it necessary to take a new look at ideological work. The "People's Front" and the Public Council were two independent organizations, which arose spontaneously but which, for the time being, were quite opposed to each other. However, they had quite clearly reflected the complex range of moods, concerns and social expectations of the people of Yaroslavl. It was precisely this confrontation that gave its specific aspect to the development of glasnost and its gains and losses, which are now felt by the Soviet people so sharply and with such differences.

What is a meeting? The pointed formulation of this problem and criticism, regardless of personality, as well as demands addressed at the city authorities are not always realistic. Naturally, some of them were. At the meeting we mentioned, V.V. Aristov, deputy chairman of the oblast executive committee, submitted a report. The motion was made to increase the network of reception and delivery centers, so that the population could deliver freely meat, milk, vegetables and fruits. New such centers were opened in each city rayon and products were purchased at commission-earning prices. The suggestion was made of organizing the uninterrupted acceptance of cattle delivered by the oblast working people to the meat combine. This too was done.

It is no secret, however, that the atmosphere of a meeting is governed by emotions which, occasionally, may reach an unprecedented degree. Naturally, one could complain about it and if it is a question of distortions and improprieties or blatant insults, such complaints are necessary. However, anyone can understand that emotionalism is a mandatory "genre feature" of a meeting. The science of psychology has proved that emotions get into play whenever the body finds itself under exceptional circumstances and the usual regulatory standards are no longer adequate. Feelings suppress the mind and collective feelings suppress it even further. Therefore, in principle, democracy by assembly is, by its very nature, predisposed above all toward emotional summations. It would be legitimate to take this into consideration in the

first explosion of glasnost, after so many long prohibitions and silences. But what if such extraordinary conditions become a daily occurrence?

Frankly, fate did not spare the Yaroslavl people extreme situations. Let us consider the food problem. In recent years centralized meat procurements have declined significantly. For half a million residents of the oblast, the villages in the Yaroslavl area have no more than 70,000 active working people. In this case even super-American labor productivity and super-Japanese technology would be useless. The situation cannot be improved by evaluations and conclusions reached at meetings or by accusations and exposures.

According to the psychologists, emotions are "an ancient pre-thinking form." I do not know the extent to which the emotional Yaroslavl preperestroyka leadership was seeking a solution to the food impasse. However, the "exploit" of the former oblast fathers could not be described as anything other than a pre-form of economic thinking: they managed to talk the Ministry of Railways into a having daily train run between Yaroslavl and Moscow. This is quite convenient. One can conveniently take off early in the morning and come back at night with bags loaded with meat and delicatessen. There are 21 passenger coaches with comfortable seats. The train became known to the population as "Loshchenkov's Score." This was quite an original solution to the food problem, was it not?

The Public Council planned a study which could have laid a scientific foundation for solving this problem in the city. Particulars had to be ignored and strategy was to change. The plan called for beginning with a survey of specialists. The Yaroslavl area has always been generous with talent and with people of unusual minds and decisive actions. Let, therefore, glasnost with its scientific hypostasis, contribute to the fuller development of this potential.

According to some, this was an alternative to the "People's Front." Perhaps, however, this was a manifestation of different stages in the development of glasnost and its different emotional and analytical levels. Their interconnection is unquestionable if we consider the confrontation between the two organizations as the real pluralism of opinions, cleansed of personal ambitions and other subjective accretions. The "People's Front" helped to awaken the political activeness of the people of Yaroslavl. The meetings it sponsored and, subsequently, the cycle of discussions on "City and Culture," which was organized by "SOBOR," proved that the study of public opinion must become a mandatory prerequisite for the democratic solution of any important problem, and the first prerequisite to this effect. After such a discussion, which had to do with Yaroslavl's historical and architectural heritage, A.R. Bobovich, the city's chief architect, reached the following conclusion: the time has come to assess the social requirements of the citizens at the initial design stage; therefore, the next step

in the democratization of the engineering-construction project was to draft a social instruction based on extensive professional surveys of public needs.

In other words, the meeting emotionality of the "People's Front" revealed the social need for a sober analytical work by the "SOBOR." In order for these two movements organically to supplement each other (let this unity be conflicting but not antagonistic) they should have taken a few steps toward each other. Would the meetings at the sports stadium have lost any of their stress had they dealt not with isolated and, in some cases, accidental examples but with competent expert evaluations and with social needs which had been determined with scientific accuracy? In that case emotionality would have assumed a different quality.

Alas, so far not everything is developing in Yaroslavl all that logically. Possibly the time for balancing passion with reason was short, for the Social Council is only taking its initial steps, steps which are difficult and call for surmounting the traditional difficulties of a bureaucratic, of an overinsuring nature. However, there has been some progress and certain experience has been acquired and, therefore, so has a certain reputation.

'SOBOR'

In Dal's Dictionary this concept has several meanings. The first is entirely consistent with the case: "A meeting... for advice and for solving important problems." How are decisions made at "SOBOR," and how important are its projects?

Everything started with the method of discussions, which is normal for the citizens. Under the "SOBOR" aegis they assumed a practical and constructive nature, although emotional outbursts happened as well. Nonetheless, the main thing was not the fact that the viewpoints of dozens or hundreds of opponents clashed, but a clarification of moods and social needs. Their scientific study is "SOBOR's" main function.

Before the first stage in the elections for People's Deputies of the USSR had even ended, the Social Council had already acquainted the people of Yaroslavl with its survey: an assessment of the public opinion on the procedure for the nomination of candidates and the organization of the electoral campaign. The method of random telephone calls by rayon was used for a quick survey. Students from Yaroslavl University, who had received excellent grades in social psychology, held 520 telephone interviews on the basis of a standard questionnaire which made statistical processing easy. That same questionnaire was submitted to 50 secretaries of party organizations in schools and 50 members of the personnel services of enterprises and organizations, i.e., people who, as a rule, were actively participating in the electoral campaign. Additionally, the same system was applied in surveying 50 workers at the engine manufacturing plant.

Shortcomings in the campaign became clear. It turned out that 87.7 percent of those surveyed had not been given timely information on the candidates. The positive feature was that the nomination of candidates among the "People's Front" leadership had substantially enlivened the electoral competitiveness. On the other hand, however, according to public opinion, there were many negative features in the organization and holding of the meetings sponsored by the "populists." Many of those surveyed opposed the liking for spontaneous nomination of several candidates, and even more so in the course of surveys in unsuitable places, such as, for example, among people waiting in line to buy something.

Subsequent to the survey, an electoral meeting was held at Electoral District No 345. Eleven candidates competed. I.B. Shamshev, senior university teacher, and one of the leaders of the "People's Front," came out third in the vote. However, he had failed to garner more than one-half of the votes, for which reason he was dropped out of the subsequent electoral struggle. Naturally, no one likes to lose, particularly if even the slightest possible doubt appears as to the equality of conditions under which one is to compete. Such doubts did exist, although the investigation which followed found no violations of the law.

Now, however, it is not a question of the survey of public opinion. No one in "SOBOR" ordered such a survey. Nonetheless, "SOBOR" informed the public of the results of the survey through the oblast newspaper. Actually, the instant survey was a test of strength in one of the most important trends of work of the new social group. It now became clear that the creation of a cost accounting center for the comprehensive study of urban problems, under the Social Council, which had been planned from the very beginning, was realistic and useful. Customers came quickly, for the need for such studies in the city had existed for quite some time. In a word, one could start this project without further delay. However, this did not happen.

Allowing a meeting at the sports stadium is possible, and a proper instruction to this effect has been issued. Issuing such a permit is an entirely realistic and universally acknowledged useful matter. However, it must not be based on any type of ukase or instruction dating from the 1930s. The leadership of the gorispolkom erected a wall. The request of the party gorkom did not help. It was impossible. It was illegal. To register the "SOBOR" as a social association "was not possible," for there was no such precedent. People with a good knowledge of the "stagnation traditions" gave friendly advice to the members of "SOBOR:" "You had no business sending your famous letter to the mayor of the city and then going to his subordinates with a request. This was naive!"

However, like other informal associations, "SOBOR" did not lack a spirit of enterprise. Was a research center of the association of social organizations possible? Let us say that it was. But just try not to register a cost

accounting consultative bureau with the legal Yaroslavl department of the USSR Philosophical Society. The fact that this department consists of no more than a few dozen people is immaterial. What matters is that a proper instruction to this effect exists.

For the time being, the Cost Accounting Consultative Bureau (KhKB) has two full employees: a director and a bookkeeper. The personnel will not greatly increase even when there is a research center, when such a center has been nonetheless established. Its establishment, however, is mandatory. The guardians of instructions are bound to retreat. In this case as well there is no precedent.

The target of the first cost accounting project of the KhKB was the conflict which became notorious, to say the least, throughout Russia, of the Gipropribor Institute, where a closed party meeting expressed a political lack of confidence in the democratically elected director (who turned out to be a nonparty member) on the day after his election. Even many of those who had voted against the winner were indignant, not to mention his supporters. One can easily guess the type of psychological climate which developed after that in the institute. This was a tight tangle of contradictions. The Labor Collective Council called to "SOBOR" for help. With its participation, preparations are under way for new elections and specialists are making a thorough study of public opinion so that the future manager will be aware of the entire situation and can knowledgeably formulate a strategy for managing a now divided collective.

According to the contract, the KhKB was paid 7,800 rubles for this work. Naturally, to a cost accounting organization this is not a great deal of money. What emerged, however, was already a firm contract: a study of the ecological situation in a number of city rayons. The "People's Front" as well made its contribution to "organizing" this contract. The concentrated criticism of managers of enterprises which were polluting the environment yielded results. Yielding to public pressure, they developed the urgent need to become specifically familiar with all of their sins, to know them not emotionally but on the basis of a strictly scientific assessment of the ecological situation and the extent of their own guilt.

This, however, is a matter of the immediate future. For the time being "SOBOR" has many other concerns. I attended one of its weekly sessions, on 24 February. I hope that the list of the items which were considered and the approach to their solution will provide an idea of the activities of this new social organization.

The first item was a report on the activities of the Cost Accounting Consultative Bureau. The deadline for fulfilling the order was 30 April. The work schedule is being observed. This was good. This was followed by short semi-reports and semi-expressions of gratitude. I.V. Gavrilov, a teacher of mathematics and president of the

Jazz Society in the city, expressed his gratitude for the support he received in organizing the international "Jazz On the Volga" Festival. However, the young people are not attracted exclusively by rock.... Preparations are going according to plan. The issuing of invitations to the participants, the reservation made at the hotel, the agreement concluded with the Melodiya Company on cutting the records.... This initiative interested the representative of the Society for the Preservation of Monuments. An agreement was reached then and there for a combined final performance in ancient Rostov. There will be a jazz concert followed by the ringing of the famous Rostov Bells. Naturally, the Society for the Preservation of Monuments would organize an excursion for the festival guests.

A school for young journalists has existed in Yaroslavl, moving from one city location to another in different parts of the city, for a number of years. Its manager, V.A. Gorobchenko, could not conceal his happiness: thanks to the concern shown by "SOBOR," finally the school had been given permanent premises. The Krug Cooperative Association, which had actively supported the movement of "popular diplomacy," is organizing an exhibit of Italian painters. Things are moving. It was "SOBOR's" reputation that helped. The situation with premises was bad. All exhibition halls were filled. The exhibit would have to take place at the cooperative coffee shop. It was tight but, what was one to do.... Yes, V.V. Teplov, who was the representative of the Yaroslavl department of the Union of Painters in "SOBOR" agreed, the halls had been reserved for a year in advance. The coffee shop, however was no solution. He suggested that the exhibit be held in the lobby of the Painter's Club. A proper opening could be held there as well. It took 5 minutes to settle the problem. The people who had gathered here were not only interested but also practical.

Like people in any other city, many people in Yaroslavl are enthusiastic about things. Sometimes, they find it difficult to determine where to go for support, particularly if their initiative is, so to say, of an interdepartmental nature. Now they know where to go. N.G. Lovtsova, a young psychologist, came for help. The city needed a "confidential telephone," so that a person finding himself in a desperate situation or even having decided to take a fatal step, could share his problem with the psychologist. "SOBOR" has already taken practical steps to this effect. Questions were asked at the session concerning the psychological situation in the city and the reasons for the most typical stresses. N.G. Lovtsova knowledgeably answered all questions and described the experience with the "confidence telephone" in Moscow and Leningrad, which she had studied personally. A large number of rather delicate problems as well as most prosaic ones were discussed. Premises, telephones... everything seemed difficult. Actually, one thing has already been accomplished: the oblast health department will assign the necessary personnel for the new medical service, on "SOBOR's" petition.

The War and Labor Veterans Council initiated the reconstruction of a military memorial cemetery and succeeded in banning burials in it based on the requests of high authorities. Architects undertook to draw up the project. However, the efforts of the public had to be rallied, above all that of painters and writers. Money was needed, a great deal of it. A campaign for voluntary contributions was inaugurated but so far not everyone knows about it. Many enterprises could give free help in lasting and other projects. Research should develop on a different scale. The cemetery includes a common grave for children who were taken out of blockaded Leningrad and who died in Yaroslavl. We should not have nameless graves. "SOBOR" decided actively to participate in this project and to submit the reconstruction plan for discussion.

The final item on the agenda was preparations for an ecological discussion. It was planned to be held together with the "Green Bough" Club, which is part of the "People's Front", and together with other urban ecological groups.

The ecological section of "SOBOR," headed by V.L. Rokhmistrov, was noted for its outstanding work. In the course of the discussion, it was decided to call upon the people of Yaroslavl to hold a citywide ecological subbotnik. It has been estimated that 47 percent of the suggestions submitted by citizens on improving the ecological situation deal with the not always justified cutting of trees. Let the debate become, in particular, a protest against such a practice, and the subbotnik a real contribution to the correction of errors. The architectural administration is already earmarking sectors for future plantings. The students have begun to keep a record of the trees. The painters have submitted a sketch of a poster for the subbotnik.

Aware of past ecological discussions, I was expecting a polemical discussion between the leadership of the "Green Bough" Club and G.F. Ryleyev, chairman of the city's veterans council. The "People's Front" has old accounts to settle with the Veterans Council ever since the latter was able to build a hospital for war invalids in the city park, which thus became smaller. However, there was no discussion. Gennadiy Fedorovich Ryleyev cast a meaningful look at the club's leader and said: "We have on our conscience 162 trees which were cut down in the building of the hospital. We shall repay this debt. For each tree that was cut the Veterans Council pledges to plant 10 trees with its own forces."

The "SOBOR" meeting lasted 2 and a half hours. It is hardly possible for me to describe briefly the atmosphere in which this event took place. In any case, in my view, and frequently repeated in theoretical articles and political comments, the idea of social self-management began to acquire quite definite features.

And thus, two social movements, which do not always peacefully coexist, exist in Yaroslavl. It is true that now V.V. Novikov listens less frequently to the advice of "well-wishers" to abandon his "idea," and even less frequently does he hear open threats. Life demands unity of action between these two popular organizations in the city and the interconnection between the two forms (or levels or varieties) of glasnost. Such a trend has developed. The first joint ecological discussion, the preparations for which I described, took place. This is an encouraging beginning, but...

"SOBOR" has undertaken to organize a "exhibition of ideas," in other words, a citywide competition for means of solving the problems which were formulated in the course of the numerous discussions and meetings (including those held at the stadium).

The "People's Front" took a whole month to organize the boycott of elections for people's deputies of the USSR in the electoral district in which, after a district meeting, its candidate withdrew.

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'Ready to Sacrifice Everything for the Sake of Truth'

18020012f Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 89 (signed to press 4 Apr 89) pp 34-37

[Notes by Romain Rolland on V.I. Lenin, extracted from the "Diary" of the French writer]

[Text] Note by V. Sedykh, APN Political Observer:

"Even while he was still alive, his spiritual image was impressed on the hearts of the people and will remain there into the centuries," was the way Romain Rolland reacted at the beginning of February of that sad year of 1924, to the death of Vladimir Ilich Lenin.

The road taken by this outstanding French writer which led this assessment of the leader of the Great October Revolution was complex. In that same article, Rolland emphasized that he did not share the ideas of Lenin and of Russian bolshevism. The author of "*Jean-Christophe*," considered himself "too" individualistic and "too" idealistic to "join the Marxist credo with its materialistic fatalism...." However, that is precisely why, according to the writer, he ascribed tremendous importance to great personalities, and felt great enthusiasm for that of Lenin.

Subsequently, Rolland's attention to the historical role played by Lenin would become more profound, more complete and more comprehensive. In 1932 he wrote a preface to the "*Lenin' Album by the Painter 'N. Altman*." Two years later, the author of "*The Charmed Soul*," once again returned to the character of the

founder of the Soviet state. In his article "Lenin: Art and Action," he considered the attitude of the leader of the October Revolution toward artistic creativity and, above all, the art of Leo Tolstoy.

The Soviet readers are familiar with these works. Far less familiar in our country and still not translated into Russian are Rolland's letters and diaries, in which V.I. Lenin is mentioned frequently.

In 1984, shortly before her death, the writer's widow presented me as a gift six beautifully printed volumes of Romain Rolland's "*Diary of the War Years, 1914-1919*." As the note to the diaries mentions, in 1934 Rolland gave for safekeeping to the library of the university in Basel 29 notebooks which were the complete text of his "*Diary of the War Years*." According to the will of the author, the library was allowed to publish the text entirely, without any abbreviations, after 1955. At the same time, Rolland allowed his heirs, prior to that deadline, to publish an abridged variant which he dictated and signed personally. It was precisely this text that became the basis of the edition prepared for publication by Mariya Pavlovna, the writer's wife. All six volumes are prefaced with the line: "Notes and documents on the moral history of Europe of that time."

In offering me this work, Mariya Pavlovna spoke of the infinite respect which Rolland had for Lenin, "the most human of all men," and who, he believed, more than anyone else embodied in his activities the ideas of the proletarian revolution and socialism (incidentally, in the course of our last meeting, the 90-year old widow of the writer, presented me with the poem "Lenin," which she had written in French).

What was Vladimir Ilich's attitude toward Rolland? We find in the fourth volume of the diaries a photocopy of the telegram dated 6 April 1917, addressed to Henri Guilbeau, signed Ulyanov. It informs him of the planned departure (of a group of Russian revolutionaries—author) for Germany on 7 April and included a request to bring Romain Rolland along, "should he, in principle, agree." What did this refer to? Anticipating the slanderous campaign in connection with the "daring" return of the Russian revolutionaries to their homeland, through Germany, Lenin had decided to invite to Bern, to witness the time of his departure, several noted personalities, including Rolland, and to ask them to initial a document which explained the reasons and conditions of the trip.

However, Rolland expressed to Guilbeau his doubts concerning a plan which he considered risky. Unfortunately, this prevented the personal acquaintance of the outstanding leader with Vladimir Ilich, who greatly valued the antimilitaristic activities of the author of the courageous book "*Above the Fray*." (We know, for example, that in November 1915 Lenin asked V.A. Karpinskiy to send him this work.)

V.I. Lenin's name is mentioned for the first time in the 6 April 1917 entry in the Diary (in connection with the talk between Romain Rolland and Henri Guilbeau we mentioned). All in all, Vladimir Ilich is mentioned on more than 70 different occasions in this unique chronicle of 1914-1919.

Many of the entries were based on Rolland's talk with Henri Guilbeau and the Russian emigres who lived at that time in Switzerland—A.V. Lunacharskiy and N.A. Rubakin.

Following are a few excerpts of Romain Rolland's "Diary."

6 April 1917. After describing in detail his conversation with Henri Guilbeau,¹ who confidentially told him of the plan of a group of Russian revolutionary emigres to return to Russia through Germany (in a sealed car), Rolland did not conceal his fears on this account and made the following entry in his diary: "We understand their zeal quite well. They want to get into the thick of it. Yet they know that the moment they step on Russian soil they could be detained, thrown in jail and executed. Their leader is Lenin, who is considered the brain of the entire revolutionary movement."

12 April. Rolland recorded his conversation with A.V. Lunacharskiy, with whom he met at N.A. Rubakin's place.² "The discussion, which preceded the departure (Lenin's and his fellow travelers—author) was quite stormy. The socialist-patriots opposed Lenin's plan with indignation. Other socialists, Lunacharskiy specified, who deep within themselves opposed Lenin's lack of caution, nonetheless defended to the patriots the loyal nature of his intentions and the reasons for them. As to Lenin, it was useless to argue with him. Once he had decided on something, no one could make him back down. Lunacharskiy described him to me as a person of inordinate energy who had a tremendous influence on the masses. He was the only one among the socialist leaders to enjoy such influence thanks to the clarity of his objectives and the contagious power of his will.... His elder brother, a brilliant chemist, was hanged 20 years ago³ for making a bomb for an attempted assassination. The socialist deputies in the Duma, who had been exiled to Siberia and had just returned to Petrograd, could not survive without Lenin; these were people ready for any kind of trial and any suffering for their cause; as the offspring of the people, insufficiently well educated, they drew from Lenin inspiration for all their actions. Lenin decided to take the risk and to return to Petrograd despite the Provisional Government.

7 May. Rolland recorded yet another talk with A.V. Lunacharskiy, who told him that he was "part of the second echelon of Russian revolutionaries who intended, like Lenin, to go to Russia through Germany. "The Russians who are in Switzerland are convinced that there is no other way open to them for returning to their homeland, and this applies even to those who recently

blamed Lenin for this." "He is a 'saint,' Lunacharskiy said (about Lenin—author) (although he spoke of him quite harshly). He is not known to have any weaknesses. His life is totally dedicated to the cause. He cannot even be accused of pride or ambition as one may have done based on purely external features: he has absolutely no ambitious aspirations; he would be the first to yield to someone he would consider more useful to the common cause than he. However, he is convinced that he knows the truth. For the sake of the truth he is ready to sacrifice everything. His moral authority must be very high so that at this time, after the risky step he has taken, he would not be harmed by slander. Even Milyukov was forced to say that Lenin is an honest man (and the newspapers supporting the Entente were forced to repeat this). Lunacharskiy believes that Lenin can be defeated only through assassination. And he fears that that is quite possible."

12 May. "Guilbeau sent me a copy of the 'Parting Letter to the Swiss Workers,' written by Lenin.... It is an embodiment of tireless energy and infinite sincerity. Lenin breaks not only with all conservative, bourgeois, nationalist and social-patriotic parties but also with moderate internationalists, such as Akselrod, Martov, Chkheidze, Skobelev, Turati, Treves, Snowden, Ramsey McDonald, Grimm, Kautsky, Haase and others...."

29 July. "In this fierce struggle between counterrevolutionary elements and the revolution slander and insults (as always happens in such cases) immediately played their monstrous role. Equally savage curses were hurled at the soldiers of June (the French 1848 Revolution—author) and the Commune (the Paris Commune of 1871—author), and are now directed at the bolsheviks; and 'all liberal journalists' are doing this as fiercely as the police. RABOCHAYA GAZETA (the organ of the menshevik social-patriots) gave the signal for starting the campaign of slanders and provocations. Efforts are being made to defame all of Lenin's circle (Zinoviev, Radek, Trotsky, and others), in order later morally to kill the one who is praised as the Marat of the Russian Revolution—a 'fighter, who is crystal pure,' as he was described in PRAVDA, and the 'heart and brain of the revolution'."

20 November 1917 (Hotel Byron). "This is the 4th year and the 1,212th day of the war. The maximalists are in power. Lenin, Trotsky and Lunacharskiy are, respectively, people's commissars of internal affairs,⁴ foreign affairs and education. A suggestion was made of signing an armistice with Germany. The allies refuse to acknowledge the government of the Russian Revolution. Clemenceau, who is in power, will resort to force."

2 December. "As is his custom, Rubakin does not refer in particularly pleasant terms to the leader of the maximalists (although he is touched to tears by some of their proclamations and the enthusiasm they are generating). He believes that Lenin is more serious and better educated than Trotsky who, in his view, is simply a gossip who knows how to talk without saying anything."

September 1918. "...A very serious attempt on Lenin's life was made in Petrograd⁵, while another bolshevik, Uritskiy⁶, the commissar for internal affairs, was killed.... The bourgeoisie and the militaristic press throughout Europe immediately published the news of Lenin's death. In my Swiss hotel I observed idiotic happiness on the faces of people. A young French teacher (a governess working for a very rich Parisian family) was shouting in the hall that this news should be celebrated with champagne. It is entirely obvious that the bourgeoisie throughout Europe or throughout the world—pro-German as well as pro-ally—has directed its greatest hatred (explained mainly by its fear) at the Russian Revolution! They are all trembling for their purses."

Saturday 12 April (1919). "Biryukov⁷ paid me a visit.... Although he is a pure Tolstoyan, and an enemy of all violence, he nonetheless brought optimistic impressions from revolutionary Russia. He does not close his eyes at the bloody aspects but considers unfair to blame the bolsheviks for this (at least for most of it).... The soviets are allocating substantial funds for public education, no less than for art and literature: people engaged in intellectual work are paid better. Lunacharskiy, whose intelligence and taste are well-known, as well as Lenin's wife (Madame Krupskaya), a former teacher, a splendid and modest person, are essentially engaged in public education and have done a great deal in this area. One can also see many major intellectuals, who hold antibolshevik views, but who have agreed to assume or reassume important positions. I am not speaking of the prosperous theaters, for this is a known fact.... Furthermore, here is what is happening: bolshevik Marxism has totally turned the social pyramid upside-down. It has replaced the upper crust (tsarism and the privileged strata); it has brought down the private ownership classes, while the foundations of the pyramid—the working people—have been put on top."

Footnotes

1. Henri Guilbeau was a French socialist who, in World War I, held antimilitaristic positions. He subsequently broke with the revolutionary movement.

2. N.A. Rubakin was a Russian book expert, bibliographer and writer. He had lived in Switzerland since 1907.

3. As written. Actually, 30 years.

4. As written. Actually, Lenin was chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

5. As written. Actually, the attempt on V.I. Lenin took place in Moscow.

6. As written. Actually, M.S. Uritskiy was chairman of the Petrograd Cheka.

7. P.I. Biryukov was a Russian publisher close to L.N. Tolstoy.

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Rule of Law: From Idea to Practice

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[Article by Marat Viktorovich Baglay, doctor of juridical sciences, professor]

[Text] The concept of the socialist rule of law state inaugurates a new stage in the development of the study of the Soviet state. A rule of law state cannot be simply proclaimed. It must truly exist on the basis of the sum of new social institutions. It must become the result of a basic change in the nature of relations among the state, society and the individual. Obviously, changes will also have to be made in understanding the nature of the law and its philosophical and ethical foundations.

The rule of law state is established in our country by perestroyka. It is at its initial stage of development. There is as yet no total clarity concerning its functions, structure and the range of competence of the authorities and administrations, and their correlation with the personal freedom of the citizens. The overall concept has already been defined and the basic principles of the socialist rule of law state have been formulated. The adoption of the amendments and supplements to the USSR Constitution adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the elections of the people's deputies of the USSR, on the basis of the new law, mark the initial important stages in its establishment. Today the question of intensifying theory and establishing the ways for practically harmonizing the rule of law with all components of the political system is becoming increasingly pressing.

I

Rule of law states have developed in different countries differently. However, this process has a general essential feature: it has been a movement of mankind toward freedom, a realized aspiration to curb the leviathan of the state and to force it to respect the laws and rights of man. Juridically, this means acknowledging the freedom of man and society from the unlimited interference of the state and the primacy of the law over the state and the obligation of the state to observe the law in all of its activities, as well as the need for a democratic structure and functioning of the state authorities, and the acknowledgment and observance of the independence of the courts. Actually, it is also another attempt at developing global civilization which is useful to apply and heed in the course of the further formulation of the concept of the socialist rule of law state.

For a considerable period of time, the Soviet state was unable to become an unbreachable block to the development of antisocial phenomena, such as bureaucratism, corruption, trafficking, bribery and organized crime. It

"overlooked" the substantial lagging in the social area. It was not able to ensure a reliable combination of scientific and technical with economic progress. A great many right words were said about strengthening legality, involving the working people in the management of the state, and broadening and intensifying the rights and freedoms of the Soviet citizen; however, the political mechanisms and ideological stereotypes did not ensure the transformation of such words into actions.

Today the party has taken the path of decisively correcting deformations in the development of socialism and the solution of such a major problem is impossible with the old methods, the more so since this is not limited to correcting past shortcomings but affects the entire system of governmental administration and development of self-management. The mechanism of power must be reorganized in such a way as to acquire main qualities: it must become truly democratic and efficient. This is one of the decisive components for the success of perestroika, for restoring and strengthening the trust of the masses in the state machinery and for involving them in management.

From the theoretical and practical viewpoints it is also important to answer the question of the correlation between the concepts of the state of the whole people and the rule of law state. We believe that although they are not identical there is a deep interconnection between the two. Whereas with the concept of the state of the whole people we emphasized the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country and the broadening of its social base, the concept of the rule of law state means to convert a state based on a nationwide social foundation into a truly democratic one, consistent with the task set by the party of converting to a new qualitative social status and to a humanistic and democratic socialism. The rule of law state does not mean the instant elimination of the old governmental-legal institutions and replacing them with new ones; nor does it mean a "merging" of the old into the new. Its structure is a process of radical reorganization of the work of existing institutions, and the reform of their structure and of the nature of legal standards. Equally important is the problem of educating the personnel of the state and party apparatus and all working people in a spirit of acknowledging the supremacy of the law and the absolute priority of law and legality. This process can become successful if we establish a new moral-legal category—the **political reputation** of the state and party leader—if elections to soviets on all levels become a true test of the competence of the people's candidates and if public opinion becomes actively involved in such work. Therefore, the rule of law state will also mean a higher standard of political ethics.

The practical implementation of the idea of the rule of law state requires a serious theoretical interpretation of a number of concepts.

To begin with, this applies to the features of the political system, based on the leading status of the party, the machinery of which has still not surmounted the historically developed traditions of direct interference in the

practical activities of state authorities. The building of a rule of law state, therefore, blends with the implementation of the party's task of democratizing its own role in society and no longer assuming the functions of state authorities. It presumes enhancing the autonomy and responsibility of the state apparatus, and the development of self-management of the local authorities and labor collectives and upgrading the political and legal standards of the people.

Second, it applies to the features of the economic system, essentially based on state ownership and the state organization of material and spiritual production. It was under these circumstances, as we know, that the administrative-command system developed, which restricted both freedom of choice in economic activities and man's legal protection from the arbitrary behavior of the bureaucracy. The party views the possibility of correcting the situation through the development of cooperatives, share holding companies, and individual labor activities, and stimulating individual, group and collective initiative through contracting and leasing. The rule of law state will strengthen the protection of such forms of activity by the citizens.

Third, this applies to a society which clearly opted for socialism and, on this basis, achieved unity, organization and purposefulness. However, throughout its entire history, exclusively collectivistic forms of social life were promoted in that society and the individual consideration of personal freedom was firmly rejected; in turn, this made pluralism impossible and distorted many civil rights and freedoms.

Fourth, this applies to the socialist federative state system, based on national statehood, including the sovereignty of large ethnic groups and nationalities in the country. Consequently, the organization of the system and of management must be developed on the basis of the principles of the rule of law state not only on the Union level but also on the level of all the individual national members of the federation.

These characteristics constitute a major distinction between the role and functions of the socialist rule of law state and the rule of law in a bourgeois pluralistic society. In answer to the skeptics who question the possibility of creating a rule of law state under socialist conditions and a one-party system, we can confidently say that, unquestionably, a rule of law state can be built in a socialist society. However, taking into consideration the specific nature of this society, it will develop in a state of interaction with the overall perestroika process. Just about the most difficult aspect of this will be to establish efficient legal relations between the state and the party and among all other units within the political system.

II

Science faces the complex task of theoretically structuring the functions of the socialist rule of law state. It can be claimed that the range of its functional obligations should be reduced in favor of granting more freedom, initiative and socialist enterprise. This applies to the administrative activities of the state apparatus as well as the trend followed in legal regulations. This requirement, however, does not diminish in the least the significance of the socialist state or its authority and influence. However, we must clearly demarcate its range of obligations, functions and rights in such a way that they could neither be strengthened nor weakened but be set on a clearly defined level which would ensure the freedom and well-being of the people and an efficient consideration of the national interests.

The economy is the most complex area of regulatory and administrative activities of the state. Under the conditions of the radical economic reform and the development of cooperatives, the functions of the rule of law state can no longer include in the least the organization of direct centralized management of enterprises by ministries and departments, supervision over production processes in rural and industrial cooperatives, etc. The traditional economic-organizational function of the state changes and relations between the central agencies of sectorial management and the individual enterprises gradually lose their administrative-command nature, yielding to the autonomy of the latter as recognized by the law.

The nature of law enforcement functions substantially changes. This is assisted by the democratization of social life and the broadening of glasnost and the areas open to criticism, and no longer classifying as criminal-legal acts a number of so-called political crimes. It is the obligation of the state to guarantee the protection of the freedoms and rights of the individual and to maintain public order in accordance with the legally stipulated range of rights granted to the respective authorities. At the same time, this function assumes a new content related, for example, to strengthening the struggle against organized crime.

Equally essential are changes in the functions related to meeting the social needs of the population. Obviously, in this area there must be a redistribution as a result of which a significant part of obligations will be transferred to the cooperative sector (organization of public catering, trade, consumer services, and so on), while the most difficult and capital intensive will be assumed by the state. This would involve environmental protection, the creation of high-quality health care, recreation and education systems, etc. Mixed state-private systems must be developed (as in insurance of individual citizens, for instance).

The most important feature in the implementation of the functions of the state, which has already appeared in the course of perestroika, is their close interconnection with the activities of social organizations and individual citizens. However, such interaction is inconceivable without

eliminating the traditional bureaucratic "great-power" nature of the apparatus, in which society is assigned the role of a dependent weak partner. It cannot be said that the broadening of legal regulations helped to develop in this area a truly businesslike and equal cooperation instead of its opposite, thus paralyzing initiative. However, if we truly wish to achieve the broader participation of public organizations and citizens in the activities of state authorities on all levels, which is the essential foundation of socialist self-management by the people, we need a certain set of rules and the establishment of respective reciprocal rights and obligations. It must be clearly stipulated that no single decision, such as changing labor conditions, can be made by governmental authorities without the agreement of the trade unions or, in youth matters, the agreement of the Komsomol. The term "agreement" must include the possibility of vetoing any management decision. The government must openly consult with the public prior to promulgating executive acts of essential significance. The trade unions which, in particular, must perform the role of "counterbalance" opposition to technocratic and bureaucratic trends, must act on an entirely different and immeasurably higher level.

One of the most important theoretical and practical problems is that of determining the social nature of the socialist rule of law state. It is obvious that at the present stage, when society consists exclusively of friendly classes and the intelligentsia, unlike the bourgeois state our state is not, strictly speaking, a class state. This means that conditions have been created for the unconditional acknowledgment of the total juridical equality of all people and their equal real opportunities to participate in governmental and social life. The rule of law state cannot accept on this level even the slightest possible privilege, not to mention discrimination based on national, class or any other features.

In this connection, we must consider legal forms which would make it possible maximally to take into consideration the interests of all social groups. While we comprehensively emphasize the leading role of the working class in our revolution and in building socialism we must, at the same time, not forget that the present socialist society belongs to all working people and that it could not exist without the dedicated labor of all popular strata. Consequently, the rule of law state as well must become the embodiment of true equality among all citizens, wherever they may be working. It is only thus that we can see to it that all social strata and individual citizens feel an equal responsibility for the state of affairs in the country and act accordingly.

It is on this basis that the structure of the soviets, which represent the power of the people, must be not a mirror image of the social structure of society, artificially created by order, but an entity developed through the free election of politically competent working people, with the equal participation of all citizens and all social

groups in the nomination of candidates for deputies. However, this is not a question of the "free play" of political forces or of a struggle among social groups and strata. It is important to create, as a minimum, legal opportunities which will enable the authorities to and the activities of state agencies to reflect the interests of the various social strata. Without this, any kind of statement about popular rule notwithstanding, once again the state risks to find itself in the clutches of bureaucratic and even authoritarian trends.

We therefore believe that this leads to the important philosophical-legal task of Soviet state studies: based on the actual dynamics of the social structure of Soviet society, to formulate the theory of group influences, on the basis of which each social group would be given the opportunity efficiently to participate in the electoral process and to influence the activities of all state authorities through the mechanism of public opinion. The more fractionalized and informal such groups are, the more profound and specific will be the connection between the rule of state law with the people and the more tangible will be the impetus which stimulates the development of social organizations.

III

It is common knowledge that a law is an act of supreme juridical power (second to the Constitution). However, this is a formal, albeit necessary, definition. The main feature in this concept is that the law must have a democratic trend, i.e., it must directly or indirectly defend human rights and freedoms. Otherwise we should accept that legality, i.e., obeying the laws, is in itself unrelated to democracy and is inherent in the most undemocratic regimes.

But how to ensure this democratic trend of the laws and what is the criterion of their democracy? At this point we are helped by the concept of the supremacy of parliament, which means that it is only the representative authority, elected by the people, that has the right to promulgate and amend laws and supervise their execution by official agencies. The supremacy of parliament also means that no other authority with similar functions can function above or alongside to it, which demands an important addition: the application of legally passed laws must be ensured by an independent judiciary which has adopted standards which prevent the adoption of undemocratic laws. This is the fundamental principle of a constitutional regime which ensures the democratic nature of the state.

Our press has frequently commented on the expediency of applying in our country the principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judiciary, thus providing a certain protection against excessive concentration of power within the same hands. Unquestionably, this principle would contribute to the stabilization of the political system and prevent power abuses. Nonetheless, as foreign historical experience indicates, in

itself this principle has by no means always worked in favor of democracy. In the Weimar Republic, for instance, despite the clear separation of powers, with a parliamentary system, a fascist regime was established peacefully ("legally"). The spoiling of relations among parties and use of the armed forces have frequently resulted in coups d'etat in Latin American countries, in which the separation of powers, based on the principles of a republic governed by a president, was even more consistently applied than had been the case in Germany. Finally, as the American science of constitutional law points out, the clear separation of powers in the United States, supplemented by an efficient system of "checks and balances," did not prevent but, rather, even contributed to a significant increase in presidential power. The separation of powers, consequently, should be assessed according to the specific features of the political system and the possibility not only of separating such powers but also of maintaining efficient control over such separation.

In particular, we must acknowledge that the principle of separation of powers has proved effective in solving at least one important problem: the acceptance of the independence of the judiciary and its right to apply the law. This is of major importance in order for the superior state authorities (parliament and government) to be ruled not only by the laws which they themselves draft and execute ("statutory law") but also the laws generated by the courts, a part of which cannot be amended by any other laws that may be passed. It is precisely this specific part that contains the basic guarantees for the protection of human rights and which prevents the drifting of society toward a system of personal power. This should be the most important role of the courts in a rule of law state, for which reason, it is our belief, that **judicial doctrine must be directly equated to the sources of the law.**

Does this apply to our conditions and tasks? I believe that it does, in its essential features, although one cannot see in the separation of powers the absolute, not to mention the only panacea to all undesirable trends. Other guarantees must exist as well. In our country the rule of law state must develop under the vanguard political role of the party. This could be a manifestation of a much more real guarantee both of the unity among all parts of the governmental mechanism as well as the efficient implementation by each one of them of its own functions, naturally providing that they are precisely demarcated, above all those separating the party from the state.

The supremacy of the socialist parliament, together with the separation of powers, will create conditions for the "rule of law" which must replace the "rule of men" or, in simple terms, the discretionary rule by officials. The rule of law unequivocally pushes into the background any illegal act and makes impossible imposing any arbitrary rule, except for a rule which has been legitimately applied in an emergency situation. Any violation of a law by anyone must be inadmissible and should entail immediate punishment.

The task of ensuring the democratic content of the laws urgently requires a certain legislative professionalism in the membership and work of our Supreme Soviet, so that the supreme representative authority, which now becomes standing, may include a greater number of people who would think like statesmen. We believe that, in addition to collective initiative we must also develop the individual legislative initiative of the deputies and stipulate in our procedures several "readings" of each draft law. With a standing representative authority the volume of passed legislation will increase quantitatively. Therefore, in order to be competent, every deputy will have to specialize in some area of state life and make skillful use of the services of the respective experts. Reducing parliamentary work to the work of its commissions would be inadmissible.

Obviously, significant changes will have to be made in the other basic functions of the Supreme Soviet: control over the government and finances. This should prevent violations of the laws and the promulgation of illegal acts by the governmental apparatus which is engaged in the daily practical administration of the country. A totally unrestrained apparatus which must face most difficult economic and social problems will inevitably show a tendency to engage in a bureaucratic distortion of the laws or even in openly illegal actions. This is a typical and even universal law of the management process, unless faced by daily external control. Such control, particularly in the area of finances, must be of expert quality.

The new amendments to the Constitution make it possible to exercise systematic control over the government by the representative authority. In the course of the development of these concepts, the Supreme Soviet must regularly sponsor debates on the basic problems of the activities of the government and, if necessary, give it (or to individual ministers) a no-confidence vote which will lead to a resignation. It is important to involve more extensively in the exercise of control functions the commissions of the chambers, which have the unquestionable right to summon any minister and undertake the independent investigation of cases involving violations of the law or corruption. Finances and, particularly, the revenue and expenditure parts of the state budgets must be constantly kept under supervision with open and extensive control on the part of the chambers and the commissions. It is very important also to formulate a procedure for controlling governmental resolutions, so that they may be consistent with the Constitution and the laws. To this effect every deputy must be systematically informed of the activities of "his own" controlled ministries and departments, and be in constant touch with them or with other interested social circles.

The decentralizing of state management, which is taking place in the course of perestroika, and the expansion of the rights of Union republics, krais and oblasts urgently require a clear demarcation among the functions of the state management authorities on the Union and local

levels. This is a particularly difficult matter in the areas of regulating and managing the economy, social affairs and culture, in which the significance of taking national features maximally under consideration is great.

The USSR Council of Ministers must provide the full management of the country and, consequently, bear joint responsibility not only for economic and sociocultural development but also, as a whole, for the entire domestic and foreign policy of the state. Leadership of the armed formations in the country and the activities of the ministries and departments of defense, state security and internal affairs require particular glasnost and public control. In this case management must be strictly consistent with the laws governing the functions, financing and structure of the leadership, naturally while maintaining the necessary secrecy, wherever this is justified. The need to strengthen the guarantees of legality and glasnost in this area is fully explainable, for it is a question of agencies which could apply force and, under certain circumstances, prevent the citizens from the exercise of their legitimate rights.

IV

The understanding of the nature of freedom and human rights changes sharply in the course of perestroika: the concept is established that they are the main values in life. This is extremely important in the light of the updating which is taking place in the country. The country is converting to humanistic and democratic socialism based on initiative, enterprise, glasnost, pluralism of opinion, free choice, self-management and autonomous activities. Today it is not some kind of loose "popular majority" that is beginning to make use of freedom but the specific individual. Naturally, individual rights and freedoms do not mean in the least some kind of anarchy or loss of organization. Socialism is, precisely, an organized society and it would be unreasonable to lose or even weaken this quality.

During the periods of Stalinism and stagnation the excessive organization and statism of all social institutions gradually restricted individual initiative to the limit. Equalization blossomed. The results were not slow in coming: the country fell behind socially, interest in work declined, an under-the-counter economy appeared, there was a tremendous waste of human energy, poor improvement in overall standards, undeveloped public opinion, and so on. Directly or indirectly, the rule of law state must help to surmount these ills.

The Marxist-Leninist understanding of human rights and freedoms has an important aspect: collectivism in the use of rights. In practice distortions in this area are possible, as we know from past experience. However, in its pure aspect, so to say, this principle is of great importance.

Within the collective the individual has the possibility comprehensively to develop his talents. Consequently, personal freedom is possible only within it. This is Marx's idea which cannot be disputed unless, naturally, instead of concern for the broad toiling masses one concentrates on protecting the freedom of selected people or, rather, the prosperous people, which precisely is the practice in bourgeois democracy.

Socialism approaches equality and real freedom for all on an organic and serious basis, firmly defending the concept that such freedom can be achieved only through the unification of people. This is closely related to the party's task of developing the activeness of labor collectives and social organizations, naturally under conditions of their internal democracy, and the guaranteed rights and freedom to display initiative by people who are particularly energetic and active. Under socialism equality does not mean equalization.

In the rule of law state there is no place for senseless restrictions of the rights of man, which are presently fettered by all sorts of instructions and bureaucratic regulations. Under the guise of concern for "common interests," the opponents of perestroika are holding back the development of cooperative activities and family leasing in agriculture. They obstruct the activities of trade unions, hinder youth initiative, oppose the expansion of glasnost, etc. To this day unjustified restrictions have been preserved in laws and resolutions including some which were passed recently. In the rule of law state the protection of the rights and interests of the citizens becomes the main task of the authorities. It would be difficult to reassess on this level the extended list of human rights included in the final document of the Vienna meeting and the related obligations assumed in this connection by the individual countries, including the USSR.

The freedom of man, and not only his well-being, becomes the main value. Real equality, furthermore, means lifting bureaucratic control over the individual, and reducing to a minimum the discretionary opinion of officials in considering citizens' petitions or demands. The law, and only the law, and not some kind of established expediency should determine the extent of individual freedom and its consistency with the interests and objectives of the entire nation.

The broadening of rights and freedoms, particularly in the political area, is by no means a simple matter. Throwing oneself blindly into the arms of an abstractly understood freedom, without being prepared for this economically or psychologically, is not only senseless but even carries the threat of turning into anarchic irrationality and stopping the process of perestroika. Therefore, the measure of freedom must be consistent with the standards reached in economic, political and cultural development.

The new social and political activeness of the citizens appears in the course of perestroika and so do its negative phenomena. Obviously, it is by no means easy for everyone to accept the principle that "anything that is not forbidden is permitted," i.e., specifically what can or cannot be done. Hence a lack of positive initiative, on the one hand, and exaggerations in understanding what is permissible, reaching the limits of senseless destructive actions, on the other. Obviously, to a certain extent this is inevitable, for the traditions of democratic action are weak and, in general, the exercise of freedoms has never been or could be the same everywhere.

The regulated use by the citizens of their individual and socioeconomic rights is relatively easy. It is much more difficult, under our circumstances, to develop the institution of political rights and freedoms. Yet it is precisely such an institution that contains the most sensitive nerve of any democratic regime! We can categorically say that in our country there has simply not been such a legal institution developed to its full extent. Essentially, discussions on the moral and political unity of society, its ideological integrity, and the need for the minority to obey the majority concealed the rejection of pluralism of opinion, something which is intrinsic in mankind. Yet, however much ideologically united a socialist society may be, it includes individuals and groups whose views may be different from officially held ones and for which, under no circumstances, should the citizens be persecuted. We must totally eliminate political discrimination, and the right to differ, exercised within the law, should be considered the juridical implementation of socialist pluralism. Socialism must acknowledge and protect the political rights of minorities more truly and extensively than bourgeois society. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international agreements adopted by the United Nations should be the firm support and guideline in this case.

It is easy to anticipate the following question: Would such requirements threaten our socialist foundations? This is neither a simple nor meaningless question, for words are a powerful force, precisely when expressed at a time when many of the deformations of socialism, senseless restrictions of individuals and their dependence on administrative control have still not been lifted. It is the purpose of science to help political practice to set efficient criteria of what is permissible, what is consistent with the socialist choice and with the democratic law and order of a rule of law state and to establish clear regulations governing reciprocal relations between citizens and law enforcement authorities. In our view, the time has come to formulate a scientifically substantiated theory of the correlation among freedom, discipline and organization.

Naturally, political rights and freedoms are not reduced solely to freedom of speech and pluralism of opinions. It is perhaps the most difficult thing for any state to determine the extent of permissibility in switching from words to actions. In our view, a more efficient regulation

is required, in particular, on the right to hold demonstrations and meetings, and so on. Such activities, which generate high emotional tension, usually reject sensible restrictions. However, for the time being the law enforcement authorities lack experience in handling large groups of excited people. This confirms, yet once again, the underdeveloped nature of our concepts of the legal status of the citizen and the insufficient practical experience in democracy.

In addition to the individual aspect of freedom, the rule of law state must ensure the freedom of public organizations. Under socialism they have become an indivisible component of the political structure of society and perhaps the closest "associates" of the state authorities. Unfortunately, however, the peculiar understanding of the ways and means of party leadership by these organizations, the trade unions in particular, has led to the loss of independence and to significant statification by many of them. By playing such a role, however, the social organizations stop being the equal and strong assistant or even partner of the system, and the citizens cannot rely on them in the defense of their legitimate rights and interests. The rule of law state must develop and apply a much more extensive protection of the autonomous activities of social organizations and develop an essentially new system of relations with them, based on acknowledging their function as one of control and counterbalance to possible bureaucratic distortions in the activities of state authorities.

The emphasis which is usually put on increasing democracy in the socialist rule of law state should not conceal the task of firmly promoting the strengthening of law and order and discipline in society and the strict and mandatory observance of the laws by anyone without exception. The rule of law state does not mean in the least the existence of a weak and indecisive authority, which could only worsen the situation of citizens' rights. It was no accident that the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference pointed out the need to improve the work of the militia, the prosecutor's office and the other authorities, and emphasized the importance of enhancing the responsibility of our citizens to their labor collectives, the state and society as a whole.

Finally, we must mention the changing role of juridical science in our state building. The concept of the rule of law state is a methodological program for restructuring this area of knowledge. Its influence on public opinion and state management must be constant and real. The model of the rule of law state in all its details cannot be created instantaneously and behind closed doors. It requires collective efforts. Today any combination of obsolete ideas, not to mention senseless political rhetoric and rehashing what is common knowledge, cannot meet the expectations of the masses. The contribution to the theory and practice of creating a rule of law state will be effective only if we surmount the alienation of science from life and promote the high civic-mindedness of every scientist. Naturally, there must be a significant

increase in the level of research of foreign state-legal experience and theoretical thinking and, naturally, not everything depends on the jurists. The main thing is for the practical workers within the party and state apparatus to forego their habit of ignoring scientific expertise. This is particularly important now, when practical work is beginning to change the structure of the system and to ensure the radical renovation of our legislation, and when the idea of a socialist rule of law state is becoming an area of practical action.

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Paradoxes or New Trends? Unity and Pluralism of Industrial Forms

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[Text] A panoramic view of profoundly conflicting trends is developing in front of our eyes. Huge production complexes and multinational corporations are growing in the capitalist world. Meanwhile, small and medium-sized business is expanding and its role in terms of employment, production and scientific and technical progress is growing.

The exploitation and poverty of tens and hundreds of millions of people is worsening. Mass unemployment has become a permanent feature. Meanwhile, the level of real income of the employed segment of the population is rising. Systems of social security are being developed, and the needs of the working people are becoming more complex and reaching higher standards.

The systems of monopoly and state control are becoming increasingly comprehensive, refined and thorough. Meanwhile, competition and the spontaneous actions of market mechanisms, particularly in the global economy, are not weakening, to say the least.

The list of such paradoxes could be extended.

Conflicting trends—on a different socioeconomic basis and in different aspects—are developing in the socialist economy as well. This economy urgently needs reorganization based on the interaction among large, medium-sized and small enterprises, increased democratic and scientific centralism combined with decentralization on the basis of a planned market, strong social control with the free development and satisfaction of individual needs, and so on.

All this, and a great deal more proves that in the contemporary interrelated world common, global objective processes appear, manifested differently in the two systems. This means that they have their common reason and common roots.

The revolutionary nature of the changes which have taken place and are continuing to occur in production forces and in all societies is unquestionable. In order to describe and explain these changes bourgeois science has formulated over the past 50 years a number of new theories. R. Aron's "Industrial Society," K. Clark's and J. Fourastier's "Service Society," Walt Rostow's "Mass Consumption Society," John Kenneth Galbraith's "Planned System," D. Bell's "Postindustrial Society," E. Toffler's "Third Wave Society," J. Naisbitt's "High Technology Society," E. Masoud's "Information Society," and others are all concepts which single out entirely definite and essential features of existing reality. However, do they encompass the pivot, the essence of the changes which have taken place? A. Buchholtz, the West German author, in noting that "our age is a stage in the development of the earth with no comparison to anything else," and that "we are encountering an increasingly tight network of technocratic structures and phenomena of civilization," is forced to admit that "we have no method which would scientifically interpret problems of such high complexity (see *"Kontinuität und Wandel in den Ost-West-Beziehungen"* [Continuity and Change in East-West Relations], Köln, 1983, p 365). Toffler, who is the author of the concept of the shift of the "industrial wave" in history with the subsequent "third wave," formulates the problem in even more dramatic terms: "Why did the old second wave unexpectedly stop functioning? Why is the new civilization wave flowing over the old? No one knows." He further says: "What we cannot find is... the link which holds the entire chain together" (see *"Amerikanskaya Model: S Budushchim v Konflikte"* [The American Model: In Conflict With the Future], Moscow, 1984, pp 40-41).

Lacking a methodology for the profound study of the new age, a number of Western authors nonetheless reject from the start the approaches suggested by Marxism. Thus, A. Buchholtz claims, in the book we mentioned, that "wherever the claim for such a method is formulated, as is done by Marxism-Leninism, ideological postulates block the way to understanding the nature of decisive phenomena" (p 365).

Meanwhile, creative Marxism precisely gives us the type of method which enables us to see contradictions and the steady process of socialization of production which irreversibly intensifies the interconnection among heterogeneous elements in modern civilization.

A Turn in Production Forces

In recent decades there has been no shortage of new definitions of our age: "atomic age," "space age," "age of electronics," "age of biotechnology," "information

industry age," and others. Each one of them is, in itself, accurate. However, all of them characterize nothing but the forms and trends of the scientific and technical revolution rather than the common base of the contemporary production process. The experience in developing theoretical knowledge indicates that the most difficult thing is to detect something which is essentially new in what we encounter at each step and which has long become a customary element of life.

However, we have been warned. As early as the mid-19th century, in interpreting the initial achievements of electrical engineering, Marx and Engels predicted the coming of an "economic revolution." V.I. Lenin's works contain the foundations of the theory of electrification as a new base of industry. Nonetheless, neither the electrical engineering change nor its socioeconomic significance have been totally realized by us so far.

The essence of this change is, above all, that for the first time a unified "machine system" has appeared which, in the course of its development, can encompass the national economy of an entire country or a group of countries.

The engine is the base of any machine system. The thermoelectric, hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, which are part of the power generating system, are such a "united national economic engine." All of these power plants are "powering a single shaft," maintaining tension in the power transmission cable from which the energy is drawn and transformed through a million "gears," such as transformer substations, electric motors, cathode-anode systems, electric heaters and other equipment. Electric power activates the working machines which under the influence of electrical engineering have radically changed: the electric power drive has become "built in" in a great variety of unexpected forms, in machine tools, chemical reactors, smelting furnaces, transportation facilities, computers, etc.

Therefore, the factory machine system (the steam engine, mechanical transmissions, working machinery) has been replaced by a system of machines in which each individual enterprise and work unit is more or less an autonomous part of a general technological entity.

The system for generating, transmitting and using electric power is the universal and the main but not the only "related" system which binds the individual economic elements into a single technological entity. Such "combined" technological systems (for the sake of brevity, let us refer to them as infrasystems) equally apply, to a different extent, to transportation and communications, water and heat supply systems, and so on. Therefore, an infrasystem is a specialized functionally single subsystem of public production forces, which combines heterogeneous individual production facilities and which organically becomes part of their components.

The sum total of the infrasystem which links the individual enterprises and all economic areas within a single technological chain constitutes, in our opinion, a basic feature of the contemporary phase in the development of large-scale industry. Whereas the first phase of large-scale industry, with its separate machine system, could be described as a factory system, the second could be described as an infraindustry system. It could be defined as the type of historical form of production forces in which individual (local) arrays of machines are technologically linked as infrasystems within a universal system which is the technical and organizational base of social labor and the combined new-type worker.

An essential, a qualitative distinction exists between the factory, the closed, and the infraindustrial, i.e., universal, machine systems. The factory machine system could be used by directly coordinating the labor of the workers in a given factory; the infraindustrial machine system requires the direct coordination of the entire social labor, whatever forms such coordination may take, whether centralized, chain or combined. In other words, the factory machine system was a **partial** social means of labor; the infraindustrial machine system is a **universal productive power of labor**.

Unlike the industrial revolution of the turn of the 19th century, which replaced man-made industry and small-scale production with big machine output, the infraindustrial change takes place within large-scale machine production. It represents its revolutionary transformation on the basis of electrification, the broadest possible development of fast transportation systems, gasification, communications and other infrasystems. In other words, this first common infraindustrial turn of the 20th century did not take place immediately. The new system was established at the start of World War II. The entire postwar industrial development and the contemporary scientific and technical revolution are developing on the basis of and within the framework of infraindustry which, in turn, is acquiring ever more developed and complex forms. Let us note for the sake of our Western opponents that this conclusion makes it possible to clarify the interconnection among new processes within the production forces but also, at the same time, makes it necessary to review many obsolete concepts on the laws which govern such processes.

This also includes the answer to many opponents, whose arguments coincide with the one given by American economist R. Wesson: "The ideas which inspired Marx were developed in the course of the industrial revolution. The theories which were born in the period of transition from a semifeudal agrarian to a capitalist society are hardly applicable under the entirely different conditions of the transition from a contemporary industrial to a so-called postindustrial society" (R. Wesson, *Why Marxism? The Continuing Success of a Failed Theory*. New York, 1976, pp 4-5).

The establishment of infraindustry had two consequences. On the one hand, a direct technological connection among individual production facilities appeared. On the other, their autonomous nature, flexibility, "divisibility," and mobility increased sharply.

Under these circumstances, **the law of production concentration operates above all as the law of the growth of infrasystems**. The power of electric power plants, and the range of power transmission increases; combined power systems develop. The length and handling capacity of petroleum and gas pipelines, railroad and motor vehicle highways, canals and communications systems increase. They become increasingly interrelated, forming single networks. As to specific production facilities, depending on many variable circumstances, trends may predominate of concentration or deconcentration. The combination of an electric power industry with gas and water supply, automotive transportation, contemporary communications systems, and so on, develops in a number of sectors prerequisites for highly efficient work not only of medium-sized but also small enterprises, including those consisting of a single individual. In particular, production concentration at general-purpose machine building plants engaged in the production of a wide range of complementing parts and with their own machine tool building, casting and even production of construction materials, means restricting specialization and thus socializing the production process. Conversely, economical and technically efficient small-scale and medium-scale production, to the extent to which it intensifies the social division of labor, enhances the level of economic socialization on the basis of infraindustry. In this connection, for a number of reasons we can consider that **today production concentration and deconcentration have become two sides of its socialization**.

The infrasystems actually broke down the wall which technologically divided material from nonmaterial production and the industrial from the "nonindustrial" economic management areas. Today not only public catering but science, health care, culture, sports and tourism are areas of activity based on infraindustry. Under the conditions of infraindustry the technological difference between the production and nonproduction areas is no longer essential. A common system is developed for the production of commodities and services in the first and second reproduction subdivisions.

There has been an equally decisive elimination of the technological division between production and daily life. The contemporary house is a complex technical "unit," saturated with appliances the functioning of which is based on the infrasystems—the electric, water, heat and gas supply systems, communications and the information industry.

In other words, infraindustry technologically combined a variety of scientific and production sectors and large, medium-sized and small enterprises, the production of commodities and services, and the industrial area with the area of daily life.

The flexibility and universal nature of infraindustry and the fact that it is based on the continuous development of science have led to the fact that the overall pace of renovation and change in methods and output in industry and the reorganization of industrial structures have increased exceptionally. This has radically changed the role of the time factor in all economic activities, sharply "brought the future closer" and made it necessary to consider expected essential changes as one of the crucial determinants of current evaluations and decisions. Economic future became a factor of the present and the present, a function of the future.

Naturally, infraindustry is not something permanent. On the contrary, it goes through substantially different stages. The contemporary scientific and technical revolution, which was made possible through the development of the infrasystems which form its foundations, also ascribes to infraindustry qualitatively new forms and opens new areas to it.

Nuclear energy gave new power and stability to the "combined electric motor;" the entire electric power system is on the threshold of the next spasmodic strengthening and expansion as a result of the discovery of high-temperature superconductivity. The electric power drive has been given an essentially new area of development thanks to electronics and the creation of control systems as the fourth element of the machine systems. The interaction between infraindustry and the scientific and technical revolution led to the creation of an infrasystem in the information industry, which includes data and knowledge banks, based on powerful computers, and contemporary means of communications and information. That same interaction brought to life the space industry, biotechnological industries and the marine industry.

The direct connection among production processes passing through a single power supply is merely the first stage in the technological integrity of the economy. The second stage consists of the type of combination of all intermediary specific production lines in which the "output" of the product of one industry at the same time meant (taking into consideration the optimal transportation time) "an entry" into another production. The transportation system has performed the role of a conveyor of a continuing technological process.

Finally, the third and highest level of technological integrity is the orientation of the end product (or service) toward the specific consumer. In other words, this means "custom work." In this case, a close coordination between production and consumption processes is achieved on the basis of infraindustry.

It is clear that the concept of a "universal system of infraindustry machines" gives political economists a certain guideline in the labyrinth of the processes occurring within the scientific and technical revolution in the study of their influence on socioeconomic development

under the conditions of socialism and capitalism. This approach makes it possible specifically to assess the role of each new major phenomenon of the scientific and technical revolution in the subsequent socialization of production and the intensification of its general internal relations and increased variety of forms.

A New Quality of Labor Socialization

Under the conditions of infraindustry social labor—i.e., the division and interconnection among all types of jobs—assumes a new structure and quality. The growing socialization of labor, which is a central concept in Marxist political economy, has its technical and social aspects. Many bourgeois theoreticians, referring to the diversification of output and the increased share of medium-sized and small enterprises and the aggravation of competition, try to depict matters as though this movement has turned back in both aspects. Without mentioning the social aspect as yet, let us emphasize that socialization of labor on the basis of infraindustry is not a simple continuation of what happened earlier but an essentially new process. In this case a quantitative approach is obviously inadequate.

Under the conditions of a factory-based industry, the social link of labor was expressed in two ways. Within the enterprise, this meant direct social labor by the sum of workers servicing the same system of machines and, therefore, working jointly in a single rhythm. On the scale of society, the labor contact was achieved through the spontaneous division of labor, through the "unknown" market.

The change in the social division of labor, brought about by infraindustry, consisted of a conversion from the division of labor among technologically separate detachments of working people, working on the basis of individual machine systems, to a division of labor based on a combined "machine system."

The "machine system" in infraindustry, which encompasses the entire society, technologically unites the entire social labor process, converting it, in this aspect, into a direct social process.

As to the indirect combination of the divided labor, through the exchange of products, here as well revolutionary and qualitative changes take place. The development of a flexible and varied type of transportation and communications and the information industry are increasingly reducing the need to work for an unknown and uncontrolled market, replacing this with commissioned work requiring precisely stipulated deadlines, and the work of partners maintaining a coordinated rhythm. The exchange of goods turns into a form of achieving the direct technological labor connection. At the same time, infraindustry triggers the opposite trend toward diversification in large-scale output and its "breakdown" into autonomous blocks and the growth of small enterprises, as well as the explosive multiplication of social needs

and and a general acceleration of the rhythm of renovation and replacement of technologies and products. This is the source of a spontaneous division of labor and of permanent renovation of the socialization of labor, through the market, as an attribute of infraindustry, outside of which the latter cannot develop normally.

Changes in the structure of the overall worker are a major feature of the growth of socialization. Whereas in the first phase of machine industry the overall worker (i.e., the sum total of workers united within the labor process by a single machine system) was limited to the individual factory, infraindustry lays a technical foundation for the establishment of a qualitatively new association which, in principle, can include virtually all workers in the national economy. However, that same force, at the same time, triggers an intensifying differentiation among them: personnel of scientific laboratories and design bureaus, machinery operators, machine tool operators, programmers, narrowly specialized personnel managing conveyer belts, and so on. Infraindustry creates, at the same time, a relative separation among operations and specific types of labor as well as technological combination among other. Under the conditions of a highly dynamic production structure, there is a permanent reproduction of distinctions among the labor of the workers in new and in traditional skills and among different sectors, areas of activity and large-scale and small-scale output.

However, it is important to note in this case that the second phase of large-scale machine production faces the worker with a number of new essential common requirements.

Unlike the previous situation, it is no longer muscular but nervous and mental energy outlays that play a decisive role in labor. Practical experience in modern production is obviously inadequate. Extensive specialized training is necessary. Also needed are flexibility, adaptability to the frequent changes in technology and production organization and readiness to switch professions. As a whole, the labor of the majority of the personnel in the infraindustry is not only more complex but essentially different, demanding of them new qualities.

All of this indicates the need for a new worker in the infraindustry. However, the training of such a worker presumes a true change in the requirements and way of life of the working people. Material needs drastically increase. They become qualitatively stricter and more complex. Priority is given to social needs, such as health care, a healthy environment, education, vocational training, recreation, and so on. The entire way of life is restructured in such a way that the high labor and moral qualities of the individual can be reproduced over a long period of time and that the major investments which must now be made by society in training the worker preserve their value.

The meeting of the new needs of the working people and the consequently needed higher income have necessitated a fierce and lengthy class struggle in the capitalist countries. It is only as a result of major social changes that gradually the new sociopolitical distribution mechanisms were developed, which make it possible to prevent the most destructive class conflicts. The economic dynamics controlled by the state was converted into a form of coexistence and shifts of antagonistic interests.

The system of mass needs, triggered by the infraindustry, in turn provided a powerful impetus for the appearance of new economic sectors (electrical engineering, chemistry, automobile manufacturing, the aerospace industry, the production of household electrical appliances, communal construction, etc.), diversification of large-scale production, increased number of small enterprises and an explosive development of services.

Under the conditions of large-scale machine industry the individual commodity is the product of the labor not of the individual worker but of the overall worker. In the steam-driven industry it is the work of the overall worker of the individual factory. But what about the infraindustry?

Here as well there has been a change. The production of each consumer value and its quality are now the joint result of the effect of "universal production forces" (science, infrasystem, and social combination of labor as a whole) as well as the activities of the personnel of the "releasing" enterprise. Correspondingly, the value of the commodity is no longer determined exclusively by working time outlays at the enterprise, even corrected by the "socially necessary" outlays.

A radical change has taken place in outlays themselves, reflecting changes in the complexity and nature of social labor. A key role is assumed now not by "proportional" and direct outlays but by the overall "basic" social outlays—infrasystems, science, education, health care, etc. That which was previously considered a subtraction from the value created by the overall factory worker has now become the most important element of social outlays, forming the value of the commodity. Such outlays include not only the live social labor of the overall infraindustry worker but also outlays of natural resources as a factor which determines the state of health and energy of the working people and the future potential of labor productivity.

These overall social outlays are formed and distributed as individual commodities, on the basis of laws which are as yet to be studied. All we know is only that the pace of infraindustry requires going toward **determining the value of the individual commodity not on the basis of the separate outlays but the "global" conditions for reproduction and the requirements of the dynamic balance of the economy.**

This does not void the influence of the usefulness of the commodity on its value. Conversely, typical of the infraindustry are structural changes in the course of which the disparity between production and need for specific types of goods become virtually permanent. This not only creates the appearance that the usefulness and rarity of the commodity determine its value but also expresses the real increase in the influence of such factors on the amount of socially necessary outlays.

K. Marx predicted that at a high level of social combination of production the value of a product will no longer be determined by outlays in working time. From this he drew the conclusion of the inevitability of the disappearance of the exchange value, i.e., production for the sake of exchanging commodity output. This conclusion was entirely legitimate for a development based on factory industry. However, the infraindustry phase radically changes the nature of the postulate—the socialization of production and therefore the conclusion itself.¹

It is relatively easy to understand that under the conditions of infraindustry the correlation between "plan" and "market" changes. It is considerably more difficult to prove that the entire system of old concepts—social outlays, abstract and specific labor, commodity, market and plan—**radically changes its content.**

The obvious contradiction of infraindustry is found between the intensification and expansion of the direct and logical interconnection between production (and, in general, economic) processes, on the one hand, and the equally fast development of differentiation and decentralization, accelerated renovation and changes in the structural and qualitative characteristics of processes and products, on the other. The former increases the need for planning and the second for commodity-monetary relations.

Under the conditions of the first phase of machine industry, when individual factories were interconnected through the uncontrolled market and when the number of enterprises and production variety were relatively limited and stable, the idea of a rigidly centralized plan conflicted with commodity-monetary relations as a necessary alternative to anarchy and crises and, subsequently, to the domination of sectorial monopolies.

In the age of infraindustry, the monopoly forms of organization must follow the length of the production chain of the infrasystem and the "science-production" vector, the development of intersectorial relations and the numerous integrated "production-end consumer" sets. Such forms must necessarily be pluralistic, flexible and adaptable. However, these are merely the capitalist forms of manifestation of the general organizational imperatives inherent in the second phase of large-scale machine industry, in which the acceleration of the scientific and technical revolution, on the one hand, and the thermonuclear and ecological risk to civilization, on the other, have created a historical situation under which

priority is assumed by the process of the gradual adaptation of social forms to the overall requirements of economic efficiency and survival.

Under the conditions of a mature infraindustry, with its widespread and dynamic system of direct intersectorial relations, the sectorial monopoly and the mandatory plan, which formally opposes it, play a destructive role. In particular, such a plan, instead of converting the connections into direct-social ties through the indirect intercession of the market, conversely, converts direct economic relations into state-indirect ones. The detailed directive-based plan, which requires the consideration of billions of changing relations, but which is unable to do so, highlights the living fabric of direct daily economic contacts and unwittingly becomes an instrument of alienation of social labor. If the plan stipulates specific production methods for the producer and thus deprives him of his interest in seeking more efficient ones; if the producer has been assigned a certain type of output, although constant opportunities appear for producing similar yet better and less expensive goods; finally, if the producer has become alienated from the process of the utilization of his product, therefore deprived of a feedback between consumption and production, labor becomes a blind action of performance and is alienated from the creative potential of man and his live social nature.

John Kenneth Galbraith, the noted American economist, formulated a concept according to which two types of relations are typical of the "new industrial state," both under capitalism and socialism: "planned," among big corporations and "market" among small ones. In this case we come across a traditional pitting of the plan against the market reflecting the realities of a past age.

In reality, both ties among enterprises (big, medium-sized and small) and ties between them and the end consumers are commodity-monetary and cannot be any other under the conditions of an infraindustry, with its exceptionally complex dynamic sectorial and factorial production structure and requirements. However, the very "fabric" of such relations (which forms the market) has become qualitatively heterogeneous. It includes commodity-monetary exchange, to begin with within the framework of technologically unified infrasystems; second, among enterprises working within a single rhythm and linked through a transport conveyer belt; third, between sellers and buyers, related through a system of "organized" middlemen or the "anonymous" market.

It is obvious that planning (as a consciously established and purported proportionality) must take place not by restricting the market but by influencing it, taking into consideration its different components. Therefore, on the basis of the infraindustry, when specialized large, medium-sized and small enterprises may prove to be equally efficient, the problem of the correlation between the plan and the market is formulated differently compared to the conditions of a factory-based industry.

The system of commodity-monetary relations, which covers hundreds of thousands and millions of commodity producers, can no longer be considered under socialism as "secondary," or an "unsubstantial" form of ties. However, we cannot ignore the fact that, at the same time, infraindustry triggers a sharp need for new forms of centralism and coordination in planning. We need an essentially new combination between plan and market in order that the pluralistic system of infraindustry can be subordinated to social objectives, for its different units are drastically different in terms of and from the nature of the socialized relations.

Ownership: Dynamics of Contradictions

The development of the infraindustry is accompanied by noticeable changes in forms of ownership. Contemporary production forces demand the type of relations of ownership of means of production and products which would combine the universal linkage of such relations with their universal flexibility, variety and dynamism. The specific system of forms of ownership of contemporary capitalism precisely developed as a result of the "confrontation" between its basic principle—the private ownership of means of production—and these requirements. At the very first phase of large-scale machine industry capital-function becomes separated from capital-ownership on the basis of the separation of lending capital, as a result of which capital gains high mobility and possibility of extensive financial control over the production process.

Further evolution in this direction is related to the growth of stock holding capital, which took place above all on the basis of the development of infrasystems—railroads, canals, electric power transmission systems, communal networks, etc.

The concentration of functioning capital and the strengthening of the monopolies, on the one hand, and growth of lending and stock holding capital, on the other, laid the foundations for financial capital and for a universal system of decentralized but interrelated control over the economy and constant transfer of resources from one area to another, based on the laws of the "capital market." Included in this system are various funds (retirement, "philanthropic," etc.) and, above all, governmental (central and local) finances.

The historical limitation of this system of ownership lies in the essential irreconcilability among private-group interests, on the one hand, and between the interests of the working people and society as a whole, on the other. This irreconcilability is detected within each crisis situation which may arise either as a result of substantial changes in the correlation among group forces or changes in internal and external reproduction conditions.

Socialism is based on the nationwide ownership of means of production which, in principle, excludes such a class antagonism. Historical practice, however, has indicated that within the framework of this ownership other contradictions may develop, which require serious scientific analysis. They include contradictions between the new level of maturity and the unity of the overall socialist worker as the main subject of nationwide ownership, on the one hand, and the separated management apparatus which alienates the working people from such ownership; between the requirements of socialist infraindustry for a dynamic and flexible utilization of resources in the interest of society and departmental-parochial monopoly with its sectorial and local appropriation and freezing of resources; between the mass of the working people, who use nationwide ownership as a means of appropriation of labor income and that part of it which, to one extent or another, is used by them for purposes of dependency or profit. The dynamism of the age of infraindustry highlights the truth that in addition to class exploitation, in which the owners of the means of production appropriate the results of someone else's labor, a different situation is possible as well, in which, for the sake of protecting their positions conservative social groups hinder normal economic progress and thus deprive society of its results.

The elimination of such contradictions is the task of the contemporary revolutionary restructuring of socialist society. To this effect it is extremely important to ensure the truly nationwide nature of ownership of basic means of production, and to surmount the dictatorship of uncontrolled departmental-parochial management apparatus and its monopoly in the area of decision-making; to achieve the type of variety, flexibility and dynamism of the sum total of forms of socialist appropriation of the means of production and products which would be entirely consistent with the requirements of the present stage in the development of public production forces.

The main way in this case is the broad and full democratization in the management of the national economy as a whole, through the system of the soviets of people's deputies, with a universal economic literacy and total glasnost and the systematic separation (above all on the basis of the comprehensive development of leasing relations) between the functions of ownership of basic means of production and the functions of economic management.

As we know, in the "mature" state of the means of production, when production forces begin to grow into dominant production relations, the influence of the changes which the former exert over the transformation of the latter gradually intensifies. Conversely, in the course of a profound social revolution, the active and transforming role of the base and the superstructure in terms of production forces increases drastically. In all cases, both production forces and production relations retain their specific inner logic of development, defined, in the first case, by the laws of the unlimited scientific

and technical progress and, in the second, the laws of the historically limited development of the specific form of ownership of means of production. The conflict between the two is inevitable. However, its temporal boundaries, scale, gravity and forms of resolution greatly depend on the flexibility, mobility and variability of the specific social system.

Many Western economists, who discuss problems of perestroika in the USSR with a great deal of interest, assume that it is taking place either despite or outside of the Marxian method and theory. Much closer to the truth are the views of the noted American Sovietologist M. Goldman who, despite our best wishes, cannot be suspected of any sympathy for Marxism. He writes the following: "Marx was possibly right by saying that the changes in the production method, which takes place with the advent of high technology, make corresponding changes in the superstructure necessary. In that case what would happen if a society, particularly a society which considers itself a revolutionary force, would oppose such changes or else would not react to them entirely adequately?.... The effort to solve these problems is, precisely, Gorbachev's challenge" (M. Goldman, "Gorbachev's Challenge. Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology." New York, 1987, p 13).

In the light of what was said, going back to the assertions of our Western opponents, let us note that Marxist criticism of bourgeois society today neither can nor should ignore the real contradiction. On the one hand, we cannot reject from the outset the serious economic theories, for they reflect the new social processes and phenomena. On the other, not one of them has been able to reveal the overall content or the interconnection among the changes taking place. The basis for this was and remains creative Marxism-Leninism, which does not aspire artificially to reconcile the new phenomena with old formulas but which develops its postulates and concepts through the study of reality. The critical analysis and reworking of the achievements of Western science is an essential starting point for a real scientific socialism, while Marxism, which rejects anything dogmatic and surmounts any bias and one-sidedness and limitation, is the only possible platform for a scientific debate.

Footnotes

1. The quite incomplete familiarity with Marx's works leads to the fact that the most serious among his Western critics are forced to rediscover today what Marx clearly saw more than a century ago. The well-known American economist J. Naisbitt writes that "Therefore, in information economics, value is created not by labor but by knowledge. Marx's 'labor theory of value,' which was created at the start of industrial economics, must be replaced by a new one, by the knowledge theory of value. In the information society value raises through knowledge. It is a different sort of labor compared to what Marx had in mind" (J. Naisbitt, "Megatrends: Ten New

directions Transforming Our Lives." New York, 1982, p 17). The study of Marx's "Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1859" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 43, part II, pp 207-208, 210) easily proves that Marx foresaw the determining role of universal scientific work in determining "value," must more profoundly than did Naisbitt.

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Greater Innovation and Daring

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[Article by the following teachers at the University of Friendship Among the Peoples imeni Patrice Lumumba: A. Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences, head of the department of scientific communism; N. Kirabayev, candidate of philosophical sciences, head of the department of philosophy; I. Malkovskaya, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, philosophy department; and Ye. Nitsyn, senior teacher, department of political economy]

[Text] A decisive breakthrough in the social sciences, pushing beyond the boundaries of dogmatism and the stereotypes which have become a firm part of their flesh, is possible only if we were radically to change of attitude toward them. Limiting the tasks of social scientists to commenting and defending the existing situation unflinchingly lead to "stagnation" in social thinking and its cognitive role. We are convinced that a profound restructuring in the social sciences is possible only under the circumstances of the free creativity of scientists, competitiveness in the study of the most complex theoretical and practical problems of the contemporary world, and bold invasion of "spheres" which previously remained the monopoly of a restricted group of individuals. That is why we took the publication of the theses in KOMMUNIST No 7 for 1988 for purposes of discussion as proof of the encouraging changes occurring today in our social science. We also welcome the articles by Yu. Krasin "The Labor Movement in the Search for a Democratic Alternative" (KOMMUNIST No 14, 1988) and G. Shakhnazarov "East-West. On the Question of Deideologizing Intergovernmental Relations" (KOMMUNIST No 3, 1989) which, as we understand it, marked the opening of a creative discussion on this problem which is of fateful significance to our civilization. The very fact that these questions were posed and the way they were posed indicates a serious and greatly innovative approach taken by the authors to the problem of social progress.

We know that until recently social progress was viewed simplistically, exclusively as a conversion from a lower to a higher level of development. However, the growing interconnection among integration processes which objectively give priority to universal human interests in the development of mankind as a whole, leads to the

conclusion that social progress "is possible and necessary within the framework of the lengthy coexistence among different social systems..." (p 80). The theoretical substantiation of this postulate is the study of the concept of the "crisis of civilization," which has still not become a substantial subject of research by our social science. Let us note, however, that the concept of civilization as well, and its connection with already traditional categories which characterize the historical process, need a Marxist interpretation. Separating the concept of civilization from that of socioeconomic system requires a clear awareness of their specific content as well as interconnection. In this aspect as well the problem of social progress can be considered in a variety of ways. Is it possible to establish the probable trends of progressive development within the framework of each of the existing systems while ignoring the development of civilization? If not, then what is the sense of singling out the strictly formative criteria of progress? It seems to us that the concept of civilization, as a universal-historical characteristic which reflects the fact that all mankind belongs to the same species, is a universal one, achieved through the specific forms of the individual systems.

From this viewpoint, the progress of civilization is possible as a result of profound changes within the capitalist and socialist systems, in the course of their peaceful competition and interaction.

We consider accurate the views of those authors according to which the crisis of civilization cannot be identified with that of capitalism or even interpreted as its direct consequence (see p 81). Indeed, the socialist world as well did not find itself spared by the crisis of civilization. To some extent this is explained by the fact that historically socialism, which actually began its life in a country which, in terms of its production forces, was below the standard reached by other countries, which immediately assumed an aggressive stance toward it, found itself in the position of having to "catch up." The military-communist interpretation of socialism, which prevailed as of the end of the 1920s, "reinforced" by the cult nature of sociopolitical developments, resulted in the fact that socialism was unable to realize its tremendous potential and advantages. Failing to find in political forms the real means of lifting the threat of the aggressive actions of capitalism, actually socialism was unable to oppose with its inherent humanism the growth of militaristic trends. In the final account, developing in an inadequate form, socialism was not only unable to avoid the influence of the crisis of civilization but, to a certain extent, found itself subjected to its influence. Imperialism, which is mainly to be blamed for such a course of development was able, through social maneuvering, to convert its class objectives and interests into national ones and, subsequently, into the objectives of the entire West, and to present itself as a fighter for and defender of freedom and democracy.

However, by no means has the tremendous potential which is inherent in the nature of socialism become exhausted. Having taken the initiative aimed at the

radical renovation of the system of international relations, socialism is exerting today a tremendous impact on the transformation of certain aspects of socioeconomic reality in modern capitalism and is, above all, "undermining" the positions of the militaristic military-industrial faction within the monopoly bourgeoisie.

In this connection, we believe substantiated the concept that in an interrelated world simple parallel coexistence is impossible (see p 85). An objectively necessary reciprocal influence between systems should not be considered an inevitable evil which one must, willy-nilly, accept. The surmounting of the "antagonistic mechanism of development" indeed triggers the need for an ability to use the progressive achievements of either system and to modify the forms shaped by the logic of development of production forces and the internationalization of production to the needs of one's own system. It is entirely likely that the sociopolitical structures of the opposite formations are equally capable for development, taking democratic features into consideration and also, in a certain sense, the universal standards of human community life.

Such an approach should not be considered in the least as a convergence between the two social systems. Rather, the process of mutual influence would lead to a clearer "divergence." However paradoxical this may seem, we believe that it is precisely the deformed socialism that, in its external confrontation, showed great "similarities" with capitalism. This involved the alienation of the power system from the people and related corruption, and the merger of the interests of the political power structure with departmental egotism, a rigid policy in the field of international relations, based on confrontation, and technocratic priorities compared to social and moral progress. The identification of the socialist potential in its truly scientific understanding, including mastering the wealth of all human culture, can more clearly define the specific nature of the socialist forms of social life. Including in our life and applying all the potential opportunities offered by the socialist system is one of the primary tasks of perestroika, with its clear orientation toward the humanizing of all social structures.

Unquestionably, the factors which determine the development trends in contemporary capitalism as a "transitional stage" are the growth of the socioeconomic efficiency of real socialism, as a result of which its reputation in the eyes of the world community rises, and the evolutionary choices which will become prevalent within the system of the global capitalist economy.

The authors justifiably include in the many-faceted manifestations of the crisis of civilization the chronic poverty of "two-thirds of mankind which are actually excluded from today's global formula for progress" (p 81). Unfortunately, this problem turned out to be excluded in the theses themselves, although it is entirely obvious that it is precisely in the developing countries that today the most dangerous potential for conflict for

mankind is currently taking shape. Furthermore, this area is the closest available reserve for strengthening the forces of social progress on the global level.

The dichotomous (capitalism-socialism) vision of the contemporary and rather complex and many-faceted third world, and the aspiration maximally to broaden the anti-imperialist front by involving essentially anti-democratic regimes in the developing countries which, however, are thoroughly familiar with leftist phraseology, have frequently led both science and politics to serious breakdowns, which could not fail to affect the prestige of socialism itself. Surmounting the crisis in which the liberated countries find themselves and the solution of other global problems in the contemporary world require a new type of political thinking and way of acting, and the rejection of stereotypes and dogmas inherited from the past.

At the present time a difficult and fierce and, frequently, tragic struggle between alternatives of social development is taking place in the liberated countries. We cannot fail to note that social cataclysms, created by feverish efforts to solve problems of backwardness and dependency through personal dictatorships create the most dangerous hotbeds of tension and internationalize a number of conflicts. A crucial situation has developed also in the countries with a socialist orientation, where excessive centralization of economic and sociopolitical structures does not always operate quite efficiently. Here as well extraordinary decisions and the elimination of impasses will be required.

It is necessary to revise the old concepts expressed in the works of Soviet researchers, which base the "socialist nature" of one regime or another on the size of the state economic sector, the pace of cooperativization, planning, and so on, without any serious analysis of the essence of relations which hiding behind words and figures. If we consider justified for ourselves the claim that there is no socialism without democracy, this should equally apply to countries with a socialist orientation.

Obviously, the contemporary Marxist approach to the realities of the socioeconomic and political development of countries with a socialist orientation should be based on a more profound study of the mechanisms, including sociopsychological ones, which prevent the establishment of the new principles of social organization and independent activity of the masses.

The crisis phenomena in countries with a socialist orientation do not drop from the agenda the question of the existence of alternatives to capitalism in the third world. They prove yet once again the harm of using any kind of stereotype in efforts to block processes which are essentially capitalist or to surmount the conservatism of traditional forms and, once again, make relevant the Leninist ideas of the multivariant approaches to the socialist organization of society. The noncapitalist way is

a historical alternative in the development of the liberated countries. This question cannot be dropped from the agenda even with the most accurate scientific studies of the types of political systems existing in the developing countries or the study of the multiple options existing within the conditions of capitalist social relations, for a dependent capitalist development triggers the type of social contradictions which can be fully resolved only outside of its framework, by adopting a different system of social coordinates. In the final account, it must be a question of building a society on a level not only higher than the precapitalist but even the capitalist forms of social structure.

The center of gravity of all political decisions in countries with a socialist orientation today shifts to the creation of an efficient economic management system and a search for individual initiatives in the implementation of the transitional tasks of the national democratic revolutions. As a result of the policy of national conciliation a social "bloc of alternatives" develops as a subject of general social activity.

The situation which has currently developed in relations among the different parts of a heterogeneous world faces the Marxist-Leninist parties in the liberated countries, as their most important and primary task, that of finding means of struggle consistent with the conditions of their place and time and demand "to defend the revolutionary interests through ways consistent with changed circumstances" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 31, p 438). The solution of the current crisis in the developing countries presumes the mobilization of the anti-imperialist potential of the various sociopolitical forces which frequently pursue conflicting objectives but which are objectively interested in humanizing the entire system of "North-South" relations and resolving accumulated contradictions. In this case both reformist and revolutionary alternatives are possible, the implementation of either of which will be determined by the correlation between the fighting forces and their configuration on the global, regional and national levels.

The present model of "peripheral" capitalism harms the interests not only of the toiling classes but of private ownership strata as well, including a certain segment of national capital. The social forces which support the "modernizing of dependency," are becoming an increasingly important factor in the life of Asian and African countries. They support the idea of a new international economic order and demand a realistic approach to solving the problem of their debts.

The anti-imperialist program of the national democratic revolution, enriched with the experience of the new political thinking, is now shaping the social aspect of the type of revolutionary alternative which would solve the national crisis by eliminating undemocratic political structures, inequality and discrimination and asserting the dignity of the individual and national cultural values and an autonomous way of development. It is within this

context that we should consider also the struggle waged against the superbureaucratization, excessive inflation of the state sector, political and ideological sectarianism and the struggle between a mossy dogmatism and the realism of truly progressive forces which have become aware of their place in the reorganization of the world.

The use of the opportunities which arise and of all available options will require the creation and functioning of powerful political-legal mechanisms which would regulate international relations in the spirit of the principles of the New Delhi Declaration, contributing to the humanizing of intergovernmental relations.

The formulation in the theses concerning the overall subject of social progress is entirely accurate. Indeed, structural changes in the economy of the developed countries and in social priorities require a more profound study of the social forces which are ready and able to solve the specific problems which face contemporary mankind.

We must agree that it would be hardly accurate today to classify as the decisive subject of social progress the entire working class without exception, while ignoring the changes which have taken place in its structure under the influence of scientific and technical progress. For example, if we single out three major groups in the material production structure—scientific-industrial, industrial and remaining pre- or early-industrial production, we would unquestionably come across a differentiated attitude shown by the different the working class groups toward any given value. Thus, the need for the development of self-governing principles is most clearly manifested among the workers belonging to the first group, as is the aspiration toward democratic forms of organization of socioeconomic life. The third group is mostly interested in improving material conditions, wages above all, and frequently shows a trend toward equalization.

At the same time, the fact that "the scientific and technical revolution enhances the significance of labor, for it brings into action and combines an increasing number of material agents" (p 89) does not mean in the least the automatic growth of the role of the type of labor which is assuming an increasingly intellectual nature. Thus, for example, microelectronics relieves man from physical efforts and labor monotony; at the same time, however, it assumes the functions of the human intellect as well as many of the human work habits. Many types of professions are related to the fact that the worker is not asked to display any kind of professional talent but merely to have a strong nervous system.

Therefore, today we need a thorough study of the specific positions held by the various groups of the working class and the way in which their social position is substantiated by the actual nature of their work.

Clearly, however, the overall trend is one of broadening the concept of the "overall worker," based on the increased social role and number of those who, as is accurately pointed out in the theses, are exerting an increasingly direct impact on production, on all conditions of human activities and on human reproduction itself. Blue-collar workers remain the basic element of such working people. However, the most dynamically growing group in this connection, within the overall subject of social progress, is that of the working people in the so-called "nonproduction sphere."

The shaping of the overall subject of social progress on a broader social base is largely related also to the fact that the contemporary movements which rally people belonging to a great variety of social strata are based no longer on strictly class interests but on common concern about the threat of antisocial actions on the part of conservative forces. The growth of this concern faces scientists with the problem of the self-regeneration of civic activity. Various new social movements are becoming part of the division of forces in which opposite groups are represented by a kind of "political elite." Covering a wide range of social protests, they frequently rally antistatism, and trends toward free and independent organizational structures. Such a situation requires a profound study of the new forms of joint activities which would exclude imposing one's own interests and objectives claiming to be the only significant ones. An entirely real situation exists in which joint actions do not face the partners with the need to abandon their own political and ideological values.

The search of new forms of alliance among the different forces which aspire to solve problems of the same nature will prevent the subconscious consolidation of the conservatives, who officially may not be on the same side but who actually urge mankind on toward a global catastrophe.

These considerations, naturally, by no means reflect the entire range of problems related to defining the prospects of social progress in the contemporary world. However, the publication and discussion of the theses in *KOMMUNIST* would draw the attention of public opinion to such problems and, unquestionably, would play the role of a catalyst in their study and development.

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**Listening To One Another. *KOMMUNIST*,
KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII,
KOMMUNIST ESTONII, and *KOMMUNIST*
(Lithuania) Roundtable**

18020012j Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 6,
Apr 89 (signed to press 4 Apr 89) pp 62-80

[Text] A roundtable discussion on problems of internationality relations was held by the journals *KOMMUNIST*, *KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII*, *KOMMUNIST ESTONII*, and *KOMMUNIST* (Lithuania) on

8-9 February 1989, in Riga. Participating in the discussion were noted scientists from the Soviet Baltic republics, representatives of the central committees of the Latvian and Lithuanian Communist Parties, and of mass social groups and creative associations. The moderators were I. Kezbers, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretary, O. Latsis, KOMMUNIST first deputy editor in chief, and I. Dedkov, KOMMUNIST political commentator.

An exceptionally broad range of problems was discussed in Riga. Most of them were quite pressing. It is not astounding that a variety of views, frequently controversial, was expressed. Some of them were countered, one way or another, in the course of the debates, while the others are submitted by the editors to the judgment of the readers. Although we by no means share all viewpoints expressed here and consider a number of ideas insufficiently convincing, we shall nonetheless try to give the fullest possible idea of the range of opinions which characterized the discussion.

The roundtable materials were prepared by KOMMUNIST associates V. Kremnev, V. Nekhotin, and A. Ulyukayev.

Economic Sovereignty: The Essence

A. Kalnynsh, academician, Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences:

The republic's economic independence must be based on its full right to use economic instruments in all enterprises and economic organizations on its territory. The enterprises must have the direct right to make use of state property. They must not be simply transferred from Union to republic jurisdiction. The economic independence of basic production structures must be asserted. Using economic instruments, such as taxes, price ceilings, and interest rates, the republic's Supreme Soviet must set the framework within which they operate.

Ministries and departments must be freed from the direct administration of economic affairs. The enterprises themselves can form, on a voluntary cooperative basis, a variety of associations and concerns. The basis for the creation of such nondepartmental economic units is the organization of intersectoral governmental associations, the participants of which will no longer be subordinate to the ministries.

Economic independence within the republic, on the level of towns, rayons, and villages, is equally important. A coordination and a balancing of expenditures with revenue must be ensured for each territorial unit. All problems of socioeconomic development which can be solved on the level of the local soviets must be resolved precisely on that level.

M. Bronshteyn, academician, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, head of the political economy department, Tartu University:

Republic cost accounting and the economic sovereignty of a republic presume not a closed economy but use of the economic and legal regulatory agents both on the Union and regional scale. It does not eliminate but asserts the participation of the republics in Union programs. However, the republics must be given the right to discuss and control such programs. We are unwilling to pay for reversing the flow of northern rivers or for various types of economic adventures. We wish to participate in programs consistent with our possibilities and with jointly formulated criteria.

Finally, the concept of republic cost accounting presumes market control and limiting any whatsoever attempts at monopolizing it on the part of any sector, whether governmental, cooperative or private. Equal opportunities must be granted to all. Let the market decide who is right.

All of this has nothing in common with regional closeness or the establishment of a republic bureaucratic system although, we must point out, we frequently provide reasons for being accused of such "sins" because of our hasty actions such as, for example, suggestions that the republics take over all production assets on their territories. It is obvious that this can be conceived also as an attempt at "expropriation" and absolutization of the state form of ownership. Today we are finding more accurate formulations such as, for example, that the property of the people of the Estonian SSR is a separate part of the property of the whole nation. This approach sets our relations on a normal economic foundation.

Other documents as well have included formulations which were not entirely correct. This includes, for example, the demand to transfer enterprises from Union to republic jurisdiction. The very word of "jurisdiction" has an administrative and not an economic meaning. This has been opposed not only by Union ministries but also by Union enterprises which fear that it is the local bureaucrat rather than the market that will begin to dictate the situation.

From the Program of the Latvian People's Front:

The NFL calls for abolishing the all-Union jurisdiction of enterprises, organizations, farms, banks, as well as networks, facilities, and systems for transportation, the power industry, and communications on republic territory.

Yu. Boyars, doctor of juridical sciences, docent, Latvian State University imeni P. Stuchka:

Economic sovereignty is of exceptional important to a republic. The situation now is such that Latvia has control over no more than 5.5 percent of its industrial

assets! Naturally, there are defense industry projects and some other enterprises of Union significance. In any case, however, it is the republic's Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet that must exercise control over industrial projects.

Facts and Figures

On 1 January 1988 Latvian Republic ministries and departments had under their jurisdiction 21.8 percent of fixed production capital; 50.2 percent were under Union-republic jurisdiction and 28 percent were under Union jurisdiction, including, respectively in industry, 5.5, 31.1, and 63.4 percent. A total of 14.5 percent of the nonproduction fixed assets are under Union administration.

K. Prunskene, doctor of economic sciences, professor, member of the Sayudis Sejm:

I disagree with Academician Bronshteyn. To consider the property of the republic as a separate part of the property of the whole nation is possible only if the state sovereignty of the republic is not acknowledged and if the concept of "people" applies only to the population of the entire Soviet Union, while the population of a specific republic is not considered a people. Essentially, this approach nullifies the concept of the owner-proprietor. In my view, a true interest in ownership may be displayed within the framework of a socially visible community, to a no greater extent than within the framework of a small republic or oblast, or kray, in the case of the RSFSR. The question of ownership cannot be solved exclusively by acknowledging the enterprise collective as the owner and manager. On what basis, for example, could a plant collective be the owner of its output? Ownership must be localized within the framework of the republic, and the right to handle such ownership must be granted to the collectives of its enterprises. Naturally, we do not wish to replace a Moscow bureaucrat with one of our own, a republic bureaucrat. This does not mean, however, that enterprises should be granted total autonomy.

V. Yankauskas, head of the socioeconomic department, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee:

Naturally, the danger exists that Union subordination will be converted into republic subordination and the Moscow "master" will turn into the Vilnius "master-administrator." In order to avoid this, we must undertake the creation of enterprises with a nondepartmental status, which can structure their activities on a cost accounting basis and on the basis of contracts with the consumers of their goods. A great deal is already being done in our republic along this line.

O. Potrekli, Latvian State University professor:

If we are speaking of a change in socioeconomic models, which is the objective of perestroika, the problem of ownership assumes priority. Nationalization and declaring the means of production to be the property of the whole nation raised the question of the distribution of these assets. The departmental mechanism for such distribution appeared in the 1920s. The origins of many bureaucratic deformations are found in the fact that the means of production were being distributed and that in our country there was no market for means of production. We have no commodities but funds. One could handle such funds as one wished such as, for example, move them from Riga to Vladivostok and back. This system has already totally outlived its usefulness and must be replaced by a new one. This means that the organizational and economic problems which arise within the concept of regional cost accounting are related to the Union, regardless of the republic in which this takes place.

V. Astrauskas, doctor of economic sciences, deputy director of the Lithuanian SSR Gosplan Scientific Research Institute of Economics and National Economic Planning:

You know that a document on regional cost accounting has been formulated. One could criticize it at will. But if we consider it as the first step in the conversion to economic autonomy, it is a major step forward. In my view, the majority of people have already spoken out in favor of it. Starting with 1990, by 1992 or 1993 we must convert to the next stage, during which conditions for solving currency and financial problems will become right.

A. Gaponenko, candidate of economic sciences, lecturer, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee:

We must consider the two levels: that of relations among republics and relations between nationalities within a republic. Speaking of the former, let me support the viewpoint that we need Union, republic, and town property. The right to handle this property alone does not give grounds for independent economic management. If the means of production are at the disposal of the republic, the supreme owner could, at any moment, reallocate them. This means that they must be given an owner, proceeding from the fact that a significant portion of them were created by the people who work on republic territory. The question of how to do so in practical terms is a different matter. It is impossible to convert immediately to the new system of ownership relations. We need a certain transitional period which may take perhaps 5 to 10 years. Such distribution would indeed come out of a "single pot," and at this point it is impossible accurately to determine who owns how much. The enterprises which are newly created with budget funds should clearly be owned by the republic or the city, if it is the city budget that financed them.

Incidentally, when nationalization was taking place in the 1920s, the enterprises were assigned both as communal property and as the joint property of the republic and the center.

P. Gulyan, corresponding member, Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences:

Let us determine, above all, why, in general, is economic independence needed. In my view, the objective is entirely clear: to improve public production efficiency. If we proceed from this fact, it is not only and exclusively the individual republics that are interested in autonomy but also the country at large. It is regrettable that we have not been able to explain this in such a way that everyone would understand it, and not only would not hinder but, conversely, would contribute to the establishment of the type of economic mechanism which would make the utilization of our production resources truly possible.

V. Yarovoy, general director of the Dvigatel Association, chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Joint Council of Labor Collectives:

It was the situation which had developed in the republic that led to the creation of the OSTK [Joint Council of Labor Collectives]. The enterprises joined efforts not for the sake, as many people currently believe, of preserving the departments and remaining linked to the center. We perfectly realize that if we live on the territory of a republic we must seriously engage in the development of its social area. For example, the Dvigatel Plant alone has invested over the past 13 years 46.6 million rubles in the social area. Probably more should be done. Nonetheless, we must not totally ignore that which is already being done.

Above all, we are developing economic cooperation among enterprises which are members of the council. Joint decisions are backed by contractual obligations. Let us consider, for example, the extremely serious matter of labor resources. We oppose limited residency and we realize that the cadres which are attracted with its help are not the ones we need. The problem, however, must be resolved somehow. We agree that we should no longer import cadres in the republic. In that case, however, obviously we must redistribute them within the republic. I have repeatedly spoken of this, including to the Gosplan but there has been no reaction whatsoever to my suggestions. Therefore, we must rely on cadre "self-support," starting with kindergartens and schools, after which we must direct people to attend technical colleges and institutes and offer scholarships.

We are being accused of the fact that the OSTK adopted a document in which it actually formulated its political role. Yes, it is true that a draft was published in which it was a question of creating two-chamber soviets, and strengthening the representation of enterprises. We have held a number of discussions on this, and there have been differences of opinion even within the OSTK

Presidium. Based on the existing situation, we decided to drop this item from the program. Possibly, it would be better raised in the distant future. For the time being, we have decided to follow a different road: the creation of regional economic councils which should include representatives of all social movements. Such councils will ratify economic decisions, so that they could be equally advantageous to all.

In no case does the OSTK intend to abandon the developed and mutually acceptable principles of regional cost accounting. But I fully agree with Comrade Astraukas that decisions must be consistent with the actual situation in which they will be implemented. At the first stage the partial solution of the problem of economic independence may be possible; this must be followed by the next stage, however, and it is not excluded that in general at that point the Union enterprises will pass under republic management. For the time being, the Dvigatel Plant for one is simply unable to work under such circumstances. It has ties with dozens of scientific and design organizations. Its metal and fuel supplies are also oriented toward the Union. Who could today, in the republic, assume such obligations?

M. Lauristin, head of the department of journalism, Tartu University, member of the board of the Estonian People's Front:

To the scientific public in the republic, the Dvigatel Plant is "terra incognita." We cannot enter that enterprise or obtain any kind of information about it. For that reason, I would like to ask you, to begin with, about the national structure of its personnel. Second: You said that you have generated work for the city, worth many millions of rubles. Nonetheless, was that for the city or for your own workers who came from elsewhere?

V. Yarovoy: Two hundred and fifty thousand rubles out of every million rubles spent by the enterprise for social needs are allocated for the needs of the city. As to the work system followed by the enterprise, this is not within my range of competence. It is based on respective decisions which take into consideration its type of output. We have never concealed the national structure of the personnel: Estonians account for 3.5 percent and Russian-speaking workers for 96.5 percent. That is why it is exceptionally difficult for us to conduct our business in the Estonian language, as stipulated by the Law on the State Language.

O. Latsis: The impression is created that there are no national specifics whatsoever in OSTK activities. You're engaged in solving territorial and intersectorial problems. Apparently, production cooperation cannot be a target of any kind of social movement. Do you see in the activities of an enterprise located within a national republic any kind of national features?

V. Yarovoy: I can clearly feel the difference of conditions between, shall we say, Leningrad, where I worked for 25 years, and Tallinn. That is why, in working here, I always look for a compromise, I seek reciprocal interests and try to enhance the reputation of the enterprise within the republic and to surmount the negative attitude toward it. That is precisely why we are involved in the development of the social infrastructure.

A. Plotniyeks, doctor of juridical science, Latvian State University professor.

Republic cost accounting must be based on the clear division of ownership. According to existing legislation the entire Soviet people are the owners of the land, the ground resources, and the republic assets, i.e., this means the peoples of other republics as well. Therefore, each one of our projects has 15 owners. But how to manage under such circumstances? No republic has ever granted all-Union ownership with any kind of law for either the land or the ground resources to become all-Union ownership. The Treaty on the Founding of the USSR does not say anything about this. How then did this happen? Let us accept the reality: Each nation in a Union republic is the owner of its land.

The institution of federation ownership must exist. This means the sum of all property needed for attaining common objectives. Adding communal ownership to this, we obtain a streamlined system in which any enterprise, any administrative-territorial unit, and any of our 15 sovereign socialist states could function on the basis of full cost accounting.

M. Bronshteyn: Republic sovereignty means, above all, the sovereignty of the people. Naturally, the people must be the masters of their land. However, this does not mean mandatory state ownership of production assets in the least. Both domestic and global experience prove that state ownership is the way to the creation of bureaucratic systems. A variety of forms should exist, including municipal, state, mixed, and other.

On the Power of the Strong or On How To Restructure Relations Between a Republic and the Center

K. Prunskene: Today in Lithuania the concept of a "strong center" triggers a reaction of caution. It is a heavy burden on a weak economic mechanism which must be improved. The center is trying to preserve its functions and is seeking standardized laws and uniform models for all republics. Each region, however, has its specific social type of individuals, related to environment and history. This specificity developed not only under the Soviet system but in the course of several centuries. Economic thinking in Latvia, Central Asia or Siberia is by no means identical. Therefore, it is hardly possible to create a uniform economic mechanism for all parts of the country. However, such efforts are being made. To this day such efforts at eliminating differences have been quite "successful" in the sense that in terms of

land fertility the Ukraine has already become similar to the north, while alcoholism, theft, and negligence have become almost evened up throughout the country.

The draft plan for regional self-management and self-financing, which was developed at the center, once again seeks a method which would apply to the entire Union and is suggesting a common model applicable to all republics. Thus, judging by the recently issued draft on the restructuring of the agroindustrial complex, in the future as well the USSR Gosagroprom intends to assume, for example, the formulation of programs for the social restructuring of the countryside. But of what countryside is it a question? Are the villages in Estonia, Turkmenia or Russia all the same?

We are being accused of an attempt to wreck the unified national economic complex. What kind of unity is there here, and what are its results? If they are the imbalance of the economy and a low living standard it means that we must seek another type of unity, through the market, through direct relations among partners, thus eliminating the blocking role of the "strong center" to which it is still laying claim.

V. Astrauskas: Our colleague Prunskene said that the republics need specific economic structures. But who will tell me what type of specific structure is needed by the Estonian and the Lithuanian? Let us clearly define the type of specific structures that we wish for Latvia and for the Ukraine. Otherwise our discussion will yield nothing.

K. Prunskene: Could one ask of Uzbekistan or Turkmenia to manage their economies on the basis of concepts developed in the Baltic area? If democratization is not a meaningless word, the republics themselves must formulate their own models and act on the basis of their own concepts, in accordance with their own possibilities. The specific model needed by the Lithuanian can be developed only by the Lithuanian; that of Belorussia, by the Belorussians.

V. Yankauskas: It seems to me that we must proceed on the basis of a strong republic, at which point the center itself will automatically become strong. How can a center be strong all by itself? The center consists of the Union administrative authorities which, in themselves, do not produce any material goods. Everything is produced in the republics. Excessive centralization led to the conflict between production and consumption on the republic level. It is very difficult to explain to the population why it is producing a great deal but consuming significantly less. It is precisely in this connection, in my view, that the question arose of economic autonomy and economic sovereignty.

Statements such as the following are frequently encountered in the press: If we are providing someone the possibility of experimenting with greater economic autonomy, we shall immediately undermine the single

national economic complex. But why would we undermine it? It is a question of autonomy within the framework of the Union, and of preserving existing reciprocal relations!

P. Gulyan: What kind of center are we talking about, economic or administrative? Currently we do not have an economic center. We have republics which, combined, form a single national economic complex, regardless of the rating we give it. If we speak of the administrative aspect, how could there be simultaneously a strong center and strong republics? In my view, it should be a question of sufficiently dividing the functions between them. Unless we bring order in this matter, all that will remain will be empty slogans. I believe that the draft which is being discussed could be considered a compromise. It is suitable for all republics. As a whole, however, it does not solve the problems but merely improves the current system. Today we need more profound work and more daring experimentation in republics which are ready for this, bearing in mind that such work is in the common interest. Naturally, we must help one another. Each republic, however, should know how much it contributes to the Union fund and how much it receives from it. Everyone must know who is still living at someone else's expense. I am not referring a priori to Central Asia. Better calculations may turn out that it is we who are living at the expense of someone else.

A. Belaychuk, professor, Riga Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers and member of the board of the Latvian SSR International Front of Working People:

In my view, the center must resolve global problems while the rest should be entrusted to the individual regions. If there is enterprise and association cost accounting and if there is internal production cost accounting, we also need cost accounting on the higher levels. This means, above all, the republic. However, why should not there be a cost accounting of the entire country, of the entire socialist community, of Europe, and so on? A number of problems arise from the fact that a great deal of questions in this area has remained unanswered.

So far science has not defined the concept of ownership. How is ownership separate from possession and what does subordination mean? There are no concepts of "country economic management" and "republic economic management." The work of the center remains unclear. Yet it is only by solving this problem that we can speak of republic cost accounting. Obviously, the greatest shortcoming in the processes occurring in the Baltic area is that in formulating the concept of republic cost accounting they did not begin by determining, albeit most generally, what does a "strong center" mean. Models of republic cost accounting should be different. However, a certain central idea should be observed. What precisely, we do not know as yet. It is this lack of

clarity that triggers problems of relations among nationalities. Unfortunately, such problems are being solved on an amateurish level, for which reason, for the time being, we have no scientific solutions.

M. Bronshteyn: Although I have read all the documents of the Interfront and listened to you closely, I still do not understand what it is that you mean by a strong center and what are the economic functions that you assign to it?

A. Belaychuk: The center is needed, above all, in order to make decisions on foreign policy problems. Clearly, it should also be in charge of redistributing funds among republics, for some republics export finished products while others export raw materials.

K. Prunskene: I do not understand how one could draw an analogy between republic cost accounting and some kind of cost accounting of the socialist system and, even more so, a global economy. You are speaking of totally disparate phenomena!

A. Belaychuk: Today we find in Western Europe common customs barriers, a common currency, and common passports. It is probably precisely the same trend which prevails throughout the world and which should be manifested in our country as well. Actually, what is taking place in our country is a process of separation of republics from the center. The gap which I mentioned is found between these two trends.

Will Customs-Houses Help?

A. Kalnynsh: The concept of republic cost accounting is closely related to normalizing commodity-monetary relations on the intra- and inter-regional levels. In our view, this requires a convertible Union currency. This would be more sensible than to introduce separate currencies for each Union republic. For the time being, however, there are no such currencies and what we have is uncontrolled emission of money. We must find ways to consolidate for the people of one republic or another the results of its toil. Therefore, those who work better should have a corresponding level of prosperity. Thus, the question of the ways of adopting a convertible, an exchangeable currency which can be bought and sold should be solved extremely specifically; some transitional periods as well as regional experiments should not be excluded in this case.

M. Bronshteyn: Such transitional periods involve major difficulties and friction, which are particularly noticeable today. It is a question of steps to limit access to the republic's market, the Estonian one in particular. It has been suggested to prohibit enterprises from exporting goods outside the republic. Or else, let us consider the system of licenses: If you want to export bolts in accordance with a contract on cooperated procurements, request a license. However, this could benefit only the domestic bureaucrat who may grant or refuse such a

license. This will take us to an impasse. The suggestion has also been made of introducing republic currencies. This would not be a currency but only one of the means of protecting us from the so-called purchaser. Throughout the world the "purchaser" is a benefit whereas in our country he is virtually a blood enemy who encroaches on our own bit of salami or shirt! That is how low we have sunk.

Many people believe that the best protection of the market is to have one's own monetary unit. The idea is that the rate of the monetary unit of a republic, which has a better commodity supply, would go up: For example, the "common" ruble would be worth 80 "Estonian" kopeks. Those whose markets are even better would exchange the ruble for 70 kopeks or 60. In that case, however, the first places to have their own currency should be Moscow and Leningrad. Imagine, however, what would then happen: We would simply break down into some kind of feudal principalities. There will be people who will be constantly changing currencies and control such exchanges. This will create tremendous difficulties and loopholes for abuse.

It must be realized that such ideas are the consequence of our common difficulty: the total imbalance of the market, the catastrophic drop in the purchasing power of the ruble, and the unprecedented 100-billion budget deficit. At such a point anyone who has something begins to defend his own market. This would become inevitable. I do not believe that republic currency is the best choice. In all likelihood, however, we should have to introduce a checking system for without it huge imports of goods and speculations would take place.

K. Prunskene: The system of checking accounts would be hardly the best way of solving the problem, compared to republic currency. Naturally, if we had a convertible ruble and a normal monetary system the problem would not exist. But what is the situation currently on the scale of the Soviet Union in terms of controlling the distribution process, so that what we receive for our labor would be consistent with our labor contribution?

M. Bronshteyn: In order to regulate relations among republics the principle of equivalent trade is extremely important. Let me cite a simple example: After the publication of the open letter in PRAVDA, I received a handful of letters from all parts of the country. Some people wrote: "What are you defending? Estonia lives better than everyone else and is stealing from the other republics. We are supplying you with metal, fuel, and cotton. Therefore, you live at our expense." Yet this is a normal trade, a normal division of labor! Even areas with a poorly developed light industry could live well with an open market and a mutually profitable equivalent exchange. In general, all reciprocal claims of this kind, as well as views such as "we could live quite well

even without the Union, we have everything we need," may be explained with the lack of equivalent trade. It is under such circumstances that centrifugal trends develop.

O. Potreki: The problem of equivalent trade and the financial improvement of the country are related to price setting. So far, it has been based in our country on the economic views of the 1930s, according to which the newly created value in the first subdivision is realized essentially in the prices of commodities in the second. While in the 1920s the share of the first subdivision was 20 percent and that of the second 80 percent, no one felt this difference particularly. One or two percentage differences in the price of a commodity was not much. Now, however, we have in the first subdivision 84 percent of commodities compared to 16 in the second. Consequently, 84 percent of the newly created value is realized through 16 percent of commodities. Hence the problem of budget deficits! The budget cannot be balanced for the simple reason that there is no normal price setting. In our country price setting is based not on the law of value but on the needs of the budget.

K. Khalik, candidate of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law:

The departmental system leads to the existence in the republic of two economies (central-departmental and republic) and actually creates within them two different social systems, two structures. In Kazakhstan and Central Asia and, in the last decade, in Estonia and Latvia, they have become quite clearly distinguished nationally: City, industry and better developed social structures are the lot of the non-native ethnic groups while the countryside and nonmechanized labor, of the native population. In the other republics the native nationalities are still, one way or another, more or less harmoniously balancing the entire social structure and the entire system of the social division of labor.

In Estonia, not for psychological or linguistic but for objective socioeconomic reasons, such a differentiation is characteristic of everything, starting with the settlement system. There is actually a degradation of the Estonian national structure in the cities. The social area is being narrowed and disproportions of the "country-town," "industry-agriculture," and "industrial labor-service labor" appear. The socioeconomic interests of ethnic communities become substantially different as a result of social and national divisions. The only way to integrate such interests is through the economic sovereignty of the republic.

Facts and Figures:

Between 1971 and 1987 the Latvian population increased by 292,000, 190,000 of which from migration (65 percent). Migration accounted for 54 percent of the population increase in Estonia and 42 percent in Lithuania.

A. Gaponenko: The problem of the richness of social structures is the basis of all national conflict in Estonia and Latvia. Thus, in Latvia most of the workers in industry or crafts are Russian-speaking. For a long time workers who essentially came to work in the republic were skilled. The majority of the people working in agriculture are natives. Most of the technical intelligentsia is Russian-speaking, but in the humanities it consists of Letts. Income distribution between the different social groups is uneven. For example, in our republic the real income of kolkhoz members is 42 percent higher than that of workers and employees. Bearing in mind that most kolkhoz members are Letts, the basis for conflicts is clear.

I believe that the solution of such conflicts lies in the development of a truly market-oriented economy, within which there will be a free redistribution of resources, while uniform levels of real income will be based on the working and living conditions of the population. We also need a political mechanism which would enable us equitably to distribute income from the public consumption funds.

Budget allocations must be made through a two-chamber Supreme Soviet. Either chamber could veto decisions which harm the interests of one ethnic group or another or of members of a specific social group. Conflicts among nationalities can be eliminated only by creating equal opportunities for all ethnic groups to fill all slots in the social structure and to obtain the education they wish. On the one hand, we must ensure the access of the Letts to some types of technical training and set up Latvian-language groups. On the other, groups must be set up for the Russian population in the agricultural institutes and a Russian humanities institute must be opened.

A. Kalnynsh: According to Comrade Gaponenko, the real income of Latvian kolkhoz members is higher than that of workers and employees. This depends, however, on the way it is computed. On a per capita basis the count is accurate. However, it would be more accurate to estimate the hourly work income; in that case the correlation between the income of the urban and rural population will assume an entirely different aspect.

M. Bronshteyn: We must remember that not all economically efficient suggestions are acceptable because of social, political or other considerations. Thus, it is economically entirely accurate to call for the free flow of capital and manpower. However, if now we were to allow the free flow of manpower, and if the republics are unable to limit it, they would simply disappear as national republics. Under conditions of a universal scarcity it is impossible to control migration economically by paying for imported manpower: Such payments would become part of production costs and, therefore, prices will rise. The enterprises will shift their financial difficulties to the consumers and would not reduce in the least importing manpower.

From the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Latvian SSR and the Latvian Republic Council of Trade Unions:

As of 1 January 1989 associations, enterprises, and organizations will mandatorily make differentiated payments to the budgets of rayon and city executive committees on the territory of the Latvian SSR in the amount of 25,000 rubles per every worker imported from outside the republic and for every member of his family.

Linguistic Ecology

M. Lauristin: Many of our errors are related to the fact that we considered national problems as separate from the entire system of social relations, without studying the subjects between which they developed, for relations do not appear between factories or ministries but between people living in their homeland, in their homes, and in their families or outside of them. During the period of perestroika we are beginning to realize the concept of the nation as the real subject of history and social life, with its self-awareness. Each republic—Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania—is an environment for existing, developing, and living and, perhaps, dying of a single native nation, by virtue of its nature, history, and type of production. The Estonian or Latvian nation begins to show a degradation in its own social structure when entire areas of self-reproduction of this structure are removed because of, let us say, the development of industry. If the social structure of the other nationalities in those republics is also incomplete, to them this is merely a problem of survival but not of the existence of the entire nation which is reproduced under totally different social conditions.

Question from the hall: What do you make of the fact that there also are Jews and Armenians who live outside of their ethnic territories without their nationality becoming degraded?

M. Lauristin: Like the individual, the national subject is able to compensate for what he lacks. However, everything has its limit and if this limit is crossed the nation begins to degrade. For example, some elements of culture disappear forever and parts of the national organism die. This can be seen in the example of the majority of nations deprived of statehood or true sovereignty.

It is being said that whereas everywhere else processes of integration are taking place we are now calling for greater differentiation. However, in order for integration to exist we must increase the wealth of national cultures. We must give them the opportunity to be reborn and to develop. Different nations have different ability for self-reproduction, which depends on their size, cultural system, education, and so on. The language is the foundation for the preservation and reproduction of national

culture. The laws on the language are called upon to protect this foundation. This is the primary, one could say the ecological, step to protect culture.

V. Steshenko, chairman, Council of the Baltic-Slavic Society for Cultural Development and Cooperation (Riga):

As is the case with the rest of the country, Latvia is catastrophically short of culture in the broadest possible meaning of the term. When we speak of a system of members of cooperatives, we must recall that it must be a civilized system. I shall not begin to enumerate the common difficulties, such as the residual principle for financing culture, the double morality standard, the fact that culture as a social process has been replaced by the achievements of individual professionals, and so on. All of this has caused damage to the spiritual life of the country, damage which is difficult to correct and which has specifically influenced national cultures. The cultural environment, the culture of the way of life which, in the Baltic area maintained traditionally high standards, found themselves eroded.

One of the main reasons was the unrestrained migration which drained the rural and suburban population of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. Let us admit that a comfortable situation was created for those who came to Latvia, to the extent to which this is generally possible, considering our common poverty. As a rule, such people limited themselves to acquiring a minimal knowledge of the Latvian language, calmly ignoring it throughout their entire life. The type of bilingualism which developed was that anyone who came knew Russian while knowledge of the Latvian language became a matter of good will. To the majority of new settlers the history of Latvia was reduced to that of the Red Sharpshooters and rumors about the "forest brotherhood," and the concept of Latvian culture was limited to familiarity with the names of Vilis Latsis and Raymond Pauls and the fact that the Letts have always liked to dance. The Latvian people remained merely as a background with a different language. The saddest thing of all is that this state of affairs was justified by theoreticians. One Moscow scientist was quite sincerely amazed: How can it be, he said, that after 40 years of Soviet system one can still hear Latvian spoken. He was not convinced by my references to the blossoming of nations under socialism.

K. Khalik: Assimilation takes place in any polyethnic community. This is a normal phenomenon. However, we must not confuse the result of a free personal choice encouraged by objective requirements with the result of the pressure exerted by one type of external circumstance or another. This particularly applies to linguistic assimilation. The most important functions of national languages today have not only not been developed but, conversely, have been suppressed or entirely eliminated. If there is no secondary or higher training, management, science, and professional art conducted in a national

language, and any mention of the voluntary nature of a choice of the study of a language becomes, naturally, unfounded. In this case the choice is forced.

This is further enhanced by the fact that the new reinforcement consisting of Russian-language speakers in the country is by no means culturally homogeneous. It is difficult to say how many generations should pass before they become organically integrated within Russian culture, for in this variant language is frequently reduced to an instrument of primitive communication. In any case, the language which develops in the first generation does not as yet have any cultural memory. It lacks associations and contacts with the universal cultural stock and with Russian culture in its entire wealth.

M. Lauristin: We see the solution by providing the small national sprinklings, Belorussian or Ukrainian for example, the opportunity, on the individual level, to develop their own language and culture, and freely to communicate with their "home body," with their republics in which this culture is functioning at full capacity. Today education in the country is structured on identical principles independent of culture, language, historical memory or tradition of one nation or another. In the Baltic area national culture is reproduced in the school but is highly standardized and can retain its originality only in the areas of national language and literature. Side by side with those schools are the Russian schools, where curriculums are even more standardized and are not aimed at helping Russian-speaking young people to adapt to life in the republic. Yet the school develops not only the personality but relations among nationalities as well.

In my view, each national culture must develop to the fullest extent as it makes use of its own traditions and, on their basis, sets up its own school system, naturally taking into consideration the all-Union basic curriculum, which guarantees the possibility of people communicating with each other regardless of ethnic origin.

A. Alekseyev, deputy chief, trade management, Riga City Executive Committee, member of the board of the Latvian SSR International Front of Working People:

While acknowledging the unquestionable need for the assertion of the Latvian language as the state language, we believe that the same status should be granted to the Russian language as well. It is not even a question of legal formulas but of the defense of the language which is today spoken by a rather large percentage of the population. One may have different views on this problem but what is clear is that an unfair solution to any problem will not contribute to social stability.

I. Kezbers, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretary:

The status of a state language in our Republic has become a constitutional rule and a resolution to this effect was unanimously adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet. Are you questioning its competence?

A. Alekseyev: All of us have the right to our own opinion on a given law. My view is that in the Latvian Republic, where 1.5 million people speak Russian and approximately the same number speak Latvian, there should be two state languages.

Yu. Goldmanis, candidate of historical sciences, head of the national relations sector, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department:

Clearly, the formulation of special codes and rules governing the use of languages should be the prerogative of the supreme power authorities of each republic. On the Union scale it would make sense to define only the basic principles and trends of such control which, naturally, should be democratic.

From the Program of the Latvian People's Front:

"Citizens who address themselves to the state authorities, establishments, organizations, and enterprises in the Latvian SSR can use either Latvian or the Russian language and obtain official documents in either one of these languages, as they wish. The free use of the Latvian and Russian languages must be ensured in the area of social services."

Science and Mass Awareness

I. Apine, Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member:

The processes occurring in the Baltic area are dynamic compared to elsewhere. However, we cannot consider them unique. Let us consider the problem of migration, which is of purely economic origin and with which both Moscow and Leningrad are well familiar. However, having appeared on a socioeconomic basis, problems among nationalities assume a certain autonomy and subsequently develop according to the laws of the logic of mass awareness. They could assume a rather sharp and even conflicting nature unless solved on time. That is why it is so important to determine the nature of this awareness in which cultural traditions and historical events are refracted. National policy was subject to deformation for many years. Under those circumstances, how could the national self-awareness of all population groups, including the Russian, escape such deformation? Typical of a major portion of the Latvian population is an emotional distortion, a violent outburst which is natural after such a long silence concerning its real troubles. Or else let us consider the local Russian population: I am not speaking of the creative intelligentsia

which have sunk roots in Latvia and which feels and perceives occurrences differently. Starting with the 1930s the Russian-speaking population has increased by a factor of 14. Some of it hold a marginal position. This is a rather complex group lacking deep roots in either culture. Yet the entire system of international upbringing, of which today we refer with greater irony, existed only in the Latvian language. The Russian language population was kept outside that system, with the assumption that it did not need any international upbringing. It was believed that the main thing was to block the "nefarious influence of bourgeois nationalism" among the Latvian population. When the emotional outburst occurred, assuming unusual forms for nothing of the sort had been observed in recent decades—meetings, demonstrations, picketing lines, slogans, and songs—the result was puzzlement, hostility, and a psychological shock. The people were totally unprepared to understand this. Let us point out also that many party workers on the middle and lower levels, drowned under current organizational work and unaccustomed to such situations, frequently considered such occurrences a catastrophe, an attempt at violating the very foundations of the system.

G. Kirkilas, head of the Sector of Relations Among Nationalities and Social Movements, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee:

The situation in which a communist must join the real struggle for political interests greatly complicates our lives. In general, such lives have stopped being even relatively calm. I dare to think and even to forecast that the time has come to prepare for work under entirely different situations, in which different interests become interwoven. Today we already have very serious political opponents. In party work as well, converting to a different vocabulary and phraseology is not all that simple. In Lithuania as, probably, in the other republics, we must reorganize ourselves. We need not only new ideas but also a new form of presenting them, which would be found attractive and convincing to the people. When we are dealing with the mass awareness, the novelty of an idea is very important even in terms of its form, not to mention its content.

Yu. Goldmanis: The concern of scientists and politicians caused by the fact that on the scale of the Union we are deprived of a consolidating principle, such as the idea of a single nation, is understandable. Furthermore, not everything is as it should even in terms of understanding the nature of the unity and integrity of the Soviet people. The concepts of patriotism, feeling for homeland, have become devalued in some important and essential aspects; frequently their development is reduced to providing military-patriotic upbringing. However, there also is a feeling of involvement with world civilization, with the socialist system, with one's own republic, city, and village, and not only with one's country. They must be combined rather than pitted one against the other. In our party files we have kept works by secondary school graduates of the spring of 1941. They were provided by A.Ya. Pelshe, who was then Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretary in charge of ideology.

Speaking on 15 June 1941, at the Congress of Latvian Writers, Pelshe noted that these works indicate gaps in educational work. The topic was "The Homeland." In May 1941, however, the children were not writing about our infinite space but about Daugava and Riga.

I. Apine: According to this logic, in any case the defense of what is national is equivalent to nationalism. In the case of Latvian history, the 1959 plenum was not an accidental event. Essentially, it was a copy on the Stalinist model of national relations. Its consequences defined the nature of such relations until 1985-1986. It is only now that we are beginning to come out of this tangle of distortions. During the years of stagnation pseudointernationalism was quite extensively promoted in the republics. The zeal of the local officials was detrimental both to real internationalism as well as to national development, language, and culture. Internationalism is not the equivalent of converting to the use of the Russian language in the national republics, based on the principle of "the faster the better," or that "the Russian language is the second native language."

R. Ozolas, deputy editor in chief, Izdatelstvo Mintis, editor in chief of the information bulletin of the "Vozrozhdeniye" Lithuanian movement for peregroyka:

We are trying to solve most problems speculatively, using the customary systems, whereas the main thing has already happened in many areas: The people are no longer afraid. Specifically, let me underline one thing: We must firmly deideologize many aspects of the spiritual area. I am referring to philosophy, science, and art. The main things that are happening in the Baltic area are an awareness of national statehood as the foundation of social life. Problems of relations among different nations cannot be solved without acknowledging that a nation, like an individual, lives only once and has the right to its place under the sun. The national minorities which choose to live within it or side by side with it must realize this.

A. Alekseyev: Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania include national minorities which have the right to expect of the native populations concern and understanding. In our Republic, the non-Latvian population employed in industry has reached the 60-percent level; as it adds to the Republic budget, it should also receive something in accordance with its contribution. We live in the age of glasnost. We are aspiring to create a rule of law state and justice. Consequently, glasnost, legality, and justice must exist also in solving such problems.

M. Lauristin: Based on tremendous historical experience, we developed an understanding of the value of national history, the national wealth of culture, and moral ideals. However, this stratum of cultural information of society, which we developed remains practically

unused. There was a time when Russia was described as the prison of the peoples. To our bitter regret, Stalinism turned it into the cemetery for the members of many such nations.

Not so long ago we were proud of this. We read works about the "small peoples," which had been able to find for themselves an honorable and worthy place within large nations. However, suffice it to look at what occurred, perhaps, with the peoples of the North. In the same way we are losing many other national resources. A national rebirth, a view of the nation as the subject which makes history, instills hope that we shall be able not only to protect perhaps part of such resources but also ensure their more sensible and efficient use.

Yu. Goldmanis: Without ethnosociological studies and a clarification of the actual situation it is difficult to argue about the model of national relations which we find desirable, including its cultural aspect. The optimizing and coordination of national interests are impossible without this; we must find our way in the mechanisms which shape national feelings and self-awareness.

L. Dribin, doctor of historical science, head of the national relations sector, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Party History:

All scientific forecasts in the 1970s concerning the national problem proved to be unfounded. This is the great fault of the social scientists who studied national relations. What occurred in fact was not internationalization or any rapprochement and merger among nations and not even unification, but something else, something which we are only now beginning to realize.

Why did the scientists make such errors? To begin with, as a result of commission work, and making results fit speculative concepts. Second, because of the ivory-tower work style and the fact that a small group of scientists monopolized research. They included Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, and other, but virtually all of them had lived in Moscow for periods up to 25 to 30 years and only rarely visited the "periphery." I fear that in the setting up of new scientific collectives, which we need so greatly, they will be staffed by those same people who lack a precise and complete information on the individual republics. The new models of national policy will be drafted without the involvement of fresh forces. In order to avoid this danger, the scientific councils of the new research centers dealing with national problems should, obviously, include in their staffs leading republic scientists.

Culture: Unity Within a Complex System

M. Lauristin: The idea is that our society must become the most advanced, able not only to master culture but also to develop new values and ideas and to create the most favorable conditions for the development of man and, in that sense, become the freest, including free from

contradictions which hinder the development of nations. We must pay and pay again to achieve this. I believe that it is precisely from this viewpoint that we must consider problems of relations among nationalities.

Today we are getting rid of some stereotypes which had become accepted by society in recent decades. Man was considered, so to say, from the viewpoint of philanthropy. If we spoke of the social area, it turned out that the state had "granted" a kindergarten, a club, and so on; in the area of national culture, it was as though someone had granted nations the possibility of blossoming, of going to Moscow to attend a festival or to publish books in their own language. The mythology of the state as some kind of supreme force which could take something out of nothing and grant it to everyone was the virtually most important feature of our old understanding of national problems.

From that viewpoint the nation was like a surplus, something unnecessary, which demanded ever new grants, some kind of special opportunities, which thereby prevented us from making efficient use of our own wealth. Naturally, I am simplifying the matter but what stood behind this system was the dream of getting rid of nationality as being something which required "inefficient" expenditures, including those for the development of culture.

Our society has a mass of problems but the problems are on different levels. The situation of the individual is being juridically structured through civil rights and social guarantees. A mechanism exists for securing such rights and protecting them from arbitrary actions. But an individual lives, shall we say, 70 years. The lifetime of a nation is entirely different and, on this level, problems appear, develop, and are solved on a different time cycle. In the realm of spiritual culture as well we have become accustomed to finding our way not even on the basis of the temporal life of the individual, not to mention the nation, but of gauging everything in terms of the current 5-year period. In my view, if we would like, as a result of perestroika, to establish a truly humanistic society, we must proceed from the subject and not only from departmental plans or other similar external factors.

V. Martinkus, candidate of philosophical sciences, chairman, Lithuanian Writers' Union:

Each farm in the countryside has its optimal size which must be taken into consideration. The same applies to culture and economics. We cannot successfully manage items of different sizes with the same method. This is obvious to both sociologists and economists. The reason for many difficulties is that we try to influence objects which, in terms of their dimensions, have long become uncontrollable, using the old command methods.

A. Gayzhutis, doctor of philosophical sciences, deputy director, Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law:

Occasionally, views are expressed in the course of discussions, to the effect that national relations in our country would become more meaningful if all of us would become somewhat more cultured and spiritual. I consider this formulation of the matter naive. Things will not improve unless we restructure the very principles and mechanisms of cultural policy.

The Stalinist formula, according to which each culture has, under socialism, a certain international content and can develop only within a specific national form is still largely applied. On the basis of this formula, the most essential features in the historical legacy of nations—character and mentality—apply only to the external form rather than the essence. I believe that this is the origin of many other difficulties in the development of national cultures. We hear from some scientists and writers that now the dam has burst. This claim has a certain element of truth. Indeed, what prevails in cultural exchanges among nationalities are not international and universal human factors but mass culture, in the worst meaning of this term. And if the cultural awareness of one group or another, which constitutes a national minority, is nurtured only out of such sources, and unless there are inner mechanisms for the reproduction of national culture, it would be difficult to avoid a general decline in spiritual values and moral regulatory agents.

V. Steshenko: Today the stratum of Russian culture in Latvia is extremely thin. In the Russian language community it is the passive perception of spiritual culture that prevails. Whereas the Latvian community realizes itself in the cultural process, the Russian language community has largely become a consumer of culture and, most frequently, imported ones, oriented toward entertainment (this does not apply to the small circle of Russian intelligentsia and the old residents).

Unquestionably, priority must be given to the development of Latvian culture. However, we should sound the alarm also about the status of Russian culture in Latvia. This must be done not only by the Russians but by the Letts as well. Frightened by the national upsurge of the Letts, the uncultured person, surrounded by people like him, becomes aggressive and a sensible dialogue with him becomes unlikely. Therefore, the rebirth of Russian culture in Latvia also means a rebirth of Latvia, of the struggle for the preservation of Latvian culture.

It is entirely obvious that the non-Latvians will not emigrate from the Republic. We must stabilize the population, for nothing can be built on shifting sands. However, such sands will remain unstable unless we make a purposeful effort, based on the experience of the past, and on global experience. In the 1920s and 1930s the Latvian national minorities, including the Russian, lived an intensive cultural life. There were 1,500 Latvian schools, 150 Russian, German, Estonian, Jewish, Polish, and Lithuanian schools, and so on. Some 150 journals were published (according to 1938 data, three of them in

Russian) and 54 newspapers. Sales clerks and streetcar conductors had to know no less than three languages—Latvian, Russian, and German. There were Russian cultural-educational societies ("Uley," "Boyen," "Rodnaya Starina," and other). Estonia as well had an association for Russian education and philanthropic societies. This experience should be used but, naturally, not mechanically.

V. Lazutka, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, Vilnyus Higher Party School:

The percentage of many groups of non-native populations in prewar Lithuania was even higher than it is today. For example, Jews accounted for as much as 12 percent of the entire population; the percentage of Russians was relatively higher. Karaimy, Lithuanian Tatars, and Russian Old Believers had found for themselves a place within Lithuanian society and had been able to adapt to this environment in which the native nation developed, without losing their own identity. There were cultural mechanisms which blocked assimilation and which made possible a symbiosis and not a blending and averaging of cultures.

Now Letts, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz have felt the danger of such assimilation, in which the specific features of their national cultures continue to survive exclusively on the level of daily life. We are all interested in having no culturally backward minorities. That is why the path of national revival is important not only for the native nation but for all other, the path of national-cultural autonomy.

Yu. Goldmanis: The fact that in his time and, incidentally, under entirely different circumstances, Lenin rejected the program of cultural-national autonomy is still frightening the dogmatists and prevents us from seeing the valuable accomplishments in this area in the USSR in the 1920s and beginning of 1930s, and in the Baltic states at that time.

M. Lauristin: Unity of cultures means unity of a complex system. We can never avoid differences in the pace of development, social infrastructures, and systems for information and dissemination of culture. In our country they are as different as they are, shall we say, between Europe and Latin America. In terms of the different areas we must have a different policy not only in economics but in culture. Despite the entire importance of all-Union programs, the republics must have the opportunity to determine by themselves the pace at which they can develop and the use they can make of their sociocultural potential.

K. Khalik: We are underestimating the peculiar situation of our time. Specifically, it is that there is a comprehensive reconstruction of the national memory and national self-awareness, turned toward the past. In the mass awareness there are active memories of destroyed national monuments, lost alphabets, and

defamed national heroes. In Estonia this was clearly manifested in two features. The first was the restoration of historical memory of the period which began in 1918-1920. The second was the integration with the system of cultural values created abroad. For example, until the 1960s Estonian national literature developed essentially not in the homeland but abroad. On the level of the mass awareness this culture leads to a one-sided romanticizing of the past, which is difficult not to consider as a legitimate reaction to the one-sidedness and distortions in the life which the people lived for more than 40 years. In order to preserve the stability and efficiency of the state and normal democratic conditions for the development of society, radical changes must be made in cultural policy.

From the Program of the Estonian People's Front:

The purpose of the People's Front is for all national groups living in Estonia confidently to feel themselves living on the grounds of their own national culture. True internationalism, the main content of which is national tolerance, proceeds from knowledge of and respect for one's national culture.... The People's Front sees to it that members of all national groups living in Estonia (Russian, Finnish, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Jewish, Polish, etc.) are given the possibility to pursue a cultural autonomy.... It supports the development of education, the organization of societies, the exchange of information, and amateur and professional art in the native language within the framework of cultural autonomy.

On the New Aspect of Federalism

V. Miller, director of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law:

In the republics, including in Latvia, there has been a great deal of sharp talking and writing about the imperfection of federative relations and obvious distortions in relations between central and local authorities. Let us above all make the simple truth clear: There is no return to the past. New ways must be sought. One of them is to grant as many rights as possible to Union republics. At that point it will become possible to solve all problems and, at the same time, preserve the Union of republics. The major step here is drafting and signing a new Union treaty among republics.

Such a treaty was signed in 1922. We believe that it should not be restored but that a new treaty must be drafted and become a structural component of the Constitution of the USSR. This viewpoint was already expressed in Estonia. I recently supported it at the All-Union Conference on International Relations, which was held in Minsk. It was supported by the representatives of Union republics. Yet many Moscow jurists opposed it.

In order for new relations to develop between the republics and the center, the system of state authorities and management must be restructured and so should the activities of the Council of Nationalities; a state committee for affairs of nationalities, with local organizations, should be created; the central ministries and departments, particularly the Union-republic, should be reorganized, so that the republics could truly influence the work of ministries and departments.

We have said a great deal about increasing the rights of Union republics and decentralizing management. Meanwhile, centralization is going on: by Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, some Union-republic ministries have now become all-Union ministries and an entire array of sectors has been converted from Union-republic into Union and from republic into Union-republic. This is a direct violation of the competence of the republics!

G. Khazak, candidate of historical sciences, Tallinn Polytechnical Institute:

The optimal way of solving problems of state structure in our multinational state is federalism, in the full meaning of the term. Comparisons with the United States or the FRG are incorrect, for the national structure in those countries is entirely different; the situation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia is something else.

What does federalism mean? Under our circumstances, it means a building several stories high, the cornerstone of whose foundations is the national sovereign republics. We cannot put a roof on a house before laying the foundations. We must proceed from the Leninist understanding of the federal state and not from the Stalinist autonomization, which led to a supercentralized political system and, actually, to a unitarian state.

The sovereign socialist republics, united on a voluntary basis, surrender to the federative state, as a whole, some of their functions: defense, overall coordination of foreign policy and, possibly, some functions related to the coordination of overall state transportation, power industry, and so on. In all other matters, however, they remain autonomous and have supreme power over their own territory.

Should a conflict arise between the Union and the republics on a subject affecting functions voluntarily surrendered to the center, the Union would have priority; in everything else, the priority should be that of the republic. This is entirely normal in a multinational state. In a socialist federation conflict situations are possible and there are no reasons to dramatize them. Incidentally, the purpose of the committee for constitutional supervision, which is being set up would be to resolve such conflicts.

According to some specialists, if there is a federation standing between a sovereign structure and international law, sovereignty does not exist, i.e., that it is possible only in the case of a confederation. My view is different: The voluntary surrender by a republic of some of its prerogatives does not exclude its sovereignty within the Union.

A federation means that in the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities all Union republics will be represented by an equal number of deputies, including representatives of autonomous republics, krais, oblasts, and okrugs. Every member of the Council of Nationalities, as a representative of a sovereign republic, must have the right to veto problems pertaining to said republic. The Union can only benefit from this. The stronger become its components, the stronger and the more stable it becomes.

Yu. Boyars: Our state faces serious problems in federal and national relations which, if worsened, could lead to a crisis situation, unless the political system becomes thoroughly democratized. The faster we undertake this the more we involve the broad masses into this process, the better.

Sometimes our state is compared to America and, on this basis, the need for a law on citizenship is rejected. However, the American experience is totally unsuitable in this case, for the United States has a different structure. On the other hand, we have still not "grown up" to the level of a federal American democracy. Had the republic legislative authorities enjoyed the same rights in the Union as the legislative authorities of the individual states have in the United States, our federative relations would have found themselves in a considerably better position. Thus, in order to pass a law in the U.S. Congress, it must be ratified by three-quarters of the legislative authorities of the states.

In this connection, we are quite puzzled by the fact that the Union adopted a negative attitude toward the suggestion submitted by the Baltic republics concerning veto rights, in the belief that this would be totally illegal, although here we have the example of that same United States, where such a mechanism is used, not to mention Yugoslavia. The question of coordinating the wishes of the subjects of a federation is quite complex. On the Union level we need a mechanism for determining the agreement or disagreement of a republic if, for example, a nuclear power plant is to be built on its territory, its natural resources are to be used, and so on. On that level, the veto right is a reliable tool.

Real federalism presumes that all subjects of the federation will be represented in the Council of Nationalities with an identical number of votes. The objection that there are more Tatars in the Union than Estonians and that they will not be represented is groundless: Is it not

possible to grant Union status to an autonomous republic? Naturally, we should not lower the already attained level. However, we could take a step forward in raising the level of sovereignty of individual nations.

A. Plotniyeks: Speaking of relations among nationalities, let us note that the old theoretical conclusions on the Soviet nation as a new community was an artificial structure which, in fact, meant belittling the national cultures, traditions, and so on, not only of the small Baltic nations but of the Russian nation as well.

The 1977 USSR Constitution stipulates that our state is a single Union state. Consequently, it is at the same time a unitarian state, simple and complex, and federative. Where did this formula come from? On 30 December 1922, in his speech at the First Congress of Soviets, Stalin described the new state as a single Union. However, there was no mention of a Union treaty. Therefore, the Leninist viewpoint of 1922 prevailed; yet it was defeated in 1977.

How are we to develop further? The slogan "strong center—strong republics" is perceived by us as politically relevant and quite accurate. But how to begin? Unless there are strong republics, which have been really granted all the attributes of sovereign states, the center will continue to take over from the republic's machinery and try to solve everything without, however, accomplishing anything. It is important juridically to ensure the sovereignty of the republics. For many years we spoke of gradually broadening the sovereign rights of republics. However, we cannot divide sovereignty into components. If for one reason or another the state were to delegate to someone any one of its rights, it should see to it that while this right is exercised all of its other rights have not been surrendered.

When the 1924 USSR Constitution was adopted, the Union republics already had their own constitutions which regulated various areas of their social life. The 1924 Constitution consists of two documents: the Declaration on the Founding of the USSR and the Treaty on the Founding of the USSR. The Constitution dealt exclusively with federative relations but not a word was said about either. Therefore, in answer to the question of what makes the Constitution of the Latvian SSR different from that of the USSR, at that time one could not have answered as one could now: Their covers are different.

If the republic constitution would continue to duplicate the Fundamental Law of the Federation, it would not ensure juridical forms of republic sovereignty and the exercise of full governmental power on its territory. If it is stipulated that the USSR Constitution will deal with problems of the subjects of the political system of the USSR, the organization of the federative state, federative ownership, system of federative authorities and their competence, and the foundations of the constitutional status of citizens of the USSR, to a certain extent

this would outline the shapes of our common home. The republic constitution should be, first of all, the constitution of a sovereign state and of a member of the federation. Second, it should codify the foundations of the political, economic, and social system and citizenship of the Union republic and the constitutional status of the citizens of other republics residing on its territory, and the organization and forms of exercising the republic's state authority. At that point the constitutions would not be simple copies of each other.

The time has long come to review and demarcate areas of competence between the Union and the republics. In his political testament, V.I. Lenin expressed the thought that the federative authorities should be in charge only of defense and foreign relations. However, item 12 of Article 73 of the current USSR Constitution includes, among others, as prerogatives of the Union other problems of all-Union significance, i.e., virtually all problems.

V. Martinkus: It was said here that until 1936 the Constitution defined federative inter-republic relations. Officially, this is so. In reality, this did not occur, for one of the theoretical sources for the creation of the Soviet Union was the familiar Stalinist postulates which he never denied. In his argument with Stalin, in my view, Lenin achieved a formal victory only. Stalin had already been able to implement his idea of autonomization in the guise of a certain circular to the communist parties of the republics. This circular remained in effect even after Stalin had been forced to amend the definition of the Union state. We must take a truly new look at the problems of the development of Union relations, updating the status of the CPSU, etc. We—Lithuanians, Letts, and Estonians—have nowhere to go without the renovation of the party and society through national rebirth.

K. Khallik: In the past year two different approaches have become apparent in matters of national policy. The first is the hope for and concept of a radical restructuring in this area. The second is partial democratization, without revising the foundations and assessing the true reasons for deformations in this area. If we wish to take steps against clear centrifugal trends, this is one policy; the use of the national factor in further promoting perestroika, is another. In either case we must determine how our subjective wishes and political objectives correlate with actually occurring processes.

The specific feature of our political thinking, political culture, and mass awareness is that in all of our considerations both today and in terms of historical tradition on which we rely, there is a fundamental contradiction. It is a contradiction between strong imperial traditions in politics, on the one hand, and ideological standards and stipulations which acknowledge the right of nations to self-determination, on the other. Frequent attempts are made to combine these two opposites, painlessly if possible. Hence, envious analogies with the United States and embroidering its federal interrelationships.

Psychologically and ideologically this is a serious obstacle on the way to a sharp turn in national policy. There is a great temptation of pursuing such policy as in the past by merely cleansing it from obvious distortions and antidemocratic features. The profound conflict in the Transcaucasus and relations among nationalities, sometimes aggravated to the limit, makes it necessary to seek decisive measures within traditional forms.

But if the democratization of national policy turns out incomplete, it will become increasingly conflicting with objective ethnic processes within our society. During the post-revolutionary years qualitative changes have taken place in the ethnic structure of the country's population. Expectations notwithstanding, the ethnic "mosaic" did not diminish but increased. Instead of eight nations, as counted by ethnologists in 1926, today we can count some 30 ethnic collectives with a potential for independent development.

I. Apine: The tendency is to solve everything on the basis of our own national interests, which are real, imbued with pain and hurt and, nonetheless, our own. On the other hand, there are suggestions which on the surface may seem quite correct but are, actually, such as to ignore the real problems of the native population. Right-wing conservatives try to leave everything as it was, promoting a unitarian state, perhaps not an empire but a state which is "one and indivisible." A left-wing radicalism has appeared as well, which is frequently described as extremism.

We fear polarization a great deal, but could it be that the differentiation among approaches is legitimate and natural? This would strengthen a sensible position which would not predispose toward taking extreme action and would divide the healthy forces which can promote consolidation. This would make it possible for the People's Front to support its programmatic statements and not lean to the left, while the Interfront would lean to the right. This would lead to the development of a new model of relations among nationalities in the republic, which would take into consideration the variety of national interests.

A. Plotniyeks: Let me draw your attention to yet another important aspect of federative relations. The 19th Party Conference proclaimed as one of the objectives the creation of a rule of law state. This means that the law becomes the supreme authority. However, the law of the USSR has found itself in a calamitous position: It cannot operate without the resolutions of the Council of Ministers or the instructions of one ministry or another. The Constitution as well, essentially, cannot live without laws and legal acts, which is totally abnormal. Republic laws merely reproduce Union laws. We believe that, to begin with, on the level of the USSR, it must be clearly stipulated what precise type of laws can be passed by the Union and, second, that the supreme juridical force of the laws of a Union republic on its territory must be secured. The 1924 USSR Constitution stipulated the

right of Union republics to object to laws passed by central administrative authorities. This right was abolished in 1936 and has not been reinstated to this day.

We are currently restoring the supreme juridical force of the law of the Union and the republics. No single administrative act, including decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, should conflict not only with Soviet law but also with the laws of the republics. Should such a conflict arise, the Union republic has the right to proclaim such a decree invalid on its territory until the question has been decided by the Constitutional Supervision Committee.

Yu. Boyars: Very important sources have been ignored in the legislative regulation of national relations. There are a number of worldwide standards regulating the status of national minorities. We, however, are in a dark forest.

A different approach is required also in providing legal support for the functioning of state elements, such as the armed forces and the organs of state and public safety. In all countries the solution of problems related to these systems are the prerogatives of the central authorities. Naturally, however, this is not a stereotype. We believe it expedient that new territorial—not national!—formations of armed forces be established. This would prevent the existence of "old soldiers' privileges," and the state would not waste money in transferring new recruits. They could be used locally to protect the local Baltic boundaries. We would be able better to supervise the way our children perform their service and what they do, and would help the command in its educational work.

We oppose the fact that the USSR MVD has control over the territory of the republic. Our Supreme Soviet and congress of soviets can solve the respective problems by themselves. Small internal forces, common to the Union, are needed in the struggle against banditry, hijacking airplanes, and so on, but not against demonstrators. The soviets should supervise the army, the internal forces, and the KGB.

V. Miller: The major problems of relations among nationalities cannot be solved without the development of legislation, Union legislation in particular, which is now in the tail of events. For example, today social organizations have appeared in large numbers in all republics. Yet there is no law about them. Laws are being passed on state languages. We have already passed such a law yet, to this day, the Union legislation has remained silent. Questions of citizenship are being raised but we are being told on the Union level: Wait, do not hurry. It is true that republic legislation is also making poor use of its opportunities.

I. Kezbers: Another very important aspect of republic sovereignty is its foreign relations. I do not oppose the fact that the center must conduct foreign policy. All of us know that this is a very delicate area of governmental activities, which is within the range of competence of the

federation. But when policy is formulated in the area of the Baltic, Europe, and the northern part of Europe, Union and, in particular, Baltic republics should participate in such work. Currently some members of such republics may be invited as interpreters or experts in local problems and only occasionally at that. The fact that one or two positions in the consulates are granted should not be considered a gift. Having representatives of the Baltic republics in Soviet embassies or consulates in the Scandinavian countries and countries in which our emigres live should become standard practice. This too is part of the concept of the exercise of sovereignty.

Many countries have not recognized us *de jure*, essentially the United States and the NATO countries. However, without waiting for such recognition, we could expand our relations through other means. There are cultural agreements between the USSR and other countries. Within such agreements we should have our own republic protocols of cooperation and cultural centers. The sovereignty of each Union republic would be strengthened if they were to participate more frequently in the work of nongovernmental organizations. We must firmly promote nongovernmental personal relations. Currently the attitude toward our former fellow citizens who live in the West is changing. We are trying not to turn into enemies the emigres and emigre organizations, to find ways to establish contacts with them and not to reject out of hand the possibility of cooperation (it is not a question of war criminals or direct participants in activities promoted by the special services). Unfortunately, for the time being there is no general approach to the solution of such problems.

Federalism and the Party

V. Lazutka: The appeal of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee to the party members, working people, and voters speaks of changes in the status of the Republic party organization. The appeal itself does not provide any specific information on this future status. However, based on the talks and discussions which have been going on in our country for quite some time, it is clear that what this means is restoring the autonomy of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Clearly, it is no accident that the Communist Party Central Committee raised this question.

In the present situation, the Communist Party must think quite seriously about its status and the role which it performs and should perform. It is not excluded, as certain forces within the Sayudis national movement have stated, that unless the processes of perestroika develop faster and unless quality changes are ensured, the question of power will arise, either through the soviets or by convening an extraordinary party congress aimed at changing the membership of the Central Committee.

O. Latsis: The need to strengthen the party's positions is obvious. However, it is not clear how the present status restricts its autonomy and the possibility of making new decisions which are needed today. How could amendments help here and what amendments precisely? Strengthening the role of the party is not an attributed feature! A perfectly defined decision-making system exists. It has been codified in the statutes and we must have a clear idea of what to change within it and how, what would be the use of such a change and what losses could be expected?

V. Lazutka: This is a rather complex problem which should be studied. For the time being, we have gone no further than expressing wishes. If we look deeper, we could see, for example, the following aspects: Let us say that a trend is developing of a conversion to a unitarian state which, theoretically, has the full right to exist. At that point the question arises about what type of separatism or autonomizing of the party would be harmful. But if the Republic has in fact gained the status of a sovereign state, which is not something imaginary, and we come somehow closer to a confederation, the question of the autonomy of the Lithuanian Communist Party will also arise.

O. Latsis: This answer makes the situation even less clear. We must seriously analyze the situation and the prospects for its development, and it turns out that no such analysis has been made. In such a complex matter a diagnosis is made without a study! Yes, a unitarian nature leading to a federative development is taking place in the state but not in the party. The state is one thing and the party is something entirely different. The state may be federative but the party, nonetheless, remains unitarian. Above all, proceeding from strictly practical objectives of strengthening the party's positions as the political vanguard of society, it would be wrong to claim that this purpose can be achieved by federalizing the party.

R. Ozolas: The main question is to realize the need for CPSU perestroika as a subject of political action and as a force which has assumed responsibility for perestroika. All of our discussions will be meaningless unless the party is restructured. The party must become the spokesman not of some kind of metaphysical essence but of national life and of the aspirations of the people. The main thing is the creation of national parties of communists in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and elsewhere, which would make an alliance of parties. For the time being, this does not exist. Unless we progress in that direction, the party will be unable to further the positive start of perestroika and to preserve its real gains and values, at least in the Baltic area. If perestroika is mired down in the Baltic area, however, it would perish everywhere. The urgent requirement is that national statehood should become the foundation of social life, for without it we cannot move ahead. The party alone cannot restructure life. We need everywhere a national state revival, in the Baltic, in Belorussia, and in other parts of the country.

The party can come out of the condition of crisis by transferring administrative functions to its national detachments. This does not eliminate ideological and international unity. People from different nationalities, who live in Lithuania, not only can but must rally around the Lithuanian Communist Party.

K. Khalik: Suggestions on federalizing the party are related to its status within the political system. The main thing here is to take the party out of the administrative system. When resolutions on preserving the centralized party structure were being adopted at the 10th RKP(b) Congress, in Lenin's view this was accompanied by separating the functions of the party from those of the state within the political system. However, developments took a different way and the party assumed, to a large extent, administrative-management functions. Hence the suggestion of federalizing the party. If the sovereignty of the republics is truly ensured, new relations will be established among them and the party will finally separate itself from the administrative system. At that point the question of federalizing the party would not arise to begin with.

O. Latsis: We must take into consideration the processes which are taking place currently. We have the resolutions of the party conference. They gave priority to the party's role as the political vanguard. This is quite different from the old concepts, particularly the Stalinist ones, which have managed to prevail so far, with only minor changes. The separation of the party from the state and the division of their functions will take place and the party apparatus is changing. Its functions in the administration of governmental and economic affairs have been sharply restricted. All of these are real processes which characterize the party status under contemporary conditions and which cannot be underestimated.

Citizenship Is a Political Problem

Yu. Boyars: All sovereign states have their citizenship. We have a law on Soviet citizenship and in Latvia we have the Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase on accepting Latvian SSR citizenship. In other words, there is republic citizenship but not a law about it. This gap must be filled.

Naturally, the law on republic citizenship should not contain any kind of national criteria, for we cannot discriminate against people based on national characteristics. In any national state, however, it is essentially those who have become part of the community, who have learned its language, and who have accepted its political system that are granted citizenship. Such features are watched quite closely.

Migrations are strictly controlled throughout the world. It is total nonsense that there is free movement of people and manpower throughout Europe. This has been included in the documents of the European Community but, in fact, is not taking place. The higher level of

development is reached by a state the less such movement takes place and the stricter the state regulates entries. In Sweden, for example, it is only tourists who can freely enter the country, and that only applies to other countries with which agreements have been concluded; in order to take up permanent residence, one must have documents proving that one has a job and will pay taxes. Such migration restrictions do not violate Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as is sometimes being claimed. Incidentally, no one has the obligation to observe the declaration, for it is only a "moral code." All that we must do is observe international pacts on human rights. Such pacts contain a number of stipulations concerning the right to migrations. In particular, such migrations should not violate security or conflict with other stipulations contained in that document. Its fundamental norm is the right to self-determination by the people, which is codified in Item 1. If migration by one nation threatens the self-determination of another, naturally, what prevails, and in the documents such rights are considered dominant, is the right to self-determination as the supreme right of mankind.

From Item 1, Article 13, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

"Every person has the right freely to move and to choose his own place of residence within the limits of each state."

From the Final Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of Participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

"The participating states will fully respect the rights of everyone:

"To freedom of movement and place of residence within the borders of each state...."

A person may be a citizen of Belorussia and live in Riga. This is his right. In that case, however, he has no right to vote for deputies to the Latvian Supreme Soviet (he does, for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) or behave on the republic's territory in any manner other than as citizen of the USSR.

Today the question of citizenship is being solved by the Supreme Soviet, which is the agency of the supreme authority. However, this question is being drafted by the MVD, i.e., everything is being done behind the back of the person himself, who is unable to influence the decisions and, above all, there is not even an authority to which such decisions could be appealed. I suggest that the U.S. experience be adopted: that citizenship be decided by the courts. This could be accomplished by the collegium on problems of citizenship of the Latvian SSR Supreme Court. The advantage of a legal procedure is that the possibility would exist of proving one's rights. Citizenship is, to a high extent, a political problem and

one of the fundamental elements of republic sovereignty. Unfortunately, our legislation does not define citizenship. It is acknowledged that there is a political-legal connection between individuals and the state which grants them reciprocal rights and obligations.

A. Plotniyeks: The 1936 Constitution states quite clearly that "every citizen of a Union republic is a citizen of the USSR." This standard remains valid. However, a person may ask how will the fact that he is a citizen of the Latvian SSR be reflected in his passport? What could the answer be? The result is that the constitutional institution of citizenship depends on a residence permit: if you get a permit you become a citizen.

Most of this problem can be legally resolved by granting republic citizenship. Based on the meaning of sovereignty, we must grant the Union republic priority in terms of citizenship. Citizenship means a tie to the state which appears the moment the person is born and lasts throughout his life. However, anyone should have the right to change citizenships.

V. Steshenko: Would the institution of republic citizenship not become a "higher" level of serfdom rights?

A. Plotniyeks: No, it is a question only of strengthening ties between one's native home and any citizen. For many years we actually tried to destroy the institution of the family and that of the nation. There is no real attachment to one's village, city, and so on. In its new variant the purpose of citizenship is to strengthen the ties between man and his native land.

V. Lazutka: Citizenship is one of the most direct forms of eliminating the alienation of man from the state. Our society is setting for everyone the requirement of showing greater responsibility and a more conscientious attitude toward obligations. I believe that this is better achieved through republic rather than Union citizenship. Naturally, negative aspects related to this are inevitable. Life is dialectical. However, we must not postpone the solution of this problem.

In the Court of History

G. Khazak: There are several elements of the rule of law state in our country but, so far, not an integral, an efficiently operating system of it. Could socialism exist without it? It is as yet to be created as a society of real humanism focused on man and based on the principles of social justice, pluralism, and democracy. That is why everything will have to be measured with the help of new yardsticks, and in the course of perestroyka, eliminate the political distortions in society.

The Baltic Soviet republics are part of the Union, which is a federative state. However, the appearance of different socialist republics and the principles governing their

membership in the federation are by no means the same. The true political picture must be restored, however difficult this may turn out to be.

The Stalinist dictatorship was settling its accounts with the communist principles within the country, and it would be naive to assume that at that time Zhdanov's, Vyshinskiy's and Dekanozov's "foreign policy hands" wore "gloves." Unfortunately, we still lack an official interpretation of the meaning and results of the 1939 pact and protocols. We do not have the papers themselves at our disposal but, I believe, that is not all that important. It is possible to recall the events which followed the pact, particularly in September 1939. We must look honestly at the facts in the face. There are those who believe that the Baltic republics did not voluntarily join the Union. Let historians study this, let them go to the archives, including those kept abroad, and then provide a definitive political assessment of the events of that time.

I. Kezbers: It is an error to believe that the historical paths of the three Baltic republics enjoy any kind of special right of consideration. But it is equally wrong to conceal the fact that for 20 years those republics had their own foreign policy, maintained diplomatic relations with approximately 40 countries, and were full members of the League of Nations and that, in the final account, in 1939 became the allies of the USSR. This is a specific page in our history, and we are hoping for the total opening of the records and for the publication of the documents pertaining to that period. I believe that the time has come to undertake its serious study.

I am deeply convinced that by telling the truth about 1939, dealing with Soviet-Polish, Soviet-Finnish, and Soviet-Romanian relations, it is we ourselves that would benefit above all. To tell a half-truth or to present some kind of truth surrogate manufactured with amateurish methods would benefit our ideological opponents. It is of essential importance to emphasize that in 1939-1940 the question which faced the Baltic republics was the following: To choose between socialism and Hitlerite Germany. There was no third choice. The practical resolution of the dilemma, and the extent to which the choice of external factor or the factor of incorporating within the Soviet Union was solved, is a different matter but, I repeat, we have no right to avoid it.

V. Kashauskene, doctor of historical sciences, director of the Party History Institute, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee:

Here the protocols and treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany of 23 August and 28 September 1939 were mentioned. Also important to Lithuania is the 10 January 1941 protocol, according to which part of Lithuanian territory was ceded to Germany and subsequently purchased by the Soviet Union and added to the republic. Our government must express its view on

all this, although even on the basis of the materials published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA our historians can rebuild the content of these protocols.

Our past includes the deportations of 1941 and the postwar years. Stalin was able to organize everything in such a way that within a single night of June 1941 some 40,000 people were taken out of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (16,000 from Lithuania, and 15,000 from Latvia). It is believed that in the postwar years (in 1948, for instance) resolutions to this effect were passed by the Councils of Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Could this have taken place without orders from the center? All in all, a total of 120,000 people were taken out of Lithuania at different times (39,000-40,000 families); some 200,000 or 8 percent of the population (not only Lithuanians but also Jews and Russians) were subjected to repressive measures. This caused tremendous harm to the Republic. Today deportations are considered unconstitutional and the harm they caused is being somehow compensated. This, in our view, should be done by the central authorities.

We need the documents which would prove what precisely originated from the center and what depended on the local authorities. The people would like to know about the behavior of the leaders of the republics during those difficult times, during the times of mass deportations. Nor do we have documents issued by the VKP(b) Central Committee on the work of the party organization in the Republic.

Lithuania has its own Kuropaty. A governmental commission on the study of the sites where political prisoners were killed during the first days of the war and after it, is at work. The inmates were destroyed by the MVD authorities. Currently this case is being investigated by the prosecutor's office.

We are restoring the truth of history. Many people perished. The Institute of Lithuanian History is drafting a list of residents of the Republic who died at the fronts in the Great Patriotic War. We are drafting a memory book of the dead. A public commission to study the victims of Stalinism has been created. No such list can be obtained strictly on the basis of MVD investigations; reports by relatives have helped. We already have 150,000 investigations. We are being helped by the Veterans' Council of the Party History Institute and the Museum of the Revolution. We believe that this will be a monument to the people's culture. Society suffered great losses and this must be remembered forever by the people.

From the editors: The roundtable meetings have ended but the questions have not disappeared. Problems of relations among nationalities are so complex and varied that it turned out impossible to discuss all of them even in the course of a 2-day debate. As the text clearly shows, the views of the participants in the roundtable ranged from virtually coincidental to totally irreconcilable.

Occasionally the feeling developed that the speakers tried to hear each other while at other times one could only think that, for the time being, they operated in different dimensions....

Something else is clear as well: Monopoly on the truth is no longer tolerable either in its former "apparat" or latest "mass-radical" aspect. Such monopoly is essentially an anomaly. It has become even more obvious that on the way to the truth what truly matters is not how loudly one speaks but how substantive one's ideas and arguments are.

A number of such ideas and arguments are being formulated. However unusual they may seem, they must be heard and studied. Many of the questions which were heatedly debated at the roundtable are already being solved in the published draft general principles for restructuring the management of the economy and the social sphere in Union republics, on the basis of the broadening of their sovereign rights, self-management, and self-financing. Equally important to our common future are both unity and variety. Ahead of us lies the responsible way of reciprocal understanding and, on its basis, of constructive action for the renovation of our many-faceted and multilinguistic socialist home.

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Letters to the Editors

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[Text] K. Ovsyannikov, head of the Ulyanovsk Laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of Development of the Agroindustrial Complex, candidate of economic sciences; and Yu. Volkov, candidate of geographic sciences, senior scientific associate: Paying Attention to the Rural Intellectual

Today no one doubts any longer that one of the worst bottlenecks which hinder the increased production of food in the country is the lagging of the social sphere behind the needs of the contemporary rural working person. The Central Committee Plenum pointedly raised this question. It is the unanimous view that the lagging can be eliminated by sharply increasing capital investments in the nonproduction area.

The priority of outlays assumes essential significance. It is entirely obvious that laying the material foundations for the nonproduction sphere in the countryside is not a panacea which can eliminate the social privations of the rural resident, the level of development of the social area being defined by its cadre potential. It is a question of the quantitative and qualitative structure of the specialists—teachers, physicians, cultural workers, workers in trade, services, communications, and so on. Practical experience has indicated that even with a satisfactory material

base, in frequent cases the level of spiritual life and services provided the rural population remain low and that the drain of specialists in such skills is continuing.

The main reason for this situation is the low fixed wage and the lack of effective labor incentives, particularly for people who are not directly involved in material production. In our view, this category of intellectual workers, who should work in the countryside, should be given priority in wage increases compared to similar specialists in the towns. The concept that one can live more cheaply in the countryside indicates an obsolete way of thinking, which has been retained from times when human existence was limited to "bread alone." The contrast between rural and urban living conditions clearly requires that material advantages be granted to the rural intellectual. While people employed in trade, services, communications and transportation in the countryside are given incentives to upgrade their income on the basis of cost accounting activities, intellectual workers are deprived of this opportunity.

We firmly believe that unless we implement a system of steps aimed at increasing the income and material incentive of the work of rural teachers, physicians, and workers in medicine and culture, the drain of this category of cadres will increase. It has already become threatening. Our studies indicate that in 1987 the number of teachers who left Ulyanovsk Oblast villages was one-third higher than the overall population migration; in Pavlovskiy Rayon it was more than 70 percent higher; in Baryshskiy it was 75 percent higher and it was double in Surskiy Rayon. In connection with the increased income of kolkhoz members, lessees and members of cooperatives, the polarization of the earnings of the rural intelligentsia will increase and, therefore, so will social differentiation, as a result of which the outflow of such intelligentsia will accelerate regardless, we repeat, of the development of material facilities in the social area.

Even today the wages of agricultural specialists are sharply different from the earnings of the remaining part of the rural intelligentsia. The following dogma prevails in both theory and practice: the net income of society is created only in material production; the nonproduction area, not to mention the spiritual one, is supported by the worker and kolkhoz member. Although the indirect role of these areas in the creation of the added product is acknowledged (and, in recent years, as we pointed out, there has been an emphasis on the fact that the development of the social sphere has become a decisive factor in the growth of output), in practice unfairness in the distribution of the net income remains. This is reflected in the growth of capital outlays in the nonproduction area, which are insufficient, particularly in the rural social infrastructure. Periodical raises in the wages of teachers, physicians and cultural workers are rare, albeit necessary, steps which do not play any essential stimulating role. If a kolkhoz member, a member of a cooperative or a lessee can directly and steadily feel the growth of his income based on the cost accounting revenue from

his production activities, whatever the contribution of the rural intellectual may be—in health treatment, education or meeting the spiritual needs of the rural workers—it is not reflected in his prosperity.

Hence the logical conclusion and suggestion that depending on the growth of the net income in the country and, consequently, in the given oblast or rural rayon within the jurisdiction of the rural soviet the teacher, physician or cultural worker has a right to a share of this growth. We could apply a procedure according to which for each percentage of increase in the net income a certain percentage will be contributed by each farm to an extrabudgetary (regional) fund for such incentive. Such a fund could be used to encourage the personnel in the social area both for directly influencing the growth of output (such as, for example, thanks to a drop in morbidity) as well as for higher indicators in professional activities.

We believe that the application of such measures does not necessarily be promulgated by decree. This can be achieved also with explanatory work among the labor production councils and the power of the example set by the progressive farms which are growing at a faster pace. The buro of the Ulyanovsk CPSU Obkom has decided to conduct a socioeconomic experiment in two or three rayons in our oblast to test this system and thus to promote stabilization and improvements in the situation of cadres in the social area in the countryside.

M. Moskovich, Saki, Crimean Oblast: Religion and Elections

During the electoral campaign church officials were nominated as candidates by public organizations. In particular, Aleksey (Ridiger Aleksey Mikhaylovich) bishop of Leningrad and Novgorod was nominated by the Soviet Charity and Health Foundation. How is this compatible with the concept of the separation between church and state?

The answer given is that he was nominated by a social organization. Yes, this was prior to the elections. After the elections, however, he becomes a statesman, i.e., his activities as a deputy become state activities. I believe that this would be clear to all. And so, how to interpret the fact that clergymen can be elected to hold governmental positions?

The editors asked Georgiy Vasilyevich Barabashev, doctor of juridical sciences, Moscow State University professor and member of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR to answer these questions.

Above all, we must clarify the meaning of the constitutional rule on the separation between church and state. Let me point out that the very first Soviet fundamental law—the 1918 RSFSR Constitution, stipulates in Article

13, as does the 1936 USSR Constitution, that the purpose of the separation was to ensure the freedom of conscience for the working people. Elevating any kind of belief to the status of state religion or creating a privileged status for a given religion or the possibility of any association of believers and their authorities to make use of the state authority and the school to expand their influence, were considered inadmissible. Unlike the previous constitutions, the 1977 USSR Constitution does not mention the purpose of the separation of the church from the state. However, neither current legislation nor practice give any reasons to believe that this objective has changed.

Nonetheless, the separation of church from state is not grounds for restricting the political or any other rights and freedoms of religious believers or clerical and religious personalities. The principles of equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, codified in Article 34 of the USSR Constitution, is guaranteed regardless of their attitude toward religion, origin, or nature of employment. The stipulations of Article 48 of the USSR Constitution, which grants the right to participate in the administration of governmental and social affairs, including the possibility to elect and be elected to soviets of people's deputies, fully apply to all citizens. The USSR Law on the Election of People's Deputies prohibits any direct or indirect restriction of the citizen's electoral rights based on their attitude toward religion, origin or nature of employment. Consequently, a clergyman or a religious leader could be nominated at a meeting of a labor collective or of citizens at a place of residence, or by a public organization to be a candidate for people's deputy and could be elected as such. In reality, several clergymen, representing different religions, were nominated candidates for deputies. Three religious leaders were registered as candidates for deputies by the social organizations of which they were members. The possibility of such a nomination is clearly stipulated in Article 39 of the USSR Law on the Election of People's Deputies.

A clergyman or religious personality who is, shall we say, an active participant in the peace movement or the movement for the protection of cultural values and who has earned a high reputation through his work in one or another philanthropic foundation and bases his electoral program on humanistic and democratic principles, could earn the deserved extensive support of the voters and become their representative in the supreme agency of state power (as confirmed by the results of the elections). This does not conflict in the least with the separation between church and state.

S. Tsvetkov, CPSU member since 1975, senior teacher, USSR MVD Academy, candidate of juridical sciences, lieutenant colonel of the militia: For Professionalism!

I was shaken up by G. Medvedev's article published in *KOMMUNIST* No 4. Not because of its pointed details. Considering my profession, this does not amaze me. The

level of summation is what matters along with the contradiction between the leadership of a department and the need to make professionally knowledgeable decisions. Management is necessary. However, also necessary is a "committee of chiefs of staff" to draft professional resolutions. The absence of professionalism is a common difficulty.

I am 40 years old. My students are between the ages of 35 and 40. My generation is a big one. It is well-trained. However, so far it is largely removed from decision-making. It is not a question of a career. It is a question of the lack of a mechanism for the shaping of professional views. Strategic problems cannot be solved by specialized publications. Furthermore, their readership is small. My suggestion is the following: the journal should set up topic clubs for professionals. The right to speak should be given not only to heads of departments, who cannot see the entire problem because of the "sifting" by the apparat, but also to "middle level" professionals.

One of the problems which should become a topic of professional analysis is that of the struggle against crime which, as a whole, far exceeds the framework of activities of the MVD, the KGB and the system of law enforcement organs at large.

N. Ryabov, Kazan: Our Right

Today it becomes easier to tell the truth. However, we do this somehow shyly, dealing only with a specific time and, essentially, with the phenomena of stagnation. We forget that stagnation phenomena became possible thanks to silence. One cannot fail to be concerned also by the fact that a number of scientists and writers, in the search for new political, moral and esthetic guidelines, do not use entirely "gentlemanly" methods of debate. Against this background it is by no means a joke to consider M.S. Gorbachev's appeal, at his meeting with the leaders of science and culture to engage in "unilateral disarmament."

There may be the objection that in the history of culture a clash of opinions has always existed. Yes, contradictions remain the motive force of spiritual development of mankind. However, this applies only to contradictions of development and not to far-fetched contradictions, which take us into impasses and into the traps of arrogance. I fear that one could speak of the traditions which have developed in our cultural area based on the aspiration to expose, trap and defame someone or even directly inform on him. It is no accident that today, in the period of perestroika, the question of decency, honesty and conscientiousness arises particularly sharply. One unwittingly asks: Have the years of troubles, adventurism and stagnation made us so fierce and divided to such an extent? Why are we so stingy even to grant a modicum of spiritual forgiveness to someone who stumbled, or who disagreed? Where have sincere feelings and goodness gone?

Our intellectuals could counter rudeness, boorishness and tactless behavior with words and actions. These features, however, are contagious and their adoption deprives man of responsibility for his actions. It is regrettable that such features have become part of the mentality of many people, including those who manage material and spiritual production.

"...The rude and uneducated person," Marx wrote, "is ready to consider anyone as the basest and lowest being on earth only because that being may have stepped on his toe. He makes his corn the yardstick for evaluating human actions. He turns the point of his contact with such a passer-by into the only point in which the very essence of this person comes in touch with the world. However, a person could step on my corn without, for this, stopping to be honest or, furthermore, to being an excellent person. In the same way that you should not rate the people from the viewpoint of your corns, you must not consider them through the eyes of your private interest" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol I, p 132).

It would be good for such words to be applied to themselves by all maximalists who love to cast aspersions, who are so short of universal human standards.

V. Parukhin, member of the sanitation technical brigade, Leningrad Oblast: Meeting on the Nevskiy

This occurred last spring in Leningrad. By noon, one day, I found myself on Nevskiy Prospekt. I was walking down the Gostinyy Dvor toward the Pioneer Palace, not looking at people, involved in my own thoughts. Suddenly, I saw from afar, on the collar of a military man, a picture of Stalin: it was a rather large-sized badge with a pocket-size round mirror. Something similar to what is worn by rock group fans.

I was so stunned by this that at first I even questioned my sight. Was that truly the picture of Stalin? Furthermore, worn on an officer's collar? This is against military regulations. Meanwhile, imperturbably, the serviceman calmly advanced and passed by me. No, I was not wrong. I truly saw the picture of Stalin, which is impossible to confuse with anyone else's. I was unable to see the face of the serviceman himself but saw the main thing: he was by no means young, he had gray hair but walked like a youngster, his back straight. I was able to identify his rank: a lieutenant colonel.

I stopped and turned to look at him. What was happening? What could this mean? This old soldier with Stalinist training had obviously not accidentally appeared on Nevskiy with the face of his idol pinned on his officer's collar. This was a message. But what precisely? My initial reaction was the following: this person wanted a new Stalin. I was unwilling to label a Stalinist this veteran who had gone through a terrible war. I began to seek excuses.

The first thing that I thought was that no, this was not a serviceman but a former serviceman, a retiree. Therefore, we could forget about military regulations. By carrying the picture of Stalin he may be expressing his own viewpoint on the type of order which should exist in our country. This is not forbidden today for, finally, we have realized that the more there are opinions, views and original thoughts, the closer we come to the objective, to the truth, and that life itself will sweep off anything alien.

I went on thinking, trying to calm myself down. This veteran was not against glasnost and democracy if he himself was boldly using them. But what did he like about the old order? Perhaps, by this method, he could have been in favor of the iron discipline which existed under Stalin. Could he have been defending the arbitrariness and repressions of those years? No sensible thinking person would begin to defend that. Who likes to live with an eternal feeling of fear?

After all these thoughts I calmed down. But could I be mistaken?

Excerpts From Letters

I. Pyatiletov, Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast:

I believe in the ideal of a just communist society. I have always considered this to be the objective of the October Revolution and of our life. Now, more than 70 years after the October Revolution, I no longer understand what type of society it is that we intend to build. In the past everything was clear. Now there are endless questions. Is it a society of sated people? This is good. But then we wanted to build a society of equals, without rich and without needy, and we accomplished a great deal. This, however, is not the same. Should we destroy what we have accomplished in the socialization of means of production and labor? How to combine the collectivistic with the individual principles?

I would very much like to read in the journal articles by specialists dealing with such problems.

B. Polyanin, labor veteran, Kuybyshev:

There are some old women who do not have full labor seniority: their children may have been sick and have needed care. In my view, they should be given even a minimal material regular aid by the state: somehow they have to live! Is raising children successfully not considered "labor seniority?" It is no less difficult than a regular job.

A. Zholudeva, Novosibirsk:

I believe that the leaders of the Komsomol Central Committee and USSR State Committee for Sports should gather together and decide how to use to their fullest extent the experience and skill of our champion

athletes who drop out of major sports. These are prestigious people, particularly among the young, and the state spared no funds on their training. In my view, it is important to involve them in work with adolescents and secondary school students, so that not former criminals, as is frequently the case, would become the "sponsors" of the children but people who can develop in them strength, daring, self-control and discipline, and involve them in a healthy way of life. Are we not losing in such athletes good assistants in raising the growing generation?

B. Kotov, Volgograd:

Of late a great deal is being said and written about religion and, particularly, Russian Orthodoxy. This is probably due to the celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of the conversion of Rus. I am not concerned by the fact that a great deal is being said about it but by the fact that what is being said is not objective. Whereas in the past we could hear only bad things about church and religion, today we hear only good things. Today the atheists must beg for the right to speak. Any one-sidedness is harmful and dangerous. We realized this through our bitter experience. It must not be repeated.

S. Chumakov-Kuznetsov, docent, candidate of technical sciences, Moscow:

To me your journal has become daily reading. I draw from it information for my work as teacher at the IPK, and for my own social well-being, learning a great deal of new and important facts. For example, in KOMMUNIST No 3 I was particularly interested in the article by V. Bogachev "It is still not too late," and by I. Lukinov's "Outlays and Prices in Agriculture. Why are they rising?"

The only thing that worries me is the following: I am confident that today it is precisely such people who should not only write articles and draw the attention of ministerial, Gosplan and other workers to the pressing problems of our time but themselves implement their ideas. Somehow, organizationally, this must be done. Meanwhile, if possible, please convey to these authors my deep regards.

V. Shtanko, candidate of economic sciences, teaching assistant, Lvov University:

I support the suggestion made by A. Kalnynsh and A. Pelse on publishing the manuscripts of Ya.B. Turchins, the late corresponding member of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, "Political Economic Categories and Laws of Socialism," discussed in their letter to the editors (KOMMUNIST No 3, 1989). In our view, even acquainting the scientists with the formulation of the problems facing the science of economics, considered in

the manuscripts, not to mention the original ideas of the author, would play an important role in cleansing our economic thinking from the scabs of dogmatism and subjectivism.

Quite a number of unpublished or forgotten (shelved) works of true scientific value have accumulated. Their publication within the shortest possible time (bearing the situation of the publishing industry in mind) would be hardly possible. Yet they are needed for perestroyka. I suggest, therefore, until the question of the publication of this book by one of the Union publishing houses has been resolved, that the main parts of said work be published in the journal of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences and the entire work be given to the INION.

S. Dementyev, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, Krasnodar:

In the survey "On the Ways of the Legal Reform," which came out in KOMMUNIST No 14 1988, my name was listed among scientists favoring the humanizing of criminal legislation. I must point out that I do not consider myself as belonging to this category of scientists, for I am convinced that humanizing criminal legislation is inconsistent with the interests of the Soviet people.

Topical Interview

Talk by V. Nekhotin: Return

Last year the journal's readers welcomed with interest the roundtable materials on the history and contemporary problems of our Armed Forces (KOMMUNIST No 3, 1988). A memorable statement was made by one of its participants, sapper private A.A. Shekhov, who served at that time in Afghanistan and is the bearer of the medal "For Courage." Today, now that the last Soviet soldier has left Afghan soil and the "Afghan Topic" itself, judging by the letters, is triggering a number of questions and thoughts, we have decided to resume the conversation with this former private.

V. Nekhotin: Aleksandr Anatolyevich, you completed your military service almost 1 year ago. Apparently, it is not a simple matter to resume ordinary life with our present concerns and worries. Ever since the Great Patriotic War our society had not faced the problem of the mass adaptation, the return to civilian life of people who had become accustomed to entirely different psychological situations. The new generations were aware of the gravity and difficulty of this problem only from books. Now this problem has become reality. How was it with you?

A.A. Shekhov: Personally, I did not have the sensation that for some 2 years I had "dropped out" of life and in some things had fallen behind it. It is true that virtually everything I had learned before the Army, at the technical school has sunk into the background, gone somewhere. Therefore, I have not thought as yet about the

institute. The benefits are there but one should nonetheless get hold of oneself. I found a job at the Znamya Revolyutsii Plant. My personal life is developing well. Generally speaking, I am satisfied. At the plant a person is valued according to his work and not his biography, although the shop committee does not forget me and I cannot complain. I am occasionally asked about Afghanistan, as a rule by my coevals. Usually, however, we talk about orders, rates and procurements and, naturally, about that which should change in our life. In that area there are heated arguments. I note that I too am excited by this more than by anything else.

Before the Army I worked for a while as a technician in a design bureau. I was not successful, because I saw both confusion and disorder. Two of our associates were knowledgeable people. They developed some new solutions and turned them into designs. The others, in my view, could not even understand why they were there in the first place. This included myself. All we did was what we were told: draw this, correct that, erase that.... When we were without work the women would take up sewing, whereas we did not know what to do with ourselves. I no longer want to work this way, to waste my time waiting for a pension. This, probably, is the influence of my army experience. One begins to look at things with different eyes, separating the "garbage" from the action. No longer can one ignore what one considers unfair. Naturally, one does not always interfere and, alone, one could hardly change anything. However, I no longer act as I did before the army: look, curse quietly and then think, "well, that's it." Having returned from the war intact and, one could say, unharmed, I do not wish to live as though nothing had ever happened....

V. Nekhotin: In your view, is this typical of all those who went through Afghanistan?"

A.A. Shekhov: I would say that this applies, in any case, to the majority. Understandably, people are different and everyone has his own nature, personal experience, habits, rules of behavior, and so on. Naturally, this will be manifested in the way the individuals will take to civilian life. The same, actually, was manifested at war as well.

As sappers, we did not stay long at the same place and were able to meet all kinds of people. In combat, for example, everyone behaves more or less like everyone else. If a soldier is wounded or has been blown up by a mine, the only reaction is to help him. As to the rest, everything is like in civilian life only people reveal their nature faster. There were those who, let us say, were company clerks at headquarters and spent peacefully their 2 years of service and went home earlier than others, for they had a more visible profile. Others in the regiment were able to fix themselves up, as we said, in "social work:" keeping order in the barracks, replacing broken glass panels, or repairing broken stoves. Others again served in the quartermaster corps: two members of my class, for example, had that kind of service and for 6

months did not put their boots on a single time, walking in soft slippers, well-fed and well-rested. I recall that we were ordered to mount an ambush together with a reconnaissance squad. Since this was to take place at night, we decided to ask the store for dry rations. We were refused as though we were in a commercial store 1 minute before closing time.... Naturally, this type of service as well is necessary and I do not wish to blame anyone. However, if someone did not like such a job he could ask for a transfer. There were such cases as well: sooner or later the boys' conscience would begin to bother them when they thought of those who were fighting. Back home as well they were ashamed to admit that they had spent 2 years as clerks or storekeepers. At that point everything depended on the individuals himself.

In my view, such was the case with the officers also. Many of them, particularly those who had already been in combat for several years treated us well. The soldier knows how to value this. However, the following also would happen: the regimental commander would order assembly but then would summon all officers and ensigns and would take hours to discuss matters or to look them over and issue instructions. He takes his time while the soldiers wait.... He would then come to us and also "lecture" us. Meanwhile, it is 50 degrees centigrade, the sun is hot, and since the morning everyone has been sweating. The entire regiment, with the officers, are standing in line, and what is one to do....

There were also those who thought more about rewards. Essentially, orders and medals were awarded honestly. But then I recall the following case: last spring, on the eve of my discharge, a new commander took over the company. It had already been announced that soon afterwards the entire division would leave Afghanistan, but as to when precisely no one could say, and it was unclear how much combat lay ahead. This company commander, meanwhile, had to learn his job. He wanted to distinguish himself but had no combat experience. During that time the regimental command issued the instruction that the three people who had distinguished themselves the most be given awards. Many were those who deserved it, some of the boys had been repeatedly injured or ambushed. However, the company commander struck out the name of one of the soldiers and entered his own. The deputy political commander of the company happened to see this list and, in front of the soldier, crumpled the paper and told the company commander in his face: "I do not wish to serve in the same company as you."...

V. Nekhotin: Now, when glasnost has touched upon this area of social life as well, many questions are being raised differently. Until recently, virtually any discussion concerning the psychological and moral problems of military service were reduced to the enumeration of exclusively positive qualities which the Armed Forces develop and strengthen in the person. Now a much more complex picture is emerging, even in areas where military service

is taking place under relatively favorable conditions, in the military camps inside the country. This makes many people worry about whether this war had hardened the minds of the participants and how this could affect their moral principles and civilian life. What is your view?

A.A. Shekhov: I do not believe that we have become somehow different from others. Naturally, the war seems to simplify a great many things. In war you feel more or less confident with an automatic weapon in your hand and, next to you, a comrade who, if necessary, will cover you. But then, coming back, this feeling rapidly disappears. Here everything is more complex.... In Afghanistan all sorts of things could happen, we found ourselves ambushed or blown up by mines. There were a great deal of things which one would rather forget quickly. However, I would not like to erase from my mind the memory of these years. I learned, I believe, how to look at people more closely, how better to assess their actions. I began truly to understand the meaning of friendship, justice and trust. Above all, I realized what a great deal depends on the individual himself. No organization and discipline would help if something is wrong with a person. For example, as a sapper I know perfectly that many of our soldiers were blown up by mines only because after combat they were immediately assigned other duties, instead of letting them rest as they should and recover not only physically but also morally.

We learn how to look at the war itself differently. For example, my views of it changed drastically. When we were called to military service neither the newspapers nor the television would give us any idea as to what was taking place in Afghanistan. I thought that we would fly in, would be issued automatic weapons and sent to the trenches immediately, for the full 2 years. It turned out that nothing of the sort happened. We went there totally ignorant of what awaited us. Obviously, we were hoping to help the Afghans organize quickly a life different from the one to which they had become accustomed. We had expected this for nearly 10 years and, it seems to me, we are still waiting. I visited many areas and everywhere, outside of Kabul, the picture was approximately the same: mud huts and small stores around which all local life revolved. Wherever we did not interfere in this life style, relations with the population were good although, it is true, this applied to our units only. If the Afghan authorities would ask us to take a village from the enemy, we would but the civilian population would flee almost every one of it into the mountains, or hide in underground wells or go into the bushes. Whenever possible, we tried not to go there, for it was both dangerous and, as a rule, useless. Quiet seemed to prevail. But we would leave and the people would return to the village and everything would resume as it was in the past. After a while the local authorities would ask for help once again and we would once again occupy the village and once again the population would flee. This occurred repeatedly. As a result, we had not feeling of defeat but nor did we have a feeling victory. We simply came and went.

V. Nekhotin: When the withdrawal of our troops was announced there was an almost total feeling of relief, of joy. However, the long silence about the real course of events, the reasons and consequences, as well as many other factors had a great impact on the attitude of our society toward the Afghan War and its results. Judging by our mail, this attitude remains equivocal. Occasionally the impression is created that the same feeling is shared by the "Afghans" themselves....

A.A. Shekhov: Something of this kind can be heard although, it is true, not all that frequently. There are those who say, for example, that this war was unnecessary and that in terms of benefits we should not be considered equal to the veterans of the Great Patriotic War.... At that time virtually everyone fought on the front and, one way or the other, everyone worked for national defense. There were no concerns or interests higher than that, and everyone suffered equally. But by no means did everyone go to Afghanistan and by no means voluntarily. However the results of this war may be assessed, in my view, the specific individuals who, precisely, found themselves in Afghanistan, should neither be praised nor blamed. If instead of me someone else would have been drafted, he would have gone too. However, while some were fighting and dying in Afghanistan, others lived a normal life, good or bad, unaware of our difficulties. No one would dream of blaming them for this. However, it seems to me that granting benefits to the "Afghans" would be fair.

It would be stupid to blame the soldiers. It was not they who made political decisions and it was not they who could discuss such decisions. They were loyal to their oath, they performed their duty. I find it difficult, as a whole, to assess this war. I believe that its objective assessment is as yet to come.

Sociological Survey

Ya. Kapelyush, candidate of philosophical sciences, head of department at the VTsIOM: Electivity of Managers: Arguments 'For' and 'Against'

The system of appointments has prevailed in our country for decades. Problems of managers, not only of state enterprises but also kolkhozes and social organizations, where leadership is officially considered elective, were solved from above, behind closed doors, within a narrow circle of cognoscenti. Those who determined official destinies relied if not on the support in any case on the silent acceptance by people who had learned from practical experience to consider the method of appointments as entirely natural.

However, for more than 1 year now we have had the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association), which stipulates that economic managers of different ranks,

from brigade leaders to general directors, must be truly elected. What is the view about this stipulation of the law on the part of those who are directly involved in such elections?

A survey on this topic was sponsored by the All-Union Center for the Study of the Public Opinion on Socioeconomic Problems Under the AUCCTU and the USSR State Committee for Labor (VTsIOM). Questionnaires were distributed among some 1,400 people in Moscow, Novosibirsk and Perm. They represented 14 enterprises and various sectors where directors or other managers had been elected. The electivity of economic managers, which is a broad new development in management, naturally brought to light a number of problems and contradictions. The very concept was frequently limited in the mass awareness to the procedure for nominating candidates (how many, and nominated them), the discussion of their qualifications (at that same meeting or before it) and the voting (open or secret). However, on the basis of these features alone, how can one distinguish between elective and nonelective jobs? Let us consider the head of a department of the executive committee of the local soviet, approved by the deputies at their session, a plant director, appointed by a ministerial collegium, or a party committee secretary who is appointed by the party committee members. In each one of these cases the candidacy must be discussed, there must be a vote, there must be accountability and the possibility of replacing them. Clearly, however, there is no particular need to prove that so far such positions have been wrongly described as elective. What matters most is the nature of the right a manager has. If a manager draws such rights directly from the masses, if he is approved in that position by decision of his subordinates, he is accountable above all to them and he is controlled and replaced by them, which indicates real electivity.

What did the survey show? It revealed that between 8 and 33 percent of those surveyed considered the extensive use of electivity premature due to lack of necessary conditions;¹ between 59 and 74 percent mentioned that it was premature; and between 8 and 17 percent had difficulty in answering the question. The majority of participants—62-81 percent—expect that the practice of the electivity of managers as a whole would bring about major positive changes; the opposite view was held by 5-7 percent. The likelihood of negative consequences was assumed by 20 to 35 percent.

It was characteristic that a negative attitude toward electivity intensifies according to the official status of enterprise personnel; 8 percent of the surveyed workers, 18 percent of rank-and-file specialists, 22 percent of junior executives and 33 percent of senior executives considered it premature. We may assume that at higher rungs of the hierarchical ladder, among senior personnel of ministries and departments, opponents of electivity (and, therefore, supporters of appointments) would be even more numerous. On the one hand, such a difference of opinions could be explained by the fact that managers

have a more objective assessment of the real economic situation and can better see not only the merits but also the faults of electivity. On the other, we must not fail to take into consideration that electivity affects more strongly the individual interests of managers: many of them are concerned, not without reason, about their careers and their rights.

The study of the materials of the survey indicates, however, that the attitude toward electivity cannot be described in only two colors and that the views which were expressed had nuances and stipulations. Thus, among the managers of shops, departments and enterprises and their deputies, 21 percent were absolute supporters of electivity; 42 percent were quite clearly in favor of it; 11 percent had adopted a middle position; 16 percent were quite clearly opposed; 5 percent were absolutely opposed; and 5 percent had not opinion.

As a whole, there were many more proponents than opponents: among senior production personnel by a factor of 3; among junior personnel, by a factor of 4; among ordinary specialists, by a factor of 7; and among workers, by a factor of 16.

However, the opponents of electivity rarely chose the method of open objections and direct prohibitions. The survey indicated that public opinion is worried about efforts to emasculate the positive content of electivity and to convert the developing form of self-management into the latest "measure," into a screen which would conceal the same old order. We are familiar with examples in which the electivity of managers turns into a "show," and into "playing at democracy." How great was this threat? "Very great," and "quite great," was the answer of 65-79 percent of those surveyed; "not great," and "very minor" was that of 12-18 percent; 5 to 17 percent found it difficult to answer.

Also interesting was the attitude of the participants in the survey to the stipulation in the Law on the State Enterprise according to which the superior authorities must ratify the nominees. The views of the participants in the survey on this right to "veto" (was it justified? Was it necessary?) were split: it was negative among 52-61 percent; it was positive among 14-29 percent; and 10-27 percent found it difficult to answer. Four out of five of those surveyed rejected restricting the rights of the labor collective in electing managers, believing that "one must trust entirely the labor collective and its decision must be final;" "the workers know who they are voting for while the people of the ministry cannot know this;" "with ratification, i.e., appointing managers from above, the elections lose their significance."

Does electivity contribute to improving the qualitative structure of managers? We know that essentially the practice of their selection is based on the subjective views of individuals. Objectivized ways of assessment are exceptionally underdeveloped. Furthermore, in the opinion of many specialists, their use is limited in

principle, for management is not only a science but also an art. In that case the competence of the subject of such an assessment is of tremendous importance.

We shall not hasten to claim that "the collective is always right," and that its competence is higher than that of individuals (although the opposite view is equally groundless). In the case of electivity, the subject of the evaluation is well-informed of the practical and other qualities of each candidate (those who evaluate and are evaluated work, as a rule, together); however, the range of candidacies is usually within the framework of the collective. Consequently, cases are possible in which the best among the applicants will be chosen, but not the best from the viewpoint of the stipulated requirements. The method of appointment, conversely, offers a broader range of candidates for evaluation, exceeding the framework of a single collective although, in that case, familiarity with each candidate is frequently superficial.

However, the number of individuals who assess candidates for managers and who make decisions is, in electivity, as a rule significantly higher than in appointments. This reduces the likelihood of accidental error and the use of favoritism or abuse of official position. Furthermore, electivity enhances the responsibility of the manager, for he thus finds himself controlled from below, accountable to the working people. He develops new incentives to upgrade his knowledge and skills and to seek and apply new and progressive means and technologies. Furthermore, the fate of the elected manager depends on the accuracy of his decisions not only in terms of technology or economics but also in the fine area of human relations, and on qualities such as justice, honesty, stamina, etc.

The participants in the survey substantiated their choice in favor of electivity as follows: "The responsibility of managers for the results of their activities would be increased" (59-72 percent); "the qualitative structure of leading cadres will improve" (45-56 percent); "the accountability of managers to the labor collective will be strengthened" (35-49 percent); "the initiative and activity of the working people will increase" (37-47 percent); "labor discipline will strengthen" (28-46 percent); "enterprises will pay greater attention to social problems" (28-43); "favoritism and other violations of cadre policy will be reduced" (23-37 percent); "labor productivity and wages will increase" (22-34 percent); and "the principle of one-man command in management will be strengthened" (9-14 percent).

According to the opponents of electivity: "The replaceability of leading cadres would increase" (35-52 percent); "one-man management command would weaken" (16-34 percent); "narrow-group interests, compared to the interests of society would predominate" (14-26 percent); "the qualitative structure of leading cadres would worsen" (14-24 percent); "exigency and the principledness of managers would decline" (5-30 percent); "labor discipline would drop" (15-20 percent); "the

responsibility of managers for the results of their activities would weaken" (7-12 percent); "labor productivity and wages would drop" (5-16 percent); and "enterprises would pay less attention to social problems" (4-15 percent).

In this argument by correspondence on matters of the qualitative composition, responsibility and one-man command of managers, labor discipline, labor productivity and social development of the collective, the supporters of electivity "win" over their opponents quite easily and, furthermore, in defending their views, bring up an average of three to four arguments. The arguments of the opponents of electivity are fewer.

Another point of the investigation was the following: Is a competition among applicants necessary in all cases of electing managers, and should there always be more than one candidate? A positive answer to this question was given by 7 out of 10 respondents (64-76 percent in the various groups). Two out of 10 (20-24 percent) would also allow elections to be held with a single candidate. They too, however, essentially have in mind proper elections: 45-67 percent of them speak of exceptions to the general rule if it is a question of a person known to the labor collective; 30-39 percent, in the case of re-electing successfully working managers. Other arguments are heard considerably less frequently: 3-12 percent agree with the selection of a single candidate in cases of a protracted lack of applicants for one position or another; 8-19 percent allow such a restriction in the election of brigade leaders, foremen or section chiefs.

In answering the question of what type of information is most significant in the selection of candidates who are either little known or unknown, the participants in the survey indicated, above all, the need for meeting the candidates in person: 56-62 percent spoke of statements to be made by the candidates who would present a program of their future activities; 41-53 percent considered answers by candidates to questions of people attending meetings and conferences; 24 to 32 percent of those surveyed ascribed great importance to biographies and references of the candidates from their previous jobs. Last in this list was indirect, second-hand information: the significance of the conclusions of the competition commission was noted by 12-24 percent; statements by participants in meetings and conferences supporting or opposing a given candidate—14-19 percent.

How important did public opinion consider self-advertising which, for decades, was taken as a manifestation of immodesty on the part of a person, as some kind of unjustified aspiration to assume a function which had forever been the prerogative of the "upper levels?" Judging by the survey, perestroika eliminates the "ethical" norm of fictitious modesty. "The self-promotion of people must be supported," 54-65 percent of the respondents believe. The opposite view was held by 12-18 percent and 14-26 percent were unable to answer. It is

noteworthy that the opposition to self-nomination was 50 percent higher among chiefs of shops and enterprise directors than among workers.

One of the main problems was that of establishing the best possible mechanism for electivity for the various positions. The search for such a mechanism is simple when it is a question of brigade leaders or foremen: the general assembly of the brigade or the shop section, and all those present are well acquainted with the candidates and with the nature of the work of the brigade leader or the foreman. In such cases the effectiveness of direct elections is unquestionable.

Direct elections at a general meeting for directors or other managers of similar rank, appear quite problematical. The point is not only that a collective, which may number hundreds or thousands of members, cannot gather at a single place to do serious work instead of creating an atmosphere of a public meeting. There are other more substantive arguments. To begin with, by no means does every enterprise worker have a clear idea of the functions of the director; second, most workers are familiar only with a small number of people who could be candidates for such a position; last, consequently, only a few can properly compare the demands which must be met by the candidate to their actual possibilities and capabilities.

Public opinion has dealt with this situation quite accurately. The majority of respondents (52-65 percent) believe that the rank-and-file workers at an enterprise are competent when it comes to the choice of a foreman or chief of section, but not of a director. In that case it becomes a question of indirect electivity. The question is what is the best way to do so? Is it with a conference, i.e., through a meeting of part of the labor collective? Is it through its elected council? Is it through the elected authorities of the public organization?

The conclusion based on the results of the survey could be formulated as follows: the individuals who are the most competent in electing a director are his direct subordinates, who must become the nucleus of the voters. Correspondingly, graded electivity is the most expedient in production: workers elect their brigade leader, foreman or chief of section; foremen elect their shop chief; the chiefs of shops and departments elect the director.

Instead of conclusion: The founders of Marxism themselves, considered elections as the means through which the system of privileged individuals involved in management could be eliminated. Thus, in 1891 Engels wrote that the working class, in coming to power, must not only eliminate the old machinery of oppression, which had been used against it in the past, but also "protect itself against its own deputies and officials...." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 22, p 199). This implies the need to create a mechanism of guarantees against

(albeit unwitting) distortion of the proletarian management apparatus or of its individual representatives who turn from servants of the society into its rulers.

Our history confirms this need. The breakdown of the mechanism of appointments and electivity not only of legislators but also of executives, and granting to the entire society the right to elect managers are among the qualitative distinctions of the new statehood from the older types of power. "We wish," Lenin emphasized, "the type of republic in which... all officials, from top to bottom, would be exclusively elected..." ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 32, p 47).

Do we wish this today? If we do, we must acknowledge the great role which science plays in this case. In order to arm electivity, which is tempestuously developing today, with accurate forecasts and practical recommendations, it is important to make a thorough study of its subjects and objects and the structure of the various groups of voters, not only from the viewpoint of their number or sociodemographic features but, above all, on the level of their awareness. The procedure for elections and the decision formulating mechanisms must be closely studied. Changes in the structure and results of activities of elected managers must be determined most thoroughly. It is thus that science will contribute to perfecting the democratic method for structuring management authorities.

Footnotes

1. The study of the results covered each one of the five typical groups of respondents: workers; rank-and-file specialists; foremen, worker organizers and section chiefs; shop, department and enterprise managers and their deputies; and trade union activists. Here and subsequently we cite the lowest (8 percent) and highest (33 percent) values. The views expressed by the representatives of the other groups are within the indicated range.

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There Is an Opinion

180200121 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 89 (signed to press 4 Apr 89) pp 92-96

[Article by Andrey Vladimirovich Vasilyev, KOMMUNIST special correspondent]

[Text] This term, which is quite popular, is used as a rule in the case of individuals. It is also frequently used in the case of superiors. It becomes an entirely unaccustomed situation when such an "opinion" is that of the collective. Such a case is precisely the topic of our discussion. The entire story began in the city of Zaporozhye, at the Dneproenergo Power Industry Production Association.

We found about it from a letter which was sent to the editors by Aleksandr Ivanovich Chernyshov, senior foreman at the Dneproges electric power shop.

From A. Chernyshov's letter:

"By the end of April 1988 cables asking them to assign delegates to the conference of representatives of labor collectives were sent to the enterprises within the Dneproenergo Association. The composition of the delegations was strictly regulated: director, party bureau secretary, trade union committee chairman, Komsomol organization secretary, labor collective council chairman and one delegate for each 300 workers employed at the enterprise. The draft documents were made public several days prior to the opening of the conference. Everything was done in such a hurry that only a few individuals were able to become familiar with them. There was not even a question of discussing them in the shop. There was simply no time. Nonetheless, the conference opened and, from the high rostrum, a 'elections manifesto' was proclaimed."

Actually, the title of this document was more modest: Regulation on the Procedure for the Election of Managers and Competitions for Filling Vacancies of Specialists of Structural Units and the Management of the Dneproenergo PEO. It is true that the heading had little to do with the content of the regulation and was not even remotely related to the Law on the State Enterprise. The cadre department of the PEO, which drafted this regulation on the recommendations of the UkSSR Minenergo, restricted management elections by four "ifs": If there is vacancy, if the chief has disrupted the production work, if an unhealthy atmosphere has developed in the collective and if the manager has reached retirement age. In all other cases elections would be replaced by accountability reports which must be approved by majority vote.

"It is difficult even to explain why this document was adopted without a single amendment," D. Afanasyev, chairman of the Dneproenergo Labor Collective Council, said. Obviously, this was the result both of the lack of experience and the habit blindly to obey instructions "from above." Generally speaking, this was the draft of the regulation which was issued to the enterprises.

It was as though the Law on the State Enterprise, which introduced in our lives such an unusual procedure as the election of management, had only recently been enacted. Its most important component, however, which deals with the development of production self-management, has already been subjected to the strongest possible pressure by the administration, which is reinterpreting, redrafting or simply rejecting entire articles of the "freedom charter." It is frequently forgotten that the process of perestroika, which was initiated from above, is increasingly blending with the flood of requirements

concerning changes in our political and economic system, coming from below, from those same brigades, shops, plants and public organizations from which, in the past, no "special opinion" was expected at all.

Yet such an opinion did appear.

From the letter by A. Chernyshov:

"Reactions to the regulation at Dneproges varied. Management began to draft schedules for self-serving reports whereas we decided to write a letter to the labor collective council with the demand of holding real elections. This letter was signed by the majority of station workers. With a few changes, a new regulation, more or less consistent with the letter and the spirit of the law, was nonetheless adopted. Elections were held. However, equally difficult problems lay ahead...."

At this point, we must step back into history, perhaps not all that ancient. Actually, until the 1970s Dneproges worked as an autonomous enterprise directly under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Power Industry and Electrification. That time is remembered to this day at the station as a happy period. "We had our own kindergarten, a Pioneer camp, a palace of culture and our own equipment," I was told by A. Shlyagin, an electric fitter. "Now it is a though we are dependents, petitioners. If the association wishes, it will help us; if it does not wish, there is nothing left for us to do."

The idea of Dneproges' autonomy is supported by the entire collective. It is not a matter of any kind of specific social benefit. The question on the agenda is much more complex and important. Who will be the master of the production process? Would it be, as in the past, the administration or officials from the superior department or else, nonetheless, the station workers?

"No two opinions are possible in this case," A. Popov, Dneproges chief engineer believes. "It is precisely the labor collective that bears full responsibility for the reliability of the work and its quality, both legally and economically. Incidentally, that is what the law says. Electric power is not generated in the offices of the personnel of the management of the association or the ministry. Nonetheless, they have the rights and we have the obligations."

"We have one objective," adds V. Lushchenko, Dneproges party bureau secretary. "To see to it that the people, finally, can feel the extent to which the results of their labor depend on their activities, persistence and clear-mindedness."

At the station I talked to dozens of people and not one of them said that he is pleased with the present situation. "We can no longer work the way we are working now," said electric fitter N. Kharchenko, unwittingly summing

up all the statements. "We are working at half-strength, we are not making all-out efforts. Yet we are ready to work and we have both the muscle and the mind to do so."

Indeed, under the conditions of the economic reform which is taking place in the country, each labor collective can and has the right to determine which ways will be the most efficient for the development of the production process. It is as though a change of "systems" is taking place. We are converting from "day laborers" to the labor of free people. It is only those who fear that they may be unable to cope who feel threatened by this.

From the letter by A. Chernyshov:

"The structure which has developed in the country's power industry has nothing in common with the two-step management system which is now being comprehensively introduced. Judge for yourselves: in the past the system was as follows: USSR Minenergo-UkSSR Minenergo, which included production associations. In turn, they had under their jurisdiction tuning and repair enterprises, power grids and hydroelectric and thermoelectric power plants. Today the situation is as follows: The first link is the Union ministry; the second, however, includes the republic ministry, the production power industry associations, which do not generate anything themselves other than reports and instructions and, as structural units, the producing enterprises. It is only a very experienced eye that could distinguish the differences between the first and second systems."

However insulting this may sound to the personnel of Dneproenergo or the ministry, virtually all people with whom I discussed the situation at Dneproges told me that they considered these two systems entirely unnecessary. Asked about their usefulness, they looked puzzled or else mentioned the innumerable number of documents with which the departments "bombard" the station.

"Of the many services existing at Dneproenergo (which has quite a sizable personnel—600 people—whereas, for the sake of comparison, Dneproges has no more than 240), I would leave only the dispatcher service," said A. Papanov, electric shop chief. However, he would strengthen it, he would supply it with modern equipment. As to the other departments, they should be of a strictly consultative nature. This applies to the ministry as well. Let the ministry deal with long-term planning and the consideration and selection of projects (on a competitive basis), and with long-term technical and scientific developments. Furthermore, this does not require such a large apparatus. As to repairs, equipment procurements, in this case as well this is the direct obligation not of department personnel but of enterprises with which contractual relations could be established.

Enterprise autonomy and reduction of the departmental apparatus are interrelated. Probably that is the reason for which this idea is making its way (Dneproges is no exception) with such difficulty. The only argument heard is this: "Therefore, you are against management!" It is forgotten in this case that one can manage not only through orders, punishments or shouts or calling someone "on the carpet," but also through economic methods the essence of which is that poor work becomes unprofitable.

What is ignored is the main thing: production does not exist for the sake of the administration but it is the administration that exists for the sake of the production process. It is precisely the "lower" level that must decide whether it needs, for its normal operations, this entire multi-storied administration superstructure. How did it happen in our country that a view can be changed only in one direction, downward, and in no case, upward. On the lower levels, it is claimed, the scale is different, many details are lost and the overall picture cannot be seen. However, as the history of our failures and difficulties in the economy indicates, the same failure is displayed by the higher viewpoint as well.

In any case, it is precisely the higher viewpoint that predominated in solving the problem of the autonomy of Dneproges.

From the letter by A. Chernyshov:

"In mid-October 1988 an on-site session of the Collegium of the UkSSR Ministry of Power Industry and Electrification was to be held in Zaporozhye. The one item on its agenda was that of our autonomy...."

"We prepared quite carefully for the meeting of the collegium," A. Popov said. "We looked at indicators, selected proper documents, sought advice in the shops and talked with the leading specialists. All indications were that we could boldly hope for a positive solution. Our pleasant feelings were dissipated with the arrival of a commission headed by V. Dorofeyev, chief of administration of the UkSSR Minenergo, on the eve of the meeting of the collegium. Although the 'investigation' was reduced to a 'test' to which I was subjected along with the station director, V. Dorofeyev's conclusions were quite broad: 'There is no reason for granting the station autonomy. All that is necessary is to raise wages and bonuses without, naturally, forgetting to lower them for errors.'"

The meeting of the collegium, which opened the following day, took a different slant. The report submitted by N. Dubovets, the Dneproges director, was listened to attentively. The critical remarks from the hall were answered by the minister himself. The power industry workers could celebrate their victory and they did so until the station received an "Excerpt from Protocol No 15 of the Collegium's Session of 13 October 1988," which stated, on page 2: "Comrades Dubovets and

Popov, the Dneproges management, are displaying economic illiteracy, directing their collective toward economically inaccurate cost accounting systems and exerting a corrupting influence on the labor collective."

Under that, on that same page 2, was the following:

"It has been determined that the requirement of granting autonomy rights to the Krivoy Rog PES and Dneproges is not supported by serious economic preparations by the management and personnel of the enterprises and that conditions of full cost accounting of these enterprises will not ensure the creation for their collectives sources of funds and incentive bonuses needed for the normal functioning of their collectives."

The promises made by D. Nosulko, the Dneproenergo PEO general director, that the "project" of granting autonomy will be reconsidered by the ministry in the indefinite future was no consolation. Naturally, the spirit of the workers dropped: once again they had been reduced to the status of day laborers. Nonetheless, there were people at the station who believed that they will be able to achieve the autonomy of Dneproges and solve the entire huge array of problems which had piled up.

From the letter by A. Chernyshov:

"I am deeply convinced that the power industry is precisely a sector in which cost accounting and leasing can develop to their fullest extent and yield maximal benefits to the state and the people. Bureaucratic administration must be countered by new economic relations. The numerous chiefs of administrations, departments, subdepartments and sectors must be replaced by rates, prices, and tax and interest rates and relations of partnership and cost accounting. As aptly said by one of the economists, we must reduce not the number of officials but their functions. The lease contract is the precise tool which would make it possible to carry out such a project. It would make it possible to determine who is truly needed as member of the administrative apparatus and who comes to the department merely to receive a salary."

"For many years the directive-issuing authorities have lived with the illusion that the power industry is a very complex sector. They confuse two separate things: the theory of power generating and the management of the power industry," A. Popov explained to me. "Yet this type of production is one of the simplest. No administrative apparatus is required to channel the flow of electrons. This does not require a procurement department (nature provides the water) nor a shipping department (by simply moving the knife-switch we direct our output to the consumer). Unquestionably, there are difficulties related to the distribution of electric power and the work system of power station. Consequently, we must strengthen the dispatcher service and review electric power rates. In other countries, they depend on the time of day and the load. This encourages the even

consumption of power by industry and the communal economy. Naturally, the cost of energy generated at a thermoelectric power plant, where the equipment is more complex, differs from that of a hydroelectric power plant. However, this too can be controlled by the rates of withholdings for the budget. These amounts are not all that difficult to compute. As to a market, it one that any entrepreneur can only dream of. It is virtually unlimited and the question of surplus power production is not about to appear in our country soon."

At this point we could recall yet another argument of the opponents of leasing, according to which an autonomous enterprise would immediately "eat up" its entire income. What is the origin of this fear? Why does it seem seditious to think that a labor collective does not know better than anyone else its own possibilities and ways of attaining its own potential. As to eating up the funds, if we ask the workers into what they would channel first of all the income of the station, the invariable answer would be in updating and reconstructing the equipment. Without it, they believe, quite justifiably, there would be neither high wages nor housing or any other benefits.

Leasing would make it possible to interest the collective in making use of all available reserves, which are numerous. Popov and his colleagues gave me numerous examples of such failings. Let us consider the reconstruction alone, which is scheduled to begin this year. Its planned cost is currently assessed at 96 million rubles. "We could quite successfully do some of the work ourselves," the workers said, "and do it faster and at a lower cost. If such work is done at the expense of the enterprise, we would try to achieve maximal savings, for we would be paying out of our own pockets." The quality of repair of the turbines could be improved. Finally, one could once again review the tables of organization. Possibilities exist. The main thing is that the people would adopt a different attitude toward the equipment entrusted to them, for it would become their own. Incidentally, leasing would enable the ministry personnel to work at full capacity, providing that it does not receive fixed payments but a percentage of the profits."

The people of the station will understand that neither leasing nor economic independence will, by themselves, solve the problems facing the collectives. A great deal more efforts and time will be required for these concepts to assume their true economic meaning. They are based not on higher earning but on higher skills, mastering related professions, and ability to manage not only the shop but the enterprise and the sector in a practical and enterprising manner.

In time Dneproges will gain its economic independence, cost accounting and leasing. But why not now? The station is ready for this. And is the general trend in the development of the country not a combination of economic reform with democratization of all social life, based today also on the "separate opinion" of the collective?

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Climate and Economic Management Priorities
18020012m Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6,
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[Article by Georgiy Sergeyevich Golitsyn, academician,
member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium]

[Text]

Climatic Changes

For the second consecutive year precipitation on the European territory of the USSR is substantially above normal, although the summer of 1987 was cold and that of 1988 was hot. Last year, the Eastern half of the United States had the worst drought in a century. Meanwhile, because of heavy rain, in Africa the Nile overflowed for the first time in many years. All of these events, taken separately, could be considered as random variations of the climate in one geographic area of another. Such variations have always existed and always will. Against this background, however, trends are becoming apparent, confirming quite serious changes on a global scale as well.

The level of the Caspian Sea is a clear example of this fact. We know that over the past 1 million years it has fluctuated within the range of dozens of meters. In the 1930s it dropped by 1.7 meters. From 1940 to 1977 it dropped by yet another 70 centimeters. However, after reaching its minimum in 1977, the level of the Caspian Sea began to rise. Last year it was approximately 1.5 meters higher than it was 10 years ago. The press reported trouble on the Baku beaches and the flooding of stores and other installations in that area. In the winter of 1986 a violent storm over the Caspian washed away the rail tracks in the vicinity of Derbent and it even became necessary to stop train traffic. The raised level of the sea and the ground waters, related to it, are causing heavy damage to construction in Makhachkala and other coastal towns. If we recall that the technical and economic substantiations of the plan for the rechanneling of some of the stock of Northern rivers toward the Volga, which was drafted in 1979, considered saving the Caspian from shoaling the main reason for the transfer, the economic, ecological and other costs of accurately predicting changes in the climate in our country becomes obvious. The same cost, however, could prove to be immeasurably higher on the global scale.

Over the past century the average annual temperature on the surface of the globe has risen by half a degree; if we take into consideration the unusually warm 1980s (1988 was substantially warmer than any year since 1956), we can project that in one century the temperature on the planet increased by 0.7 degrees. No such pace of global change has been noted in the recorded history of the earth.

The temperature, however, is not the only or the most important element of the climate in terms of human life. Precipitation is more important, particularly, in the case of agriculture. According to the laws of physics, a warmer atmosphere contains a greater amount of water vapor. This accelerates the circulation of water in nature (on the atmospheric level at least) and, on an average, the amount of precipitation should increase. However, the following question is important: How will such precipitation be redistributed as the temperature rises, both in terms of geography and season? The study made by scientists in the United States and Great Britain of meteorological data of the time since 1881 confirms a certain increase in precipitation. It is the most tangible in the middle and high latitudes, whereas in the subtropical areas a diminishing trend has appeared, and in the tropics there has been no noticeable change whatsoever in this parameter. There has been a particularly clear increase in the sum total of annual precipitation (by several percentage points) for the entire territory of the USSR. However, we are as yet to determine the way such precipitation is broken down by season and by main area in the country (such work has been started in a number of scientific institutions of the USSR Goskomgidromet). It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of such studies. The faster and the more reliably they are carried out, the more accurate will be our plans which will determine the well-being of both present and future generations. Let me emphasize that the possibilities of the national economy as a single complex covering the entire territory of the Soviet Union significantly equalizes the worrisome prospects of climatic changes in individual areas without, however, eliminating the problem as a whole.

We must consider most thoroughly the distribution of precipitation in time in connection with the main stages of ripening of farm crops and, above all, establish the moisture reserve in the soil in each specific area and its development in time. This depends to the greatest extent on the features of the arable land and on cultivation methods (for example, moisture losses and soil erosion are significantly lesser with moldboard cultivation). In the USSR, moisture content is measured at a number of agrometeorological stations. However, the heterogeneous nature of the fields is so high and splintered that the extent to which any global or even regional conclusions may be drawn from the series of observations conducted at these stations, furthermore in changing farm crops and methods of cultivation is as yet unclear. The difficulties in this work are indeed quite substantial but it is already being done by the country's scientific institutions.

The Reasons

The scientists are practically unanimous in the belief that the main reason for the changes in the climate, which are currently observed and anticipated in the next decades is the fluctuating structure of the atmosphere.

One of the most outstanding achievements in contemporary geophysics is the precision analysis of this structure extending over the past 160,000 years. In this project cooperation between Soviet and French scientists played a major role. We were able to drill through the ice shield of Antarctica and reach a record depth of up to 2 kilometers. The French thoroughly analyzed the chemical composition of air bubbles in the core (the age of the ice in its lower strata equals exactly 160,000 years). It was determined that the two warm periods in the history of the earth—6,000-8,000 and 120,000-130,000 years ago—were consistent with an increased concentration of carbon dioxide and methane, while during ice-age periods, the concentration of such substances was half that.

Carbon dioxide, methane, water vapor, nitrogen oxide and tropospheric ozone are all greenhouse gases. They freely let solar radiation reach the surface of the earth and substantially absorb the heat radiating from the planet and in the atmosphere. Thanks to the greenhouse effect, the average temperature on the earth's surface is 32 degrees higher than it would have been without it.

To sum up the extensive research done in recent years, we can say that since the end of the 17th century there has been initially a slow and then accelerated increase in the concentration of methane in the air (it is interesting that this increase has steadily followed the increase in the earth's population). In 300 years the amount of methane in the atmosphere has more than doubled, while the current growth rates, directly or indirectly related to human activities, average 1-1.5 percent annually.

Carbon dioxide began to enter the atmosphere intensively starting with the end of the 18th century. The first reason was the cutting down of forests, which absorbed it in the course of photosynthesis. Subsequently, the emission of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as a result of the combustion of mineral fuels—coal, petroleum and natural gas—began to play an increasing role. Today this is the main reason for the increased concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which has increased by 25 percent over the past 200 years.

The content of nitrogen oxide in the atmosphere over the past century has increased by approximately 10 percent. This is explained by the intensive use of nitrogen fertilizer and the burning of mineral fuel. The latter, incidentally, is the source of a large number of sulfur oxides. The nitrogen and sulfur oxides, reacting with water vapor, form nitric and sulfuric acids. Hence the acid rain which kills the forests, the plankton and the fish in water reservoirs, and so on. Therefore, the composition of the atmosphere is directly related to the degradation of the environment.

Freon gases are a grave menace. These fluorine and chlorine combinations with carbon are used in the refrigeration industry and in aerosols. As late as the start of the 1950s there was absolutely no freon in the atmosphere

(this is not a natural gas but exclusively a man-made product), whereas now freon concentration in the air is growing at a headlong pace (by 5-10 percent annually). Freons breaks down under natural conditions very slowly, taking dozens and hundreds of years, as a result of which they are rapidly accumulating in the atmosphere.

This became a particularly popular topic in connection with the ozone "hole" which was detected in 1985 over Antarctica. Some 15 years ago U.S. scientists had already warned that the production of freon would lead to the destruction of the ozone layer. However, the initial symptoms of this dangerous phenomenon were expected to appear not before the year 2000. Quite recently shifting "holes" have already been noticed in the high and even moderate latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. A careful study of satellite and ground data led to the conclusion that in 10 years the overall content of ozone in the atmosphere has dropped by approximately 3 percent. This is related, above all, to the increased concentration of freon.

How can we assess the influence of said gases on climate changes? This is a very serious scientific problem which requires the coordinated efforts of climatologists and meteorologists, oceanographers and geographers, physicists and chemists, mathematicians and biologists, hydrologists and glaciologists, specialists in space research and many others. Throughout the world work is being done within the framework of the Global Climatological Program, and the currently drafted international geospheric-biospheric "Global Measurements" Program and many other programs carried out by the World Meteorological Organization and the International Council of Scientific Associations, rallying the efforts of academies of sciences of many countries. All such studies are projected to last until the year 2000 and beyond it. The USSR as well is participating in such programs although, in my view, our contribution could be much greater.

The heat which is retained in the lower atmospheric strata and which leads to the warming up of the earth's surface can be used as a quantitative measurement of the greenhouse effect. Its additional increase over the past 200 years, as a result of the concentration of greenhouse gases, has been assessed at 2.6 watts per square meter. Some 45 percent of the increased thickness is caused by carbon dioxide; 23 percent by methane, 19 percent by freon and 3 percent by nitrogen oxide. In the future these figures may be refined and the correlation among them may change as a result of more precise computations and changes in the structure of global industrial output (for example, as a result of lowering the production of freon, which was demanded in the Montreal 1987 Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which was joined by the USSR last autumn).

The most widespread method for evaluating expected changes in the climate is that of physical-mathematical modeling. It is used to describe changes in the solar and

heat energy and the various processes occurring in the ocean and on the surface of the land, the wind, the transfer of moisture, and so on. For the time being, the possibility of providing details about such processes in terms of space and time and the length of their description depend on the capacity of modern computers which, unfortunately, is still insufficient, particularly when it is a question of oceanic phenomena. However, even most processes, such as the interaction among solar and heat radiation and atmospheric clouds, between the atmosphere and the surface under it (the ocean, the land, the ice caps) has been studied insufficiently and present knowledge cannot be considered an entirely reliable foundation for mathematical modeling.

According to a number of assessments, if the content of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were to double, the average temperature on the earth's surface would rise from 1.5 to 4.5 degrees. Such disparity in predictions is due to the insufficient knowledge of the processes we mentioned.

Climate modeling leads to the conclusion that against the background of an overall warming, winter temperatures would rise more, compared to summer ones, and the higher the latitude the greater will be this effect. This generally coincides with data of meteorological observations conducted over the past century. Similar situations were found as a result of paleoclimatic studies of the warming ages: 6,000 to 8,000 years ago the average global temperature was higher than today's by approximately 1 degree and in the preceding period between ice ages, 120,000 to 130,000 years ago, it was warmer by approximately 2 degrees. In our country Professor Velichko heads the detailed study of the climate which prevailed during those ages.

Possible Consequences

The imperfection of contemporary models leads to the fact that their forecasts substantially vary by individual area. Therefore, in the course of their practical recommendations on assessing climatic changes, the Soviet scientists rely essentially on data obtained through paleoclimatic reconstructions. What matters is that in terms of general features the structure of the warmer climate, based both on models and reconstruction, proved to be similar. According to the experts, as a whole for our country climatic changes could prove favorable, at least from the viewpoint of agriculture. Nonetheless, increased precipitation could lead to increased flooding. The rise in the level of the Caspian could be (and already is) a serious problem. We still do not know where droughts will occur and how. In short, we are as yet to determine in their detail the consequences of climatic changes. So far, however, no one has as yet undertaken any truly serious work on this subject. Time, however, does not wait...

The expected consequences for the world at large are tremendous. Above all, this applies to the further drying out of the subtropical and part of the tropical areas. What that could mean we know from the example of the Sahel, which is the area south of the Sahara. In recent years hundreds of thousands of people have died of hunger there as a result of the drought. Millions of Africans are caught in a migration process and the desert has noticeably advanced toward the South. A number of models have been drawn predicting a summer drought of U.S. territory, which now accounts for about one-third of imported food supplies. What could this lead to? In recent years, as we know, extensive studies of the possible consequences of nuclear war have been made under the aegis of the International Council of Scientific Associations and the United Nations. One of the most important conclusions of this work is the following: loss of crops from the freeze caused by a "nuclear winter" and major disturbances in international food trade are fraught with the danger that between 1 and 4 billion people will die of hunger. By extrapolating these results we can claim that the threat of hunger is today one of the main dangers caused by changes in the climate, for the structure of agriculture in many developing countries, African in particular, is largely oriented toward the possibility of importing inexpensive food, above all from the United States. Changing this structure, abandoning the system of a single crop (coffee, cocoa, etc.) and adapting to the new climatic conditions are extremely difficult matters which require a great number of years.

The raised level of the world's oceans could be a dangerous consequence of the global warming trend. Thorough studies, initiated in the USSR by Professor R. Kluge and subsequently continued in the United States, have indicated that over the past century the level of the oceans has risen by approximately 10-15 centimeters. This is partially explained by the melting of the glaciers and, partially, by the fact that water expands when heated. According to some assessments, we could expect by the middle of the 21st century that the level of the ocean may rise by 1 meter. Meanwhile, some 30 percent of the population on earth live in coastal areas up to 50 kilometers wide. And although this process may take many decades, the harm it could cause could become one of the main consequences of climatic changes affecting the overall global economy.

The melting of the permafrost may be an essential, albeit regional, consequence of climatic changes. This is noticed most clearly in the settlements in the North, where it is causing extensive damage to the social and economic infrastructures (roads, buildings, engineering facilities, and so on). Currently this melting is related more to the direct interference of man in the very delicate and fragile natural processes in the Polar territories. However, the scientists have noticed a specific trend toward the melting of the permafrost. This problem is becoming increasingly real.

The variety of the consequences of climatic changes to the entire socioeconomic area are being considered so

important that they can no longer be ignored. This was directly reflected in the joint declaration signed by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in December 1987 in Washington. This problem was described in the document as one of the most important among those facing mankind. Soviet and U.S. scientists have been assigned to draw up a scenario of climatic changes until the mid-21st century. This joint project is scheduled for completion this year.

Therefore, a rather dark future of environmental degradation and warming up of the climate and, as a result, a decline in precipitation in many areas and a raise in the level of the ocean may be expected for the world at large. Increasingly, mankind is considering the following: Do we have the right to leave to our children and grandchildren a world poorer in resources and more dangerous to their health than the one we inherited from our own parents? Is there a solution to this situation, the development of which threatens us with a real catastrophe?

What To Do?

All such questions were raised by scientists a long time ago. They were then taken up by the social organizations in the West, the so-called "Greens." Today they are comprehensively acquiring a most important sociopolitical significance. The International Commission for the Environment and Development—the Brundtland Commission (named after its chairman, the prime minister of Norway who, at that time, was minister of the environment)—was set up by the United Nations in 1983. In the autumn of 1987 a commission consisting of representatives of 21 countries (the USSR was represented by Academician V. Sokolov) concluded its work and its report "Our Common Future" was published at the start of 1988. This is a book amazing in terms of depth and scope, covering all aspects of socioeconomic life. To sum it up in a few words, we can say that mankind has an encouraging future providing that it puts an end to its thoughtless extensive development which leads to the waste of natural resources, increases environmental pollution and leads to an even greater gap in the living conditions of the rich North and the poor South.

This can be achieved with a sharp increase in the efficiency with which energy and raw material resources are used and the repeated and multiple recycling of so-called waste, and transferring on easy terms energy and resource conserving technologies to countries which lack them and are forced to produce goods involving significant outlays of energy and raw materials. According to Western experts, outlays for resource- and energy-conservation are recovered, as a rule, over several years and, frequently, in no more than 1 or 2 years. Therefore, redirecting the production process toward comprehensive conservation would not only solve (or ease) problems of environmental protection, including those related to the climate, but also prove advantageous from the purely economic viewpoint, reducing the gravity of

the question of inequality among generations. The people have always believed that their children will live better than they. Today this faith has been seriously shaken and, in order to restore it, we must reorganize the entire global economy and the socioeconomic awareness of all mankind.

Why particularly the entire economy and the awareness of all mankind? Because we have only one earth, a common atmosphere, and oceans shared by all. The concept that the atmosphere, the ocean, and the planet as a whole are the common property of mankind and that they must be protected from us and from our current practices in economic management, is becoming increasingly valid. This makes intolerable the waste of natural resources and the increasing inequality between rich and poor countries. All these are tremendous problems, and I shall cite only one example of a conceived possible way of somewhat slowing down the rate at which the structure of the atmosphere is changing and the greenhouse effect is increasing. Each ton of mined fuel, which is consumed in the developed countries should be taxed in terms of several percentage points of its cost, and such funds should be used to create a world fund to help the developing countries in the application of resource and power conserving technologies and to prevent the cutting of forests, tropical in particular, which absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and release oxygen.

The idea that the development of mankind should not lead to the destruction of the natural environment and thus worsen the quality of life and that global problems are most closely interrelated is imbuing the awareness not only of the broad public but of governments as well. Thanks to the consistent policy of peace pursued by the USSR and a number of major Soviet initiatives, a situation has objectively developed on the planet which enables mankind seriously to believe that nuclear war can be avoided. Under those circumstances the problem of the quality of life of the people becomes increasingly clear and sharp.

The year 1988 became particularly significant in this sense. It was precisely 1 year ago that the Council of Europe (which includes 21 Western European countries) and, subsequently, in June, the "seven" (United States, Japan, Canada, the FRG, France, Great Britain, and Italy) supported the conclusions of the Brundtland Commission and announced as their objective sustainable development, i.e., the type of socioeconomic development which would not lead to the exhaustion of natural resources and the environment. The conclusions of the Brundtland Commission were also supported in the document of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee "Consequences of the Arms Race to the Environment and Other Aspects of Ecological Security." The document stipulates that "economic activities carried out without regard for economic factors triggers the pollution of the world's oceans and the atmosphere, transfers of pollutants across borders, soil degradation, desertification and deforestation, changes in the climate,

disappearance of valuable biological species, accumulation of harmful substances in the biosphere, and many other negative phenomena in nature, which are destroying the human habitat.... Life itself urgently demands the joint efforts of the global community in the interests of the joint efficient solution of environmental problems."

Therefore, we are facing a restructuring of the entire sociopolitical awareness. Characteristically, foreign scientists and members of the public and even governmental circles relate the initiated process with the course of renovation being carried out in our country. However, a tremendous amount of work lies ahead in order to implement these ideas.

Let us briefly consider the present potential of the world to this effect.

In 1987 about 22 billion tons of carbon dioxide were released in the atmosphere. Of this amount, 45 percent was the result of coal burning, 40 percent of the combustion of petroleum, and 15 percent of the use of natural gas. In generating an identical amount of energy, petroleum provides 15 and natural gas 43 percent less carbon dioxide compared to coal. Therefore, simply replacing one type of fuel with another could substantially reduce the emission of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. As we know, fuel reserves, particularly petroleum, are limited, for which reason they should be carefully preserved for the future generations. Furthermore, they will find a better use for petroleum such as, for example, in petrochemistry.

What is the breakdown of these 22 billion tons around the world? The highest share is that of the United States, 23 percent, followed by the USSR with 19 percent, Western Europe with 13.5, China with 8.7, and the Eastern European countries, with 7. All other countries combined account for no more than some 28 percent.

The efficiency with which power is consumed by the individual countries shows striking changes in GNP units. France has the best indicator, probably because of its very developed service industry. If we take that country as a unit, it would be 1.13 for Japan, 1.37 for the FRG, 2.0 for Great Britain, 2.24 for the United States, 3.13 for Poland, 3.37 for the GDR, 3.76 for the USSR, and 4.75 for China, i.e., we are using nearly four times more energy per GNP unit compared to France and nearly 70 percent more than the United States, an indicator which leaves something better to be desired (which is something that triggers a great deal of concern in the American government and business and public circles).

Consequently, today the world already has a tremendous potential reserve for the conservation of energy. It was in the mid-1970s that the Western countries began seriously to deal with the problem of energy conservation through its most efficient use, after the embargo and sharp increase in petroleum prices. In the United States,

for example, power consumption by the basic industrial sectors (metallurgy, chemistry, paper production, and construction materials) declined by 6 percent between 1973 and 1981, although output increased by 13 percent. Within that time, every year Italy has been reducing energy consumption per unit of output by nearly 6 percent. Similar figures are characteristic of Japan as well. Although in recent years, because of a sharp drop in petroleum prices this process has been slowed down in the Western countries, scientific studies and technological developments are progressing at an intensified pace. Successes in this area have been simply striking and give us hope precisely that a global solution of the problem is possible.

Scientific developments in the United States indicate that as of now the possibility exists of reducing electric power consumption for lighting by a factor of four-six; for water heating—four-seven; for home heating (individual), six-11; and refrigeration, by a factor of six-seven. All of this can be accomplished without worsening the quality of life. According to UN forecasts, conservation in fuel and energy resources as a result of the application of the latest energy saving technologies would lower by the year 2000 their use by 19 percent in the countries of Western Europe, 22 percent in the United States but only 16 percent in the USSR.

As a rule, the introduction of new economical (but also expensive!) appliances in the global market economy requires the intervention of the government, which must set specific standards. However, in that same United States, over the past 10 years there have been a number of examples in which companies producing electric power have subsidized their customers to purchase more economical refrigerators and other appliances, finding it more advantageous to sell the thus saved power to new customers than to build new power plants. Frequently economy turns out to be much more profitable than increasing output!

What Should We Do?

Why is it that in our country the energy use indicators are so distressing? The reason is the unwisely organized economy which triggers departmentalism and "gross output," which are powerful obstacles to scientific and technical progress. Industry and agriculture are the main environmental polluters. They are also the main sources of greenhouse gases. Today the USSR accounts for 20 percent of the petroleum and steel, 25 percent of the chemical fertilizers, 40 percent of the extracted natural gas, and as much timber felled as in the United States while our output is lower by a factor of two or three, etc.

Let me cite a single example of departmentalism: Quite some time ago our country developed low pressure turbines using the heat released in generating electric

power. This was a most beneficial development! However, the problem of their production dragged out in arguments among a number of ministries as to who should produce them....

The March Central Committee Plenum resolved that the food problem was one of the gravest. How are we solving it? According to official data, in the course of storing the farm produce we have grown, up to 20 percent of the food, which is in very short supply, is lost. I would assume that such losses are much higher for potatoes, fruits, and vegetables; in order to realize this, suffice it to pay a visit to the vegetable bases or read the press regularly. It is no accident that the people describe vegetable storage bins as vegetable rotting bins.

Every year we purchase between 25 and 45 million tons of grain and, in all likelihood, we lose as much because of storing the grain under unsuitable conditions. Although over the past 5 years harvests have averaged about 200 million tons annually, the capacity of our elevators is approximately one-half of the one which is needed to store the grain. The remainder is kept in sovkhozes and kolkhozes under conditions which, as a rule, are poorly adapted to this purpose, where the grain burns itself out and rots. At the same time, with an average annual crop of some 300 million tons, the United States has an elevator capacity for 600 million. This makes it possible (with significant exports) to have a reserve for more than 1 year and to guarantee the protection of the grain during rich harvest seasons.

Unfortunately, our Gosagroprom based its estimates on average yields so that in good years losses become simply inconceivable. The course charted of leasing and agricultural restructuring should bring about increased production output which today has nowhere to be stored. Therefore, in order not to spoil everything that will be grown additionally, investment policy must be radically altered and the basic capital must be invested in improving the quality of agricultural machinery and the development of an infrastructure for the agroindustrial complex—roads, elevators, warehouses, storage bins, and the industrial processing of agricultural commodities. In recent years a number of resolutions have been passed on this account but, for the time being, their implementation is sluggish.

In that case we shall no longer need further irrigated areas or the Volga-Don and Volga-Chogray canals, the construction of which, as in the past, is so actively promoted by the USSR Minvodkhoz. Strictly economic investments in the agroindustrial infrastructure are much more profitable and are recovered much faster compared to large hydraulic reclamation systems, not to mention the harm which such systems cause to the environment. At this point, once again, we should consider the U.S. experience. Since 1976 the federal government has not appropriated a single cent on new projects of this kind, with the exception of plans for treatment and water conservation. Professor Gilbert White, who is

the greatest American geographer and specialist in water problems and the environment, and is a foreign member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has emphasized, in discussing the strategy of development of water utilization in the world, that however the climate may be changing, the strategy must remain the same: comprehensive conservation of water, for that is advantageous above all from the economic viewpoint. He does not even mention environmental protection, believing this to be self-evident! It is thanks to such an attitude toward the matter that in the United States water consumption dropped by 10 percent between 1980 and 1985 while production increased by approximately 15 percent.

Our economic perestroika is most closely related to the priority which is developing throughout the world on the problem of the environment, which includes changes in the climate. In addition to production intensification, a course of power- and resource-conservation has been declared as the basic direction in our development. The strict observance of this course will inevitably solve the ecological problem.

In this connection, it would be impossible to overestimate the role played by increasing the ecological knowledge of the population and, above all, that of economic workers on all levels. The formulation of strategic decisions and daily concern for the conservation of all types of resources and already finished products and production intensification are a guarantee for prosperity in the future. Managers on all levels and the population (for extensive savings can be achieved in daily life as well!) should not only remember this but, I would say, feel it in their own skin. Before building or expanding something one should comprehensively consider whether for the same or, as a rule, for less money something could be saved, for the end objective is not to produce for the sake of production but for the satisfaction of the real needs of man. The greatest realistic need is to live under civilized conditions and to have faith in the well-being of our descendants.

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China's Economic Reform

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[Text] This article will acquaint the readers with the study made by Liu Guoguang, the noted Chinese scientist, CPC Central Committee candidate member, and vice president of China's Academy of Social Sciences. It is the introduction to a collection, which will be published by Izdatelstvo Nauka and was drafted by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Scientific Information for the Social Sciences, in cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Center for Documentation and Information, based on materials provided by PRC scientists.

The study consists of three parts, each one of which consecutively discusses the most topical political and theoretical aspects of the economic reform in the People's Republic of China.

1. In the first part the author notes that the reform of the economic system in China, which was initiated at the end of the 1970s was, essentially, a new choice of ways of achieving socialism as a social system, i.e., a process of restructuring and replacing the old type of economic system. The reform theory, the purpose of which is to study restructuring in the economy led, according to the researcher, to the need for the reinterpretation of socialism. Its traditional understanding was based on the concepts of the future society developed by the authors of the classical Marxist works and the model which took shape in the first socialist state—the Soviet Union—between the 1930s and the 1950s. In China, it developed under the influence of the system of war communism, which functioned during the period of the revolutionary war. The economic system, inherent in post-reform China, was structured on the basis of concepts of a socialist "barter economy—product economy." Hence its typical unification of forms of ownership, the barter-based processes in economic life, centralization of economic management, and equalization in distribution relations.

The main success of the reform theory over the past 10 years, the study reads, is the fact that, step by step, theoretical economists eliminated traditional concepts of socialism as a noncommodity economy. They also realized the fact that today China is at a stage of relatively low level of production forces and is going through the initial stage of socialism with a very underdeveloped commodity economy and, therefore, that it must comprehensively develop a commodity economy and, on this basis, rapidly upgrade production forces.

It was in the process of the reinterpretation of the essence of socialism, the author of the introduction notes, that the concepts of a "socialist commodity economy" and "initial stage of socialism" were born, which could be described as the cornerstone of the theory of reform in China. The conclusion of the socialist economy as a commodity economy meant that the reform will develop by building a socialist economy with the guiding role of the market; officially, this was codified with the resolution of the CPC plenum. The economic theory of socialism turns toward the realities of contemporary China. The Marxist stipulation is revived to the effect that in assessing theoretical projects and political stipulations we must take into consideration whether they are consistent with the development of production forces and the requirements of socialist modernization.

Based on said concepts, Liu Guoguang emphasizes, Marxist economic theory in China made several breakthroughs, the most important among which was on the question of ownership relations. Having analyzed its history in detail, the scientist concluded that until 1979

ownership developed in the direction of its standardization—statification. This led to the calcification of the economic system, its reduced functioning efficiency, and the growth of bureaucratism.

It became obvious in the course of the reform that the choice of the form of ownership must be made taking into consideration the level of development of production forces and their organization, on the basis of the objective requirements of upgrading economic efficiency. In the current and initial stage of socialism in the PRC the level of development of production forces has remained extremely uneven: Alongside contemporary large-scale production a backward small-scale production remains; although mechanization and automation are available, nonetheless manual labor is being extensively applied. Large-scale production with a relatively high degree of socialization and centralization has the aspect of ownership by the whole nation whereas scattered petty production is more consistent with economic management by individual workers and private owners employed in the nonsocialized area.

It is believed in the PRC that collective, cooperative, and mixed forms of ownership offer great opportunities. They can integrate production forces which have reached different socialization levels, i.e., they could combine them not only with the production process which occurs at a low level of development of production forces within relatively small enterprises but even with relatively large-scale production processes operating within the framework of the contemporary level reached by production forces. We must not develop a simplistic idea that small-scale collective management is worse than large-scale management or that collective management is worse than management by the whole people. The criterion on the basis of which one can judge of the advantages of socialist social ownership is not whether the enterprise is big or small or the extent to which it is socialized but whether the social form of ownership is consistent with the requirements governing the development of production forces and whether it contributes to promoting the activeness of the working people and contributes to the efficient utilization of resources.

For a long time, the article points out, the idea was held in China that socialist ownership must be "crystal pure," and that socialist society allows the existence exclusively of social ownership and rejects elements of nonsocial forms. Not only individual farming, which was on the verge of disappearance, was the target of constant discrimination, but even the tiny private plots and auxiliary farms of members of people's communes in the countryside were considered "capitalist tail ends," which should be cut off. Other manifestations of the concept of the creation of a "pure" socialist ownership was emphasis on uniformity of ownership in the various economic units (enterprises) and the rejection of any other of its forms. As a result, a sharp demarcation developed between the nationwide, collective, and individual enterprises as different forms of ownership.

The reform in the economic system, which has been under way in recent years, put an end to the standardization of social ownership. Above all, individual farms were developed. Gradually, private farms in which more than seven people could be hired, began to develop. The private ownership economic system was officially recognized. The section in the accountability report to the 13th Party Congress dealing with the nonsocialist systems—individual and private farming—and the three forms of enterprises involving the participation of foreign capital, stipulated that all said forms are necessary and useful supplements to the socialist economy of the country in the course of its lengthy period of advance on the way to socialism.

In addition to the development of nonsocialized economic systems, a number of forms appeared within social ownership as well. Now the national, collective, and individual forms are no longer divided and separated from each other as in the past. A coupling and interpenetration among different forms of ownership has been initiated. Associations have been established among nationwide enterprises, collective enterprises, and national and collective, national and individual, collective and individual, and domestic and foreign enterprises, which has led to the appearance of joint enterprises. Although public ownership retains its prime role, this has revived economic life in town and country and updated concepts concerning ownership in a socialist society.

On this question, the publication notes, a traditional view has developed according to which enterprises based on public ownership must combine the right of ownership with the right of management. The separation between the "two rights" was considered legitimate only for the private ownership sector and inapplicable in the national sector. After the Third CPC Central Committee Plenum, 11th convocation, however, the previous concepts were gradually rejected and the Third CPC Central Committee Plenum, 12th convocation, clearly formulated the new concept of the "possibility of corresponding division of rights of ownership and rights of economic management."

In the course of the decade of practical experience in the reform, the shift from the merger between the two rights to their separation was initiated in the countryside and, subsequently, moved to the city, initially within enterprises based on collective ownership and, subsequently, enterprises based on national ownership. The application of family contracting in the countryside, with payments based on end output, if considered from the viewpoint of land ownership, is another form of the separation of the right of ownership (collective) from that of management (farmstead). There was a division of such rights in the majority of cooperative and collective enterprises. It was only in some collective farms and private farmsteads engaged in commercial-industrial activities that the right of ownership of assets and the right of management remain combined. A variety of

forms of division are practiced: "collective ownership-economic management by small groups;" "collective ownership-individual economic management;" "shareholding ownership by members of a collective-economic management based on contracting by a small number of people," and others. The separation of rights was practiced also in collectively owned enterprises in the towns and small state enterprises which were allowed to operate on a contracting or leasing basis. In recent years a search has been conducted of ways to separate the "two rights" at large- and medium-sized state enterprises.

The article indicates the need to improve forms of economic responsibility (contracting, leasing, and so on) and the use of stockholding methods, including shares controlled by the state, shares of rayons and enterprises, and shares owned by individuals. Until recently, the author writes, the use of contracting, leasing, and shareholding forms was considered a restoration of private ownership and of capitalism. Actually, in the course of the development of a commodity economy and under the conditions of production socialization, both private and public ownership may use said forms of organization of property relations. If control over ownership right of public property is concentrated in the hands of the state, the collectives or their representatives, while actions related to the aspiration to make free use of public property for selfish purposes is blocked, no radical changes could take place in the nature of social ownership. There are reasons, the researcher goes on to say, to eliminate groundless fears according to which the reform could bring about the restoration of private ownership and the revival of capitalism. This, however, does not exclude the need to support the principle of the primary role of public ownership and to struggle against those who abuse their power for purposes of personal profit.

In the past decade, the author notes, the basic conclusion was reached that at the present stage of building socialism in China, taking into consideration the level reached by production forces, and in accordance with the requirement of their development, it is possible, while retaining and improving planned control, to apply the market mechanism, to expand commodity enterprise, and to create a mechanism for the functioning of the socialist economy which would ensure the organic combination of the plan with the market.

The article considers in detail the viewpoints existing in the PRC concerning the plan and the market. In the past, he stipulates, it was believed that only objects of individual consumption were commodities which could be taken to the market, while the means of production were totally withdrawn from the market area. Production factors such as assets, equipment, information, manpower, and real estate were considered as having nothing in common with the market. In the course of the development of the reform it was gradually accepted that not only consumer goods but also means of production are commodities which must be given access to the market. Also acknowledged was the existence of markets for

production factors. Of late even a real estate market has begun to develop. It is thus that gradually a new concept—the system of a socialist market—is taking shape.

The work discusses in detail commodity-monetary relations under the new circumstances. Practical experience confirms that in the course of their development the effect of the factors of non-price distribution of resources and income shrinks and the realm of action of the price mechanism gradually expands. Until recently prices were considered an account clearing tool in the functioning of the economy.

The price reform is characterized in the article as a challenge to the entire economic system. The old concepts that prices were merely an instrument for accounting were eliminated. A new system of views developed, according to which prices are the most important instrument in the distribution of resources and in economic controls. An end was put to the old viewpoint of the possibility of existence of exclusively prices which are set and controlled by the state. A new concept was developed combining controlled and free prices and a gradual expansion of the mechanism of price setting within the framework of market prices. A concept according to which under the conditions of a socialist commodity economy prices of goods and labor (with few exceptions) must be agreed upon by producers and consumers in accordance with market supply and demand is becoming increasingly established, with state macrocontrol and macroregulation.

The Chinese economists have suggested several variants of combining the plan with the market. The first is the "mechanical combination," according to which a small area of "unplanned," market control is allowed on the "sideline" of the system of the total plan. Typical of the second variant is the "interpenetrating combination," in the course of which the opposite elements of plan and market, which exist on a parallel basis, merge. Within this system planned control should take into consideration the requirements of the law of value, and market control must be guided by the macroplan and be subjected to its restrictive influence. Finally, there is the model of "organic combination," according to which the plan and the market are no longer two coexisting elements which regulate different sectors and areas of the national economy. They are merged and they regulate the functioning of the national economy on its different levels: The plan essentially regulates the various aspects on the macrolevel while the market regulates essentially the economic activities on the microlevel. The macrobalance must be structured in accordance with the trends of market supply and demand while the activities on the microlevel should be governed by the macroplan. Such a system of organically linking the plan with the market and with the macro- and microlevels has been reduced today to the simple and clear formula: "The state regulates the market and the market guides the enterprises."

In the course of the reform of the economic system, the study points out, equalization concepts were rejected and the principle of distribution according to labor was restored. Previously, equalization was considered one of the important features of socialism. In a capitalist society, based on private ownership, as we know, there is no equality whereas socialism is a society based on equality. It was precisely the equality slogan that had involved millions of people in the struggle for socialism. Nonetheless, a large number of people erroneously identify socialist equality with equalization in the distribution of income and socialism with universal equalization, which leads to major distortions in socialist distribution relations.

The rejection of equalization and the restoration of principle of payment according to labor became one of the primary problems in the course of the reform. In recent years China has returned to the piece-rate wage, and restored the bonus system. It is experimenting in linking the overall volume of wages to economic efficiency or to the volume of output. However, because of deep historical tradition and an extensive social base of equalization, the manifestations of the latter can be found everywhere. For example, bonuses awarded to workers and employees which, at many enterprises, are still being equally paid, have assumed the nature of a variety of additional wages. Rivalry begins when the wages of workers and employees are streamlined. Everyone tries to extract for himself a higher wage rate. Also unresolved are problems such as payments for physical and mental labor, excessive bonuses, and subsidies in cash and in kind, which trigger inequality in the individual incomes of people employed in different economic units.

Also allowed is the coexistence of a variety of forms of distribution, the main among which is distribution according to labor. At the same time, a search is under way of forms of market distribution, which would be consistent with the principle of equivalent exchange. The restoration of the principle according to labor is combined with the broad promotion of the political concept that on the basis of the orientation toward universal prosperity, some people should be allowed to become more prosperous earlier than other. The implementation of this objective is related not only to the systematic application of the principle of distribution according to labor but also the development of a market economy. The principle of distribution is based on acknowledging differences in labor and income. Today the technical standard of production in the PRC is characterized by essentially manual, mechanized, and partially mechanized labor, with an insignificant percentage of production automation. The cultural and technical standards of the working people remain low and very few people have secondary specialized or higher training. This determines significant differences in the nature and quality of labor of individual workers and, correspondingly, in their income.

In order to prevent great income disparity, several additional forms and mechanisms of distribution are used in China, based not on labor or not entirely on labor. The primacy of wages based on labor, considering the existence of a variety of forms of distribution, is a reflection of a situation in which public ownership, as the main form, parallels a variety of other forms of ownership and means of economic management.

Currently there are four major types of individual income in Chinese society. First are the labor income, i.e., the wages of workers and employees and income as compensation for labor outlays of contracting peasant farmsteads and individual workers. This is followed by a variety of personal incomes, depending on the efficiency of economic management. In this case, to a certain extent, income is also based on labor, although not entirely determined by the amount of labor, for it includes a dividend for the skillful use of opportunities and taking risks. In other words, here a principle of distribution not according to labor plays a certain role. This is followed by income on funds and assets in the guise of interest, dividends, percentages, and lease payments based on monetary savings, loans, shareholding, use of assets, or leasing one's property. Finally, there is income from assets based on the quality and geographic location, i.e., there are differentiated incomes which are not considered labor income. This distribution not according to labor is based, in the final account, on the principles of equivalent exchange, inherent in a commodity oriented economy.

Given this situation, the work emphasizes, possibilities appear of earning nonlabor income and all kinds of profits from speculative machinations and briberies. This makes the following question pertinent: Would the inequality in the distribution of income thus arising and influencing the atmosphere and stability in society harm the cause of socialism? In his answer, Liu Guoguang reaches the conclusion that in the same way that in the multiplicity of forms of ownership one should allow and develop nonsocialist forms which contribute to the growth of production forces in socialist society and do not undermine the prime status of public ownership, in the system of distribution, under the same circumstances, we should allow the existence of unearned income, based on the principles of commodity production.

Between the second half of the 1950s and the second half of the 1970s, rationing was repeatedly applied in the allocation of personal consumption objects in China. Administrative nonmarket methods were used in income distribution as well. In the countryside this involved labor units based on the criterion of the time spent at work. In towns and settlements and in the case of workers and employees, a standardized wage system was applied as set by the state. As a result, the "communal kitchen" method was applied in the distribution system.

The gradual development of a socialist commodity economy makes it possible to undertake the reorganization of the distribution mechanism. It was necessary, above all, to eliminate the system of labor units in the countryside and to abandon centralized economic management and centralized distribution in production brigades, and to grant the peasants the right independently to engage in distribution depending on labor outlays, through the market price mechanisms. It was also necessary to change the system of fixed wages in the towns, established by the state on a centralized basis. However, it turned out impossible to eliminate totally the principle of the "common pot" in the area of wage distribution. Furthermore, restructuring in that area required a conversion from an administrative wage system to one based on market principles. Distribution according to labor is considered in China a general abstract principle, which can be implemented both under the conditions of a barter and a commodity economy. However, in distribution according to labor in a commodity economy it is necessary to take into consideration the principle of "distribution according to the cost of manpower" or "distribution in accordance with supply and demand on the labor market," which makes the new distribution mechanism based on labor a mechanism of market distribution which, in addition to a nonlabor form of distribution, can also ensure the unity of the market.

The concept of the application of market principles in the area of distribution, the scientist claims, opens the way to subsequent reforms. Because of the contradictions which arise in connection with control of the overall wage volume on the macrolevel and its reform on the microlevel it is necessary, he believes, either to allow the possibility of exceeding the overall wage volume based on rates or else to hold it back in the interest of wage reform on the microlevel. If the purpose of wage restructuring is not the creation of a market distribution mechanism, such a reform would drag ad infinitum and could find itself in the vice of unrestrained wage increases. Meanwhile, in the process of replacing the distribution mechanisms, frictions and difficulties may arise, which are the inevitable cost of renovation and on the elimination of which all available forces should be involved.

The theory of the market nature of distribution is the result of a constant search in the course of the reform for answers which cannot be found in the works of the classics. It constitutes the further development of the Marxist theory of distribution under socialism.

2. Great attention is paid in the study to the theoretical problems of the tactics of the reform. In the first years, the prevailing viewpoint was that restructuring requires a relatively favorable economic environment, i.e., the availability of a limited demand market, in which supply would greatly exceed demand. It was considered that this situation would encourage the enterprises to engage in reforms and help to determine the role of the mechanism

of market competition and thus support the restructuring of financial and material reserves. Another viewpoint appeared in 1984, in connection with the "overheating" of the economy: A favorable economic environment cannot be a prerequisite for reform, for it can take shape only as a result of restructuring; since scarcity is essentially inherent in the old system, the reform can take place in a stressed situation in which supply is not meeting demand. Restructuring alone could eliminate the reasons for the scarcity.

Proceeding from the actual state of affairs, the researcher went on to say, the economic reform in the PRC is taking place under not quite favorable conditions. Economic "overheating" phenomena have appeared repeatedly as a result of the insufficient resolve and persistence in bringing order in the economic environment. It is no accident that in recent years it has been difficult to advance some key reforms. Thus, because of the stress on the macrolevel, the comprehensive reform in prices, taxes, finances, and monetary circulation, based on a price reform of means of production, intended for 1987, had to be postponed. Grave upheavals in economic development frequently lead to breakdowns. If a major imbalance develops between overall supply and overall demand and within their structure, this could weaken the role of the market mechanism in optimizing the allocation of resources. The pressure of inflation, in turn, may necessitate the use of strict administrative methods to control economic life. All of this hinders the implementation of the reform and could even force it to retreat.

That is why, the scientist notes, we must always take into consideration the real conditions under which the reform is taking place and not allow inflated investments or increased consumer demand but to try to reduce the excess of overall demand over overall supply and subsequently eliminate it, and thus create relatively favorable grounds for the implementation of set targets.

The restructuring of the economic system and the conversion from the old to the new, the article emphasizes, can be achieved through two methods: "in one fell swoop" or gradually. In China, considering the complex nature of the economic reform, the method of gradual change was adopted. This means the inevitable coexistence between the new and the old systems. Mixing them, however, could present the economy with quite pressing problems. Neither the old planning system nor the new market mechanism can fulfill their function of efficiently controlling resources. There develops a reciprocal overlaying of shortcomings. With a double system, the problem of the two price levels for the same commodity—planned and nonplanned—becomes exceptionally grave. This situation adversely affects availability of material resources for the most important planned state projects. It creates confusion in the production and circulation area and in cost accounting management, and opens loopholes for profiteering and misappropriation of funds; it has a painful impact on the morals and morality

of the administrative personnel and poisons the social atmosphere. The annual inflation of overall demand disrupts the already limited control over the market. Furthermore, the circumstances become even further aggravated by a spiraling comprehensive price increase.

Despite the adverse consequences which contradictions and frictions caused by the existence of the new system cause to economic and social life, as the author of the study indicates, the accelerated application of the new system is being held back by a number of subjective and objective reasons, particularly the factor of macrolevel imbalance. This leads to the conclusion that a double system should be retained in various areas for a rather long period of time. This situation, however, presumes the enhancement of the efforts to accelerate the reform steps, so that the new system may replace the old as quickly as possible and assume a leading status. The duration of this process is closely related to solving the problem of inflation and macroeconomic balance, i.e., the conversion from a seller's market to a limited buyer's market.

The reform of the economic system in China, Liu Guoguang sums up, is a process in the course of which the two main aspects of restructuring are interwoven. On the one hand, this applies to the reform of the enterprise mechanisms, based on defining the nature of their ownership or property rights; on the other, it includes the reorganization of the mechanisms of economic functioning, the central link of which is the price. Which of these sides is the most important? A dialectical answer to this question is found in the CPC Central Committee resolution adopted at the Third Central Committee Plenum, 12th convocation. It stipulates as follows: The enterprise reform is the nucleus of the reform of the economic system while the price reform is the key to the entire restructuring; replacing the system of property rights at enterprises presumes, as an external prerequisite, a price reform and development of a competitive market; in turn, bringing order in prices and their emancipation also require respective changes in the enterprise behavioral mechanism. Reform along these two directions is inevitable. It is an organic part of the entire economic reform or its two main lines between which connections of reciprocal aid and supplementing exist: The basic is activities related to the development of a market; the second is the creation of an environment promoting market competition.

Since the summer of 1988, the publication states, inflation, which was gathering an increasingly faster pace, became the main obstacle to reform. Under these circumstances the need to formulate the type of measures which would ensure a stable and continuing economic growth became a popular viewpoint. This includes changes involving improvements in the mechanism of macroeconomic control and regulation, and efforts to strengthen contract responsibility of enterprises with a view to preparing conditions for a conversion to a system of actions which would stimulate the market, to which

purpose rules governing its management should be formulated, prices should be regulated, and so on. It is contemplated that in 3 years the factors which are destabilizing economic life will be essentially eliminated and that between 1991 and 1995 the country will be able to convert to the second stage of restructuring in which the price reform will assume the main role.

These considerations were the basis of the decisions made at the Third CPC Central Committee Plenum of September 1988.

3. The third part of the study deals with the theoretical economic aspects of the reform. As the scientist claims, theoretical activities followed the doctrine of Marx and Engels. Creatively adopting Marxism as a steadily developing science in step with the age, the CPC deemed it necessary to abandon certain concepts which included elements of utopianism, formulated by the initiators of the revolutionary theory under different historical circumstances, and to reject erroneous concepts caused by a dogmatic understanding of Marxism or ascribed to it.

The CPC abandoned concepts of socialism as a society whose economy is of a noncommodity nature. It formulated the concept of a socialist commodity economy. On the question of ownership, the viewpoint that "the bigger the scale and the higher the level of socialization, the 'purer' ownership becomes and the more closely the right of ownership and the right of economic management blend, the better" was rejected. The party also opposed the concept of the incompatibility of planning with market control. Views which identified equalization with socialism and denied the possibility of obtaining nonworking income under socialism, and so on, were rejected in the area of income distribution.

Nonetheless, the CPC continued to support the need to observe the basic features of the socialist economy, in which a leading role is played by public ownership and distribution according to labor, the planned management of the socialist commodity economy, and so on.

Theoretical views are being revised in China on the basis of fundamental Marxist principles such as "practice is the criterion of truth" and "the basic task of socialism is the development of production forces." One of the main lessons drawn from the experience of the economic reform, the article states, is that Marxism can be defended only through its further development. In this connection, the scientist notes that if we cling to obsolete and routine concepts and if we fear to question judgments which are no longer consistent with the spirit of the age and if we do not dare to formulate new tasks consistent with the requirements of our time, theoretical-economic views will find themselves in a state of calcification. In the final account, reality and the masses themselves will reject such concepts for otherwise this would undermine the authority of Marxism.

The study notes that in the past 10 years the theory of reform has turned into political reform and that this policy was implemented through the practice of the reform which, in turn, contributed to the enrichment of theory. This is a fact of fundamental significance. The decisions adopted at party fora, as a concentration and summation of the mind of the entire party and people, were also based on the results of scientific studies, which the author considers a contribution to the development of Marxism. The powerful upsurge of the science of economics in China is explained by Liu Guoguang by the freeing of the mind and by seeking the truth in facts based on reality. Now, he writes, theoretical-economic studies in the field of the practices of the reform and building face the twin tasks of providing scientific recommendations and consultations to party-state authorities responsible for decision making and, at the same time, engaging in theoretical propaganda among the various social strata. In addition to these two tasks the systematic study of the fundamentals of Marxist economic theory, including the study of the objects, the apparatus of categories, the system of laws, and so on, is of major importance. Efforts to strengthen the fundamental foundations of the science of economics must, according to the researcher, be closely related to practical experience.

Among the topical problems of our new time the author particularly singles out the need to promote the course of "let 100 schools compete, and let various areas of thought develop." Prior to the reform the economic scientists could think and work only on the basis of a single measurement. They had no conditions for free research. They could not enter forbidden areas, not to mention deal with the development of Marxism, which was the monopoly right of the political leadership. The economic scientists could only master and comment on the works of authoritarian leaders. Anyone who would submit an innovative idea would be immediately attacked. This is one of the reasons for which eventually economic science in the PRC found itself in an impasse. It was the Third CPC Central Committee Plenum, 11th convocation, that signaled the freeing of the mind. Scientists began increasingly to get rid of the old ideological blinkers and to think independently and, one after another, eliminate the forbidden theoretical areas and formulate new concepts and new ideas. However, because of the lengthy domination of leftist errors and uninterrupted political campaigns and ideological criticism, the people have still not been able to reject the legacy of the past and, hence, the concern that the old times would "return once again." That is why, while supporting the course of competition among "100 theories," one must not allow administrative interference in scientific and theoretical areas. The accuracy of various views should be tested through practice. It is difficult to avoid errors in scientific research. For that reason the scientists must be allowed to make them and be given the opportunity to correct them. In the course of the debates on the theory of economic reform one should not be in a hurry to pin the label of bourgeois liberalism to some

statements which may contain elements of "exaggeration," or thoughtlessly describe as conservative or routine some views on the basis that at certain periods in development the mind cannot catch up with the course of the reform.

In the interest of the further blossoming of the science of economics, the publication emphasizes, the development of different trends should be encouraged. It is not only among Marxist economists that arguments among supporters of different areas should develop. The Marxist economists should not fear discussions with non-Marxists. Such discussions would contribute to the tempering of the Marxist scientists and would enrich Marxist economic science itself. The analytical mastery of foreign economic thinking is described by the author of this study as a major prerequisite for the development of economic theory in the PRC.

The scientist, who describes Marxism as an open science, claims that although in China Marxism was introduced from the outside, Marxist economic science was the product of its combination with the realities of the country's economy. A twisty road has been covered in the use of foreign experience, from uncritical borrowing to total rejection. Starting with the beginning of the reform, the attitude toward the theory and practice of other countries has changed radically. It became obvious that China has fallen behind many of them not only in terms of the level of management of technology but also in the field of economic research. Since in some Eastern European countries, the author notes, the reform had begun earlier than in the PRC and the problems which appeared in this connection were similar, the Chinese specialists studied to a greater extent initially the work of the theoreticians of economic reform in those countries. Subsequently, when the reform in China took the line of the development of a commodity economy, the eyes gradually and increasingly began to turn to Western economic science, where a commodity economy had existed for a long time. Naturally, the scientist notes, borrowing and mastery does not mean simply duplicating and imitating. China borrows and masters only that which is consistent with the development of socialized production and a commodity economy, which are not the specific accomplishments of capitalism both under socialism and under capitalism, for both socialist and bourgeois economics include socialization and commodity. Furthermore, the author acknowledges that a small group of immature people, ignoring the national conditions of the PRC, are indiscriminately making use of Western economic theories. For example, they are trying to apply the Keynesian concept on the admissibility of deficit financing and inflation of credit, which have proved their efficiency in the West, to the conditions of insufficient demand in China, where usually it is excessive demand that prevails.

One of the sections of the publication deals with the methods used currently in China for the study of the processes occurring in the country. In the past it was the

rating method that was essentially being applied. The economic scientists focused their attention on the following question: "What should be the nature of the socialist economy?" The answer to it was logically based on postulates which prevailed in the past. Now, in drafting the reform, the scientists cannot fail to be interested in the standard aspect of the question: "What type of socialism should there be?" However, in answering it, they try to determine, above all, "What is the nature of the socialist economy?" To this effect they need a description and interpretation of the objectively existing facts and their internal relations, taking reality into consideration. Without such an analysis no clear idea can be gained of the problems which arise and corresponding plans formulated. This determines the increasingly broad use of experimental methods in which the old one-sided reliance on the analysis of quality quantitative analysis is assuming increasing importance.

Economic laws, the author of the article writes, are, as a rule, not only logical but, to an even greater extent, statistical laws which are manifested to a tremendous extent in changes in quantitative relations. Without a quantitative analysis economic science cannot become economic philosophy. Naturally, a quantitative analysis in this case is inseparable from a qualitative analysis, for without a qualitative analysis economic science could lose its guidelines.

Finally, the scientist notes, along with the development of quantitative analysis, current economic studies make extensive use of the comparative method. This makes it possible to eliminate the previous limitations and one-sidedness.

Liu Guoguang writes in the final part of the article that the tremendous work related to the theoretical interpretation and practical implementation of the reform requires the training of cadres of specialists. In order to develop an economic science one must train a large detachment of Marxist economists, full of fresh forces and imbued with a creative spirit, and develop in them a feeling for the significance of their mission and their social responsibility.

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Seven Days in Tehran

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[Article by Marietta Tigranovna Stepanyants, professor, doctor of philosophical sciences, head of sector at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, member of the Committee of Soviet Women]

[Text] Ever since the overthrow of the Shah's regime, events in Iran have been drawing universal attention. They are of interest to us as well, who are the closest neighbors of that country. By the end of January a delegation of the

Committee of Soviet Women visited the Islamic Republic of Iran. It included M.T. Stepanyants, a philosopher-Orientalist. Her impressions of the trip, which was limited in terms of time and place, are quite subjective. Nonetheless, they are of interest to us although they leave untouched a number of important and complex problems of the life of the Iranian people. The author tries less to evaluate than to understand what she saw and heard during a short week. Her notes include the "human dimension" of politics and the social environment which could be useful in our interpretation of ideological and social processes occurring in contemporary Iran.

In the 10 years which have passed since the 1979 Iranian revolution, in my mind that country was associated with impressions from television images dominated by three characters: the stern, fine looking face of an old man—the Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic revolution; the militant, emotional, and fanatical actions and the bearded faces of youngsters—the "revolutionary guards"—and, finally, the faceless figures of women, covered by a black veil. I am perfectly willing to admit that other people may have perceived those television images differently. My subjective memory, however, has retained precisely these three "symbols" of the revolution.

Unexpectedly, fate offered me the opportunity to check the extent to which these impressions reflected the nature of what was happening in Iran and were they merely the consequence of a certain impact created by the mass information media?

Events developed in a most incredible and lightning way. On Tuesday, 24 January of this year, approximately 2 hours before the end of the working day, a representative of the Iranian embassy came to the Committee of Soviet Women carrying an invitation to send to Tehran, the day after, a delegation of Soviet women to participate in the second International Congress on "Women and the World Islamic Revolution." The invitation was extended by the Iranian Women's Society, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini's daughter, Zahra Mostafavi. The Iranians kindly undertook to issue visas the same day and, furthermore, to pay for the entire trip.

Equally incredible was the efficiency of the Soviet side: All formalities were set aside and on Thursday, early in the morning, Mariya Khristoforova, Committee of Soviet Women senior assessor, together with the author of these lines, flew up to Tehran.

We arrived 1 and a half days prior to the official opening of the congress. Here is one feature worthy of mentioning about the first minutes of arrival on Iranian soil: a discussion which took place in the cabin of the plane. Next to us sat a nice looking young woman dressed according to all the rules of contemporary "Islamic etiquette." It is true that her clothing was distinguished by its obvious European smartness: a fashionable black cloak, black high heeled shoes, and a black fur-lined little

hat. She turned out to be an Iranian woman who had married a Frenchman, for which reason she was living in Paris. Having determined that we are "Russian," she immediately offered us cleansing tissues with which to wipe off our lipstick (fortunately, we had applied no other make-up) reminding us of the need to cover our heads with a scarf more tightly. Her gesture was motivated by the good wish to protect us from unpleasant encounters with the "revolutionary guards." We appreciated the good service of this first Iranian acquaintance: More than one pair of critical men's eyes were focused on us and we were welcomed by two women in black gowns covering them all the way to the floor, and with headgear covering their foreheads and chins.

They put us up in the Hotel Inkilab ("Revolution"), formerly the "Royal Gardens." We were on the 15th floor and an announcement outside the elevator informed us that this floor was for women only. It is true that at one end of the hall we could see the figure of a man carrying a submachine gun: The revolution had made its corrections to religious etiquette as well.

The first day of our stay in Tehran was on Friday, which is a nonworking day (equivalent to Sunday in countries with a Christian culture). The day is spent in prayers in the mosque and performing a variety of religious duties. The latter included, in particular, visits to cemeteries. On Fridays, in Tehran, thousands of people go to "Beheshte-Zahra" ("Zahra Paradise"), the place where the "martyrs" ("shahids") are buried. In Islam as a whole, and among the Shia in particular, the cult of the martyr's death for his religion is exceptionally developed. Anyone who has died in the struggle for his faith ("jihad") is proclaimed a "martyr," worthy of respect and going to heaven after his death.

Thousands of such "martyrs," victims of the Shah's terror, the civil war, and the various terrorist actions in Iran and abroad, are buried in the "Beheshte-Zahra" cemetery.

The greatest number of stones covers the graves of those who fell during the 8-year-long Iraq-Iran war. Flags are waving in the wind everywhere: black as a sign of mourning, green, as the color of Islam, and red as reminders of the red flags of the troops of Imam Husein. Here putting up monuments is not accepted (it is true that the rich can have family vaults). Instead, something like a small exhibit under glass is placed over the stone, with the photograph of the youngster, artificial flowers, touching family mementos and, mandatorily, the picture of Ayatollah Khomeini.

The picture of the Ayatollah looks down from walls in public premises and private homes, from posters and banners on the streets of Tehran, wreaths of paper flags, resembling Christmas tree decorations, waving in the wind over shop windows. Imprinted in my memory is a tall building on each window of which the picture of Ayatollah Khomeini was stuck to the panel.

The presence of this powerful imam is felt not only visually. Toasts to him are heard in prayers, speeches, and songs.

The Shia pray, as a rule, alone ("namaz") three times daily. Every room in the hotel has a corner with a plate on which the word "kiblah" is inscribed—showing the direction of the holy Kaaba in Mecca, toward which the face of the person praying must be turned. On Fridays participation in collective prayers in the mosques is preferable.

In the capital the most important prayer meeting is held on the campus of Tehran University. We were brought there after a visit to the cemetery. Directly on the ground, on little rugs or blankets, thousands of people sat cross-legged. On that day some 50,000 were present. We were taken to the women's half, separated by white-gray canvas. We saw a huge mass of figures in black. All of them attentively listened to the words of the leader of the prayer meeting—it was the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran himself, Seyed Ali Khamenei.

To the Iranians, the Friday prayer meeting is not only an occasion for listening to religious sermons together, but also an involvement with the events which are taking place in the country or even internationally. The president spoke of the difficulties of the revolution and the fact that its success is being countered by domestic and foreign enemies, and of the inevitable victorious march of the universal Islamic revolution and the messianic role of the Iranian people. His speech was repeatedly interrupted by the Shia formula which sounded like slogans repeatedly chanted by the thousands of people: "There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his prophet and Ali is the wali of Allah." Frequently added to this traditional formula were toasts in honor of Imam Khomeini. There were also shouts such as "Neither West nor East!"

Unexpectedly, the women began moving; the black "hijabs" were replaced by lighter-colored ones in order to complete the prayer meeting, within a single rhythm, on their knees, bowing, prostrating themselves, raising their arms, and repeating verses from the Koran. We left the square and, as we sat in the car, once again we heard the chant: "Allah akbar!" ("Allah is Almighty!"), and "Long live Imam Khomeini!"

The same slogans were repeated several times in the course of the next few days, and during the speeches of the guests of honor and delegates to the congress.¹ The name of Khomeini was constantly mentioned in talks and in ordinary conversations. He was quoted and he was referred to as the supreme authority.

He personally rarely speaks and almost never appears in public. Few people can see, not to mention speak to him. The leader of the Islamic revolution is present in the minds of a tremendous number of Iranians as a person of impeccable conscience and honesty, a wise man free

from erroneous judgments and views, a model of modesty, and ideal head of family. In translation, the word ayatollah means "divine sign" or "a sign of God."

We had the honor to visit the family of Ayatollah Khomeini, together with the other foreign delegations and a few members of the Iranian participants to the congress. Whether coincidentally or deliberately planned, the visit took place the same day as the tour of the palace of the overthrown Shah.

In the morning, as we toured the former residence of Reza Pahlevi, our guides repeatedly emphasized that the hated despot lived in luxury acquired at the expense of the people, whereas the present leader of the country lives in an ordinary and very modest home. What we saw during the second half of the day confirmed this statement.

We drove to the district of rich cottages located in the foothills of the chain of mountains surrounding Tehran. We were asked to remove any jewelry, including our wedding rings, and to leave our purses in the cars. We then walked down a narrow street, lined with buildings which reminded us of the old districts of cities in the Caucasus. Unexpectedly, we were stopped at a one-story little house with a screen instead of a door. We entered: Here there was an additional questioning as to whether anyone was carrying any kind of ornament or wristwatches. We took off our wristwatches. We walked on. After a while there was another screened door. We crossed it: Here two women performed an individual body search, closely searching our clothing and even taking off our shoes and removing gifts—souvenirs which many of us carried on our persons. The small souvenir boxes we carried from Khokhloma were taken from us.

After the search we entered a small inner yard and, crossing it, went into a two-story house. We saw on the open terrace of the second floor Zahra, the Ayatollah's daughter, whom we knew and who welcomed us in. We climbed the stairs, took off our shoes and, walking down a small rug, entered a modest small lobby and then a room where those who had come earlier were already sitting on the rugs. Sitting in the middle against the wall facing the door was an elderly woman with a light-skinned aristocratic face. It was Khomeini's wife. We were introduced. She smiled very sweetly, shook our hands, and welcomed us.

Within 10 minutes the entire room was absolutely packed. Some 80 women sat down on the floor. Only the two daughters of the ayatollah a daughter-in-law, a nephew and a niece, and a few relatives or servants remained standing. The white-washed room included two small simple lamps and the only "furniture" was something like a wooden shelf on which were placed the pictures of Khomeini, his sons, and a model of a mosque encrusted with mother-of-pearl. The guests were served tea in small cups, and sweets. A conversation started.

The questions were answered by the wife and the daughters. They were about the daily schedule of the great leader, what he eats, does he sleep well, what he reads, where does he relax, and so on, and so forth. Other questions were asked as well: What kind of education did his daughters and nieces have, and how did the women—the members of his family—participate in social life, and what was the Ayatollah's attitude toward training Iranian girls abroad. Someone asked whether Khomeini sought his wife's advice in making decisions. The answer was the following: only when it applies to family matters. On matters of politics, decisions are made singly. The answer triggered an unexpected objection. A guest from the Sudan said that one should not give such an answer, for this gives the enemies of the revolution, particularly outside Iran, the opportunity to claim that Khomeini is a dictator, a "lunatic." The Sudanese woman expressed her confidence that in making decisions the Ayatollah seeks the advice of representatives in parliament or else consults the Holy Koran.

The almost hour-long meeting ended on a rather high dramatic note. An Iranian 18-20-year old girl (who had come from the provinces as winner of a competition on a composition about Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet and wife of the Imam Ali) suddenly, with tears in her eyes, exclaimed: "But why does the Ayatollah Khomeini not wish to come to us? I have waited for 10 years for this day and have dreamed to see him. Let him merely show himself up at the window of his office, on the other side of the alley, which we can see from this room." The girl started crying and after her most of those present began to cry as well. This was mass hysterics triggered by emotional tension and unrealized expectations.... The meeting ended with this dramatic development.

Unrealized expectations.... The Iranians have accumulated a great deal of those: the 10 postrevolutionary years have not brought social justice. They have not eased the lot of the poor. They have cost hundreds of thousands of young lives lost in a senseless war. They have sown hostility and mistrust among fellow citizens. In all of this the great leader is innocent, our Iranian interlocutors said. It is domestic and foreign forces of the counterrevolution that should be blamed. God! Everything is repeated and is this the logic of any developing revolution?

The enemy is not sleeping, for which reason all "revolutionary guards" must be watchful. "The detachments of guards of the Islamic revolution," states the official propaganda pamphlet *"The Islamic Republic of Iran Today"*, "are the creation of the same philosophy of the Islamic Revolutionary Committees. The leaders of the revolution and the people, who trust and rely on the Army, also realize that it is hindered by the nonrevolutionary spirit of some officers and the bureaucratic system which has penetrated the Army authorities. Until the Army has been totally reorganized one cannot expect that it could function as a revolutionary army and be able to implement the military tasks of the revolution.

That is why in March 1979, i.e., immediately after the revolution, the "guard units" were created. In addition to keeping the peace and fighting for the revolution, they act as the punitive arm of the revolutionary courts and help the Army to protect the independence of the country and to fight against foreign enemy forces" (pp 191-192).

It seems as though the "revolutionary guards" are everywhere. They guarded us in the halls of the hotel, in the elevators and lobbies of the hotels, sitting next to the driver in the car, waving their automatic weapons or revolvers, angrily interrupting our discussion with BBC journalists who tried to interview us.

During our stay in Tehran, which coincided with the eve of the "10th day of dawn," i.e., nationwide celebrations on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, one could feel the tension in the capital. The authorities were probably fearing antigovernmental actions. In any case, we were not even allowed to come out for fresh air in the hotel yard. Traveling by car, to attend various functions, they hurried us on and asked us not to lower the car windows. We did not know that it was precisely during those days that many countries had protested the mass executions of political prisoners in Iran.

The congress ended on 30 January, in the premises of a theater with approximately a thousand seats. It was here that the plenary sessions and meetings of the previous 2 days had taken place. This time guards around and in the theater were clearly reinforced. After a somewhat protracted wait, the opening of the session was announced. An orchestra consisting of violins, drums, and five wind instruments, followed by a chorus of men, came, under guard, on the stage. There were altogether 13 people. Inmates, obviously brought from the Tehran jail. These were young and intelligent faces, tense, their eyes looking down or somewhere into space, or aimed at the ceiling. The soloist performed a heartbreaking song with lyrics by the great Khafiz. The chorus then sang something like an optimistic marching song: "When the imam returned (on the return of Khomeini from exile to Iran and the beginning of the revolution—author), Iran changed. There was spring, and tulips blossomed everywhere." I was unable to help myself: I was choked by tears, I cried, and those who sat next to me did not ask why. Did anyone among them believe in this kind of methods for the reeducating of dissidents?

The speeches on that same stage, which followed the "choral singing" proved the difficulty and conflicting nature of the processes occurring today in Iran. Judge for yourselves:

After the prisoners left the theater, Mrs Dabbag, the vice chair of the Iranian Women's Society, and one of the few women members of parliament, rose on the stage. As we were told, she is the supervisor of women's prisons. This is a strange and, let us frankly say, a terrible combination

of roles. Her topic was the following: information on her trip to the USSR, as a member of a delegation which had presented to M.S. Gorbachev a personal message from Imam Khomeini. She began with an assessment of the victorious development of the Iranian revolution. "The Western and Eastern countries used the forces of the devil in their hands to kill the revolution in its inception. It is clear now that neither blind terrorists nor those who use modern weapons and technology were able to suppress the revolution.... We must return to the single God, we must remain loyal to the principles of pure Islam.... We must follow the precepts of the Imam Khomeini." She then spoke of the significance of the fact that the great ayatollah had chosen as his "envoys" one man and one woman, thus emphasizing the importance of the role which women play in the life of Islamic society.

Finally, Dabbag spoke in detail about the reception given to the envoys of the Ayatollah in the Soviet Union. She especially noted the sympathetic and attentive attitude which M.S. Gorbachev showed toward the delegation. The presentation of the message was rated as an event of historical significance, which opened new horizons in international relations. Dabbag was followed by an Iranian woman who summed up the results of the sessions of the work groups at the congress. Greetings were presented by the representative of the Pakistani Shiite community, who read her poetry on the Iranian revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini.

According to protocol, the last to speak were the guests from the Soviet Union. I was already prepared to take the microphone when suddenly my speech was postponed, for Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of parliament, had come to the theater.

Surrounded by guards, a very energetic middle-aged man entered the hall. He was dressed in religious garb: a turban, a brown robe, and under it a bright shirt, which looked like a Russian shirt. His face was smoothly shaven, his eyes were lively and, in general, his appearance was entirely worldly. Rafsanjani is a superb speaker (obviously, the ability to address large audiences without any notes, emotionally, is a distinguishing feature of the overwhelming majority of Iranian government and social leaders). The speaker of parliament spoke and then answered questions by the thousands-strong audience, addressed to the presidium in writing or asked directly from the hall, for about 1 and a half hours. You must agree that this was an unusual procedure, even under the conditions of a developed democracy. In any case, Simone Zakri, the French woman who was sitting next to me, whispered in my ear that she could not imagine a situation in which she could address herself so informally to the president of France.

A variety of questions were asked, reflecting the polarization of opinions. Someone asked why was it that the revolution had given nothing to women who had actively taken part in it and why had the promised social justice not come; would parliament take into consideration the

recommendations of this women's congress? And, probably the most direct and pointed was the question: "The leadership does not have a program for improving the situation of the women; is there such a program concerning the men?"

The moods of another segment of the audience, the fanatic one, demanding a stricter "religious orientation" of the revolution, was reflected in the following questions: Why are women not forbidden from singing songs (there are grounds in Islam for such a ban), why is the strict and comprehensive wearing of the "hijab" not observed, and so on.

Rafsanjani's answers seemed to me to reflect the moderate nature of his views. He repeatedly called upon the women "not to rush ahead of the Imam Khomeini himself." Thus, for example, referring to the authority of the great ayatollah, he explained that the Koran does not require that the "hijab" be black and almost totally cover the mouth and the face, and that polygamy, which was allowed during periods of war which the first Muslims had to fight, is not prohibited today by the Iranian leadership but nor does it prescribe polygamy and that although it would be desirable for the question of marriage to be solved in the presence of the parents (so that the girl may not be tricked), in principle Ayatollah Khomeini allows girls to marry even despite the wishes of their parents, and so on.

On the subject of critical remarks concerning the state of affairs in the country, the speaker of parliament repeatedly said: "We have not as yet created an ideal Islamic society. However, we are improving with every passing day. We have not lost our revolutionary ideals but their practical implementation needs time." I do not know about the others but I was impressed and gratified by the fact that the thousands of seemingly faceless women, when put to the test, revealed themselves quite independent (concerning the authorities), and as a critically thinking and social active force.

After Rafsanjani left, it seemed unlikely and inexpedient to go on with the meeting: Everyone was tired, and the peak moment of the meeting with the leader was behind us. Nonetheless, the session was extended exclusively for the sake of keeping the promise of giving the floor to the Soviet representative. I took this as a sign of great respect for our country.

On the request of the organizers, the text of the speech had been drafted in advance and submitted on that same morning for translation from English into Farsi. The 20-minute address was heard with great attention and the translation was full and accurate. The audience applauded us and our achievements in solving the women's problem and for our open admission of remaining difficulties, unsolved problems, and plans and projects for solving them in the future.

The session ended and the congress was closed. In the lobby we were surrounded by Iranian women. A great deal of warm and good statements were made. What was most touching was a white carnation presented by the mother of one of the "martyrs," and a poem written in Farsi, by another.

The women of revolutionary Iran are an amazing and little understood phenomenon to the outside observer. Their black garb—"hijab"—is one of the most powerful arguments in favor of assessing the Iranian revolution as an attempt to turn the country back, to a medieval social system.

What is this "hijab" which, in the 20th century, has triggered in many people shock, puzzlement, and indignation? Literally translated from the Arabic, it means a "cover," a "screen," a "veil." The "philosophy of the hijab" was developed by Muslim theologians and, like any theoretical concept, has had a variety of interpretations. The freedom of interpretation is allowed by the text of the holy writings themselves. Chapter 24, entitled "Nur" ("Light"), verse 31, which is considered of key importance in the "philosophy of the hijab," in the Koran reads as follows: "Tell the (women) believers: Let them cast down their eyes and cover their members and let them not display their ornaments so that they can be seen; let them cover their breasts,... Let only their husbands or their fathers or the fathers of their husbands or their sons or the sons of their husbands or their brothers or the sons of their brothers or their women, or those who have mastered themselves or the male servants who have no desire or children who are unaware of the nudity of women; and let them not trample with their feet so that others would establish what adornments they are concealing." Women are allowed to show the beauty of their faces in the family circle. Outside of it they must display modesty and not draw the attention of strange men. The entire question, however, is how such a greatly desired chastity is to be manifested? In the course of the sessions of the sections at the congress, the debates broke out precisely on the problem of the "hijab." Not only did European women say that this "black cover" frightens and repels them, but even Muslim women, the Pakistani representatives in particular, objected to it. Two of the six delegates of the "Country of the Pure" (such is the literal translation of the word "Pakistan"), which was created on the basis of the principles of religion and which claims to be consistently implementing the principles of Islam, wore bright-colored national baggy pants and blouses and their hair was only slightly concealed by transparent scarves of equally bright colors. The beauty of their clothing and the variety of their jewelry, including ringing bracelets, looked, speaking frankly, like a daring challenge to the practically closed circle of black cloaks (Western women, fearing to trigger the displeasure of the hosts and following the advice of their embassies, also covered their heads, wore no make-up and were dressed in black-gray-brown-colored clothing). The Pakistani women insisted on the fact that the "hijab" should have not an external and ostentatious

nature but be manifested, as they said, "in the views and in the heart." They explained that nowhere is it said in the Koran that the "cover" should be black and that it should cover the people from head to toe, leaving only a "crack" for the eyes. They explained that essentially the "hijab" excludes the possibility of the participation of women in social life, not to mention public production, turning them into prisoners and slaves totally dependent on the whims and arbitrariness of their husbands.

The defenders of the "philosophy of the hijab" tried to argue that this prescription of the shariat does not harm in the least the interests of women. On the contrary, in their view, it "returns to woman her dignity," protecting her from the eyes of men and helping her to protect herself from attempts against her person and all kinds of violence, freeing her from a "consumerist attitude inherent in Western society." The thought of the difference in the roles was persistently promoted: The men must be the "breadwinners" in the family while women must give birth and raise children and take care of the home. The supporters of the "hijab" did not object to the participation of women in public production but stipulated its admissibility only under the mandatory condition that this does not create a hardship for the family or the children.

Zahra Rahmaward, wife of the Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hosein Musavi, was one of the most energetic defenders of the "hijab." We had quite a long talk with her. She became involved in the political struggle since the age of 18. She was fired from her job for participation in anti-Shah teachers' strike and for several years went underground, hiding under different names. For a period of 10 months she had to leave the country. She is a poetess and the author of a number of works, including *"The Meaning of the Hijab to Muslim Women,"* and *"The Blossoming of Muslim Women."*

We learned from our talk with Zahra Rahmaward that the governmental structure of Iran includes a Central Cultural and Social Council for Women. This is an organization with the right to initiate legislation and with a certain executive power. The council consists of 14 members: one representative each from the Ministries of Labor, Culture, Education, Physical Culture, Islamic Orientation, Propaganda, and Health Care, and two representatives each from the parliament, the supreme court, and the council of revolutionary culture. The representatives of each ministry have special committees which evaluate the situation of women in a given area of activities and draft corresponding legislation. According to our interlocutor, in the 10 postrevolutionary years the number of women university students in the country has doubled. Currently they account for one-third of all students in VUZs and 40 percent of students in the medical fields. One-third of all employees in government offices and in the public sector of the economy are women; 80 percent of them work in medicine and culture.

Judging by such statistical data, it cannot be said that the Iranian women are in a state of "domestic slavery." The women, particularly the young, with whom we had the opportunity to talk, did not project an impression of being downtrodden. Inside our hotel room, they would remove their black coat with what seemed to us relief and joy, revealing lively, communicative, educated, and critically thinking personalities.

Unquestionably, one of the indicators of human culture is interest in the outside world and desire to find out what is taking place beyond one's own country and readiness and ability to listen to someone else. We were gratified and even somewhat amazed by the profound, rather than superficial, curiosity of Iranian women. Indicative in this respect was an interview which we gave to the central Tehran press, the leading women's journals, and the radio. Although I have had frequent opportunities to travel abroad and have frequently granted interviews, I do not remember more than two or three cases in which the journalists asked questions not only with such interest but also on a such high intellectual level. In Iran this was the rule. Interviews lasted a full hour or hour and a half and dealt not only with the status of women but also different cultures, religion, and so on. The first interview was published while we were still in Iran, in the most representative national newspaper KEYKHAN. It was published with virtually no deletions, which is rarely the case abroad, and with no distortions whatsoever.

The week we spent in a country previously unfamiliar to us, not to mention the fact that it took place within the framework of limited and essentially preplanned meetings and events, naturally, cannot provide an adequate idea of the political life of a given nation. Nonetheless, I believe that we were able to see and feel a few things, as though lifting slightly the "hijab" which conceals all of Iran from the outside world. My main impression from the trip was that of the lessons and tragedies of the revolution. Yes, that which occurred in 1979 did not mean turning history back. It was a revolution under the banner of which stood those who wanted freedom from the tyranny of the Shah, full national sovereignty and social justice. However, the situation developed in such a way that the banners turned to be green, emphasizing the "Islamic orientation" of the events. Why did the choice fall precisely on Islam? No simple answer to this is possible. It was influenced by the situation under which the totalitarian regime of the Shah had blocked all channels of democratic manifestation of a political opposition. The mosque remained the virtually only place where the feelings of indignation and protest, which had welled up in the country, could be harnessed. A major role was played by the specific nature of Shia, whose clergy, unlike other trends in Islam, is historically predisposed to oppose the worldly powers. The most essential, obviously, was the fact that Islam was a kind of "nationwide" platform which made it possible to rally within a single front the broad population strata while, at

the same time, eliminating social and even ideological differences in the face of the opposition to the regime of the Shah and the imperialist forces which supported it.

In order to understand the Islamic nature of the Iranian revolution one should remember Marx's words: "People make their own history. However, they do not make it as they wish, under circumstances which they did not select but under those which exist, and which are given to them and have come to them from the past. The traditions of all dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the minds of the living. It is precisely when people who are engaged in remaking themselves and their surroundings create something which has not previously existed, it is precisely during such times of revolutionary crises that they resort apprehensively to incantations, asking for the help of the spirits of the past, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and dresses, so that in this ritual, sanctified by antiquity, with this borrowing of the language, to open the new scene in universal history" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 8, p 119).

Unquestionably, any religious teaching, including that of Islam, contains certain principles and concepts of universal human significance. Without a humanistic charge religion could not unfurl the "banners" under which the mass movements of the oppressed have repeatedly acted in the history of mankind. However, religion has also always been used for purposes which objectively contributed to the justification and support of social injustice, the subordination of some nations to others, etc.

Turning to the humanistic potential of religious dogmas could be beneficial. However, in this case it is necessary at least to abandon any claim whatsoever to the exclusive superiority of one religion over another and to accept and respect the right of every person to the freedom of conscience, and to realize the illusory nature, fraught with pernicious consequences, of relying on the possible solution of contemporary problems by adopting the image and similarity of early Christianity, Islam, etc. Even if we acknowledge the existence of a "golden age" of one religious community or another, it is impermissible to assume that the model of a social system several centuries old could become a panacea for all troubles facing the people on the eve of the third millennium.

The hard lessons of the Iranian revolution, combined with the long war with Iraq, are today beginning to be drawn in Iran itself and beyond it. The country is at a crossroads. In the past few months the question has been discussed of legalizing the activities of public organizations and parties. Ayatollah Montazeri, who had been appointed by the Imam Khomeini as his heir, but who resigned by the end of March, had previously issued an open letter in which he disagreed with the mass executions in Iran. Efforts are being made to normalize diplomatic relations and to develop foreign political ties; there is a tendency to drop the slogan of "Death to the USSR" (although, on one occasion, it was voiced in our

presence. However, during the meeting between delegates to the women's congress and the first deputy minister of foreign affairs Besharati, they were told that, taking into consideration the political course taken by the Soviet Union in recent years, Iran should display realism and abandon a confrontation with its great neighbor; 4 million exiles were asked to return to their homeland. Self-critical assessments have been made by some Iranian leaders.

Thus, at the meeting in the holy city of Qom, held on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, Montazeri said: "The slogans which we raised for the past 10 years have led to the fact that we found ourselves in a state of international isolation and that people look at us with pessimism. On a number of occasions we have shown lack of restraint, shouting slogans and frightening the rest of the world.... Social and political errors must become subjects of repentance." He called upon the country's leadership to "compensate for the errors of the past" and undertake the creation of an "open society."

The tragedy of the revolution is the impossibility of "compensating" for the lives of thousands of people who have died. It is possible, however, for those who have remained among the living, to restore their hope, the hope of peace and the revival of Iran in the entire brilliance and variety of its national culture and material and spiritual values.

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Based on the Vienna Mandate

18020012p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6,
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[Article by Vladislav Andreyevich Drobkov, PRAVDA deputy editor in charge of international information]

[Text] It seems like a very recent event, in the second half of January, that the ministers of foreign affairs of the 35 countries participating in the European process approved the final document of the Vienna Meeting and the added mandate of talks on conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Several weeks later, on 9 March, such talks were initiated in Vienna by representatives of the 23 members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. At the same time, talks were started on measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe by all 35 members of the Helsinki Conference. This was preceded by a 3-day meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of European countries, the United States and Canada, also in Vienna.

The Soviet minister presented a specific plan for a 3-step reduction of armed forces in Europe down to the level of sufficiency exclusively for defense purposes. The NATO countries favor the stability of reduced levels of armaments. Despite all the difference between these

approaches, bridges can be built across them. This fact as well should be considered a uniquely propitious omen for the initiated talks. Incidentally, this precisely is the view of many Western observers who commented on the talks initiated in the Austrian capital.

It is gratifying to realize that on the same optimistic note the practical implementation of a broad-scale program of fora, talks and conferences, included in the final document of the Vienna Meeting, was undertaken. The Vienna Mandate, in the full meaning of the term, becomes a mandate for intensifying the building of that same "European home" about which there is so much writing and talking today not only on our continent but also on the other side of the Atlantic. What will be the shape of this "home," and what relations will there exist among its residents? Will it become possible to eliminate from its various floors the already stockpiled armaments and prejudices? The answers to all of these questions will largely depend on the extent to which full use will be made of the favorable prerequisites created in the course of the Vienna Meeting and codified in its final document.

Apparently, this project may turn out to be most difficult in the military-strategic area. It is not only a question of the fact that today Europe looks less like a building site for a common home than like the battlefield of a future war, crowded with fortifications and military hardware. The point is that decades of confrontation have instilled in the minds of the Europeans durable complexes of fear, mistrust, suspicion and the illusion that security and stability can be achieved with a superarmament race. In order to rid the minds of the Europeans, and not theirs alone, of such complexes, we must further get rid of the stereotypes and taboos of the times of the cold war. Let us acknowledge that their effect is felt not only in the West but that we too are influenced by it.

Currently the mail reaching the central press and journals includes a number of letters of concern: Are we not going too far in our concessions? We are making reductions which are significantly greater than those of the United States in medium- and short-range nuclear missiles, eliminating 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft? We are reducing our Armed Forces by 500,000 men and are the first to initiate the destruction of chemical weapons and pull back tactical nuclear systems.

I believe that such fears, which are triggered by the concern shown by the Soviet people for the security of the homeland, are nonetheless worsened by the actual lack of extensive and competent discussion of such important initiatives in the press and the various representative bodies, including the Supreme Soviet. This does not help to surmount lack of understanding and concern. It seems to me that their influence on global public opinion would not be reduced if debates on this subject were to be held in the Supreme Soviet or the USSR Council of Ministers. In any case, the discussion

by the supreme authority of the Soviet-American INF Treaty only emphasized the importance of this document. Clearly, our subsequent reductions in armed forces and armaments will be a topic of discussion by the deputies and the public. We must develop the type of political mechanism which, operating on the firm foundations of the law, can ensure the competent and full discussion and the making of decisions on fundamental foreign political and military-strategic problems and monitor their implementation on a democratic basis.

As to fears that such reductions would affect the defense capability of our homeland are, in my view, groundless although understandable. According to the Soviet specialists, such reductions would cause no harm to the defense capability of the USSR. They would, however, provide a substantial benefit from the political, economic and propaganda viewpoints. Judge for yourselves: independently, without any preconditions or outside pressure, by reducing our military power we eliminate the idea that "one can talk with Moscow only from a position of strength." This also destroys the "image of the enemy," the myth of the "aggressiveness of the Soviets," and other stereotypes which have been cultivated for many years by Western propaganda. We are removing the grounds from under the feet of the supporters of the so-called "competitive strategy," who are trying to impose upon the USSR a ruinous arms race. Finally, we are substantially easing the burden of defense expenditures, which are hindering the development of our own economy, and are acquiring the opportunity of switching additional and substantial human and material resources to its progress. All of this, I repeat, takes place without harming our country's defense capability, based on the concept of sensible sufficiency.

It is no accident that the latest series of Soviet actions and initiatives on real disarmament has caused concern and confusion among the most orthodox supporters of the cold war. As was noted by THE WASHINGTON POST, in an editorial article on the results of the Vienna Meeting, "unfortunately, the West is still far from formulating any serious diplomatic and military program in answer to the reductions suggested by Gorbachev."

For the past few months, so far unsuccessful efforts are being made within NATO to develop a "common concept" and "single answer to Moscow's challenge." Occasionally, this is used as a pretext for refusing to have a specific and fast reaction to Soviet initiatives. The success of the Vienna Meeting, which issued a mandate for talks on conventional armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals seriously weakened this screen. The NATO allies, regardless of whether or not they had a prepared concept, were forced to sit at the conference table and we came to them with a clear and radical program for the reduction of armaments and troops.

Furthermore, the Soviet initiatives in disarmament have created major difficulties for NATO representatives who would like to compensate for the loss of medium-range

missiles by replacing the obsolete Lance tactical systems with new ones, which are even more destructive and far-ranging. According to the foreign press, the concern expressed by NATO generals and diplomats about the actions of the USSR on reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe is explained by the fact that they could weaken Western support for the plans for updating nuclear armaments, supported by the United States and Great Britain, and introduce confusion and differences in the ranks of the North Atlantic Bloc allies.

Let us openly state that the Soviet initiatives are not aimed in the least at "dividing NATO," as some Western observers have claimed. Their purpose is to free Europe from the dangerous legacy of the cold war and, above all, from the piles of superarmaments which are hindering the building of the "European home." Its "construction site" must be maximally cleared.

The socialist countries have already proved their readiness for sensible compromise and constructive unilateral action. In the footsteps of the USSR Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia proclaimed substantial reductions in their armed forces and armaments. Romania had announced the same intention even earlier. It is a question of reducing the size of the armies of the socialist countries, other than the USSR, by more than 56,000 men. On an average their military budgets will be reduced by 13.6 percent. Some 2,000 tanks, 130 airplanes, thousands of guns and mortar and other equipment will be withdrawn. Let me point out yet once again that all of this is being done unilaterally, without formulating any whatsoever requirements to the West. This confirms the aspiration of the socialist states to create a truly safe and humane world based on the principles of common sense, balanced interests and priority of universal human values!

Let us hope that the example set by the socialist states and the far-reaching initiatives and clearly demonstrated good will will meet with a response through the actions of the other side.

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Short Book Reviews

18020012q Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 6, Apr 89 (signed to press 4 Apr 89) pp 126-127

[Text] "*Eticheskaya Mysl. Nauchno-Publitsisticheskiye Chleniya*" [Ethical Thoughts. Scientific-Publicistic Readings]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 394 pp. Reviewed by A. Yakovlev, candidate of philosophical sciences.

This book marks the opening of a series of yearbooks planned by Politizdat. Ethics... In the usual meaning of the term, it is identified with morality, mores and, sometimes, even etiquette. The authors of this collection as well give it this kind of interpretation. The work

includes a great variety of articles and materials, such as "The Psychology of the Good Deed" (I.S. Kon), "Family Values and the Romantic 'Cult of Passion'" (Yu.N. Davydov), "New Thinking and Ethics" (A.A. Guseynov), excerpts from "Lectures on Ethics" by Immanuel Kant, "Philanthropy" by P. Lafargue and others.

Another feature of this book is a strictly philosophical approach to the subject, an approach which has been neglected all too long and is virtually unfamiliar to most people. The reason, obviously, is the rejection of moral sermons as an extensively used instrument of suppression (frequently by individuals who were essentially immoral) of independent views or concepts. It is only now that we obviously have "matured" to the level of the true rather than academic-dissertational interest in philosophical-ethical problems, namely, "eternal" questions of what is good, what are its ways, how to remain internally honest in a situation in which any act could have "evil" consequences. Our culture is asking such questions today of itself or, in any case, is beginning rationally to discuss the ethical foundations of human activities, which should be the basis for the qualitatively new socialist society which will replace the present one.

The command-bureaucratic system was unable to withstand the test of ethics. It was unable to make the people acknowledge the exceptional importance and the "categorical imperativeness" of their orders: "any means are good in pursuit of the great aim" and "that which is useful to victory is moral." The proclaimed "specific" humanism in fact proved to be extremely abstract. Meanwhile, the "eternal questions" rose to their full magnitude in front of our society quite concretely; actually, this was to be expected. Today we could say that a holiday for ethicists has been proclaimed. However, should it be celebrated?

Let us not fall into cheap moralizing on the topic of perestroika about "converting" the former "code" based on slogans and directives.... Let us not convert the universal human principles into "priority" appeals such as the production of "priority" goods....

Despite all the excesses which were committed and which were invented and implemented by morally deaf people, who worshiped the spirit of a barracks way of life, and despite the entire violence committed, our society tried to safeguard, to use a term from Russian philosophical tradition, certain features of "conciliationism." It always kept alive the "community" of spiritually lofty and empathizing citizens who reacted to the misfortunes of others, whether close to them or strangers. Will the society remain the same if spirituality is converted in some kind of fashionable and popular commodity? We should beware of this danger as well. The establishment of a society based on morality presumes, above all, that all of us will begin to think and use our minds in following the hard path of self-knowledge, choice and solution of moral problems. The use of the

mind for such purposes means, precisely, ethics. Therefore, from whatever aspect we may consider it, ethics turns out to be a most basic philosophical discipline of the present.

Let us note that one of the merits of this book is the fact that the discussion of ethical problems is conducted with the use of extensive historical-philosophical material, in the context of global ethical tradition.

Particularly interesting is the section "Our Interviews: On Morality and the Moral Situation in the Country," in which the reader can become acquainted with the views of movie director T.Ye. Abuladze, scientist S.S. Averintsev, philosopher V.S. Bibler and worker V.V. Bulygin.

"Never say 'yes' if your heart says 'no'," writes T.Ye. Abuladze, in quoting a peasant wisdom. This interview reveals the striking fact that sociological studies of perception and understanding of "Repentance," conducted in Leningrad indicated that some young people saw Brezhnev in the character of Varlam.... Therefore, there is something in common between him and Beriia, between "stagnation" and the "cult of personality," if a similarity can be seen between such different personalities. How closely is morality linked to the social system! "There can be no morality where bureaucratism reigns. It is not a question of dignity, for we have still not reached that level, and are only advancing toward it" (p 369).

The feature of contemporary "mores," S.S. Averintsev notes, is the following: "in our life there are goods which seem to belong to all but then, in order to obtain them, one should 'hustle,' and once again see to 'what is necessary,' and speak to 'whoever is necessary,' and, above all, tell that same person that this benefit should be granted precisely to preferably oneself and not to others. Ideally, matters can even be settled without any corruption. However, one must make oneself known, demand and 'extract,' for otherwise nothing can be obtained. Oh, this verb, 'to hustle,'... the reality which is created with such hustling itself turns out futile and barren.... What must a person do if he happens to have a feeling of personal dignity, i.e., a person who opposes such practices with his entire being? Obviously, stand in a corner and wait there for a lifetime. You know, this may happen. It rarely does but it does happen. This does not bring society any good" (pp 272-273).

V.S. Bibler's diagnosis is quite unpleasant but just: "I believe that if we were to define very briefly and strictly our basic moral fault it would be... the shortage or, frequently, the lack of personal dignity" (p 376). Morality is possible but it depends on the free will of man. The following question arises: What kind of society should it be for the people to be able freely to express their will and not feel a lack of feeling of their own dignity, which is one of the conditions for a moral behavior?

The legitimate conclusion concerning the nature of the moral society is provided by V.V. Bulygin: "...The prerogative of the supreme authority should belong to the people. The alienation of the people from the power is, from the very start, a crime. As history proves, despite the brevity of life, dictators have always tried to remain in power 'forever,' which has brought about the suppression of the freedom of thought and action of the people and, therefore, the overall intellect of the people" (p 378).

This book is an important step in surmounting professional ethical moralizing and tiresome refinement of concepts which, unfortunately, have become customary in our philosophical-ethical studies. Let us hope that this vital project will be continued in the subsequent publications in this series.

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After Publication in KOMMUNIST

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[Text] In its issue No 16 for 1988 our journal published the report "Erdenet: Lessons of Joint Enterprises," which described the roundtable held in Mongolia by the personnel of NAMYN AMDRAL, the journal of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, and representatives of KOMMUNIST. The party committees of the MPRP and the CPSU at Erdenet, which actively participated in the preparations for and holding of this meeting, report on the steps taken by the party organizations to improve the work of the combine and to intensify Soviet-Mongolian cooperation.

The letter signed by P. Demchigsuren, MPRP party committee secretary, and CPSU Party Committee Secretary Yu. Soldatov notes that the roundtable helped to highlight a number of problems which have already been solved or else are in the stage of resolution. The conversion of the enterprise to full cost accounting, self-financing and self-support contributed to the broadening of its independence, to the economic efficiency of the work, and to regulating relations in the areas of currency-financial and economic activities. The questions of planning, setting up foreign exchange limits, material and technical supplies and establishing direct relations and relations with construction organizations, price setting, introducing a constant coefficient for accounts, and exporting on the foreign market, which were raised at the roundtable meeting, are being successfully dealt with. In accordance with recently passed legislation, the entire available profit left at the disposal of the enterprise will be taxed at the 30 percent rate, which will be about 70 million tugriks. Furthermore, 15 percent of the foreign exchange earnings from marketing the goods will go into the Mongolian budget. Such withholdings will substantially influence the country's economy and increase the role played by Erdenet in national affairs.

The CPSU and MPRP party committees, the letter further states, together with the administration of the enterprise discussed further ways of improving cooperation. A commission was set up which analyzed the state of the work related to the training of reserve personnel of Mongolian cadres and using them to replace assigned specialists from the USSR. The attention of the administration was drawn also to the fact that the legislative-legal aspect of relations between the enterprise and the ministries and other organizations in the Mongolian People's Republic had not been developed in its entirety. The operating part of the concentration factory needs technical retooling. The task of increasing the production of consumer goods and expanding their variety remains topical. It was also pointed out that the leaders of shops and party organizations are being insufficiently active in upgrading the standards of skill of Mongolian cadres.

The attention of managers of subdivisions was drawn to the need to improve educational work at work and in places of residence. It was recommended to take into consideration the opinion of the labor collective before extending the assignment of Soviet specialists. Problems of developing cost accounting collectives and using brigade forms of labor organization and working on the basis of instructions were reviewed. Specific steps were taken to lift the linguistic barrier at the enterprise and to streamline the use of the members of the families of Soviet specialists holding engineering-technical positions and other jobs.

In conclusion, the letter expresses the confidence that the steps aimed at implementing the critical remarks expressed by the participants in the roundtable will make it possible to upgrade the efficiency of bilateral cooperation.

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Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors

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[Text] A meeting was held with the leading personnel of the management authorities and economic organizations of Moscow Oblast, in the course of which a wide range of problems related to the implementation of the economic reform, the perestroika of the political system and the course of the electoral campaign were discussed.

On KOMMUNIST's invitation, K. Radicz, editor-in-chief of TARSADALMI SZEMLE, theoretical organ of the MSZMP, and editorial secretary K. Ponican are visiting Moscow. The topic of their talk with the editors was problems of the participation of the party journalists in perestroika and in the renovation of various areas of life in the USSR and in Hungary, as well as problems of the further development of cooperation between the two fraternal publications. The Hungarian guests were

received at the CPSU Central Committee International Department and met with Academician V.N. Kudryavsev, USSR Academy of Sciences vice-president.

The editors were visited by Domenico Campana, the Italian literary worker, who is visiting the Soviet Union on the invitation of the USSR Writers' Union. A talk was held on problems of the development of Marxist theory, the political reform and perestroika in the spiritual area.

Per Jonsson, correspondent for the Swedish newspaper DAGENS NICHETER asked questions on the renovation of the political system and sociopsychological aspects of perestroika processes in the Soviet Union.

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